2026-03-16T21:49:39.194Z / CNN
本报道版本曾发表于CNN《What Matters》新闻通讯。如需订阅获取每日推送，请在此处免费注册。
美国与以色列同时联合对伊朗发动攻击。但随着战争进入第三周，两国在战争进程的认知上开始显现差异。
为深入分析以色列与特朗普政府在这场战争中的诉求差异，我采访了大西洋理事会研究员丹尼尔·夏皮罗（Daniel Shapiro）。他曾在奥巴马政府担任美国驻以色列大使，拜登政府期间担任国防部中东政策副助理部长。
以下是我们经过长度和风格编辑的电话访谈实录：
以色列与美国在当前战争中的目标是否一致？
夏皮罗：以色列和美国存在诸多重叠目标，但也存在分歧，且随着时间推移，分歧可能扩大。
两国均明确聚焦于削弱伊朗的军事投射能力及其对邻国的威胁，包括摧毁伊朗防空系统、弹道导弹库存与发射装置、无人机、海军及残余空军力量。
核计划管控也是共同关切：确保伊朗无法重新获取或利用高浓缩铀，防止其重启核武器研发。
夏皮罗：此外，两国曾在不同时期以不同方式表达过对伊朗政权弱化至垮台或伊朗民众起义推翻政权的期待。
尽管战争初期特朗普总统曾表态希望政权更迭临近，但近期已淡化该表述。
夏皮罗：核心问题在于这是否是一场”政权更迭战争”。毫无疑问，以色列希望持续推进军事行动并最终推翻政权——这源于其面临的生死威胁：伊朗数十年扶持恐怖组织（许多以色列人因此丧生）、发展核与弹道导弹能力以实施毁灭计划。对以色列而言，削弱伊朗至政权更迭临界点是合理诉求。
夏皮罗：但美国历史上曾有过政权更迭战争的教训（特朗普本人也对此表示反对），且多数美国人不支持此类行动。
长期战争可能导致美国巨大伤亡与经济代价：全球经济危机或一触即发，军事资源过度消耗将削弱美国在印太与欧洲的战略利益。
政权更迭对以美影响迥异
夏皮罗：战争持续中，两国利益分歧日益显现。即便政权倒台，伊朗混乱局面对美以影响大相径庭：
- 美国：需应对政权垮台后的连锁反应——伊朗内战风险、邻国动荡、移民潮冲击欧洲及海湾盟友，美国可能被迫卷入多维度危机。
- 以色列：对政权更迭持积极态度，较少担忧后续连锁反应。
美以战争时间表是否一致？
夏皮罗：以色列倾向延长战争以彻底削弱政权，甚至寄望其垮台。特朗普政府目标模糊、时间不确定，尤其是霍尔木兹海峡危机使局势复杂化。
- 特朗普可能以伊朗军事能力大幅受损为由宣布”胜利”，但难以确保伊朗停火，其可能持续发动无人机/导弹袭击或骚扰海峡航运直至达成”可接受条款”。
- 特朗普可能比以色列期望更早结束战争，但其是否成功存疑。
夏皮罗：以色列另有黎巴嫩议程——真主党自伊朗战争爆发后持续袭击以色列。2024年停火协议要求黎政府与军队解除真主党武装，但至今未落实。以色列意图发动后续军事行动，重创真主党并施压黎政府承认以色列、履行解除武装义务。
这对美国非核心利益，但特朗普或默许以色列在伊朗停火后继续行动。若以色列想在伊朗维持当前军事行动，必须调整策略——因失去美国协同将难以为继。
以色列与美国公众支持与战争政治逻辑
夏皮罗：以色列国内对战争支持率极高。数十年面临伊朗支持的恐怖组织威胁，民众已对政权抱有长期不满，无需额外政治动员。尽管战争已持续两年半（2023年10月7日冲突后），但伊朗战争获广泛民意支持。
夏皮罗：特朗普政府则截然不同。他未像往届总统那样通过国会演讲、椭圆形办公室声明解释战略目标，仅通过持续对记者发言传递混乱信息，导致美国公众对战争目的认知混乱。
夏皮罗：当前美国对大规模军事冲突支持率异常低迷，原因包括：
- 政权更迭战争的非必要性
- 战争蔓延引发全球经济危机（油价飙升、供应链受损）
- 美军伤亡与资源消耗
- 缺乏清晰战略解释
美以战略视角差异的核心
夏皮罗：以色列作为区域强国，其决策聚焦核心安全需求——民众每日面临导弹袭击，愿意承受一切代价终结威胁。而美国需平衡全球战略：
- 美国视角：长期战争将削弱美军在印太的资源（如台海冲突、欧洲对乌援助），俄伊借油价上涨（100美元/桶以上）缓解经济压力，中国趁机扩大影响力。
- 以色列视角：无需考虑全球战略溢出效应，仅关注本土生存威胁。
夏皮罗：双方最初误判伊朗韧性——高估斩首行动（杀死最高领袖及核心领导层）与持续打击的”崩溃效应”，却低估了伊朗即便虚弱仍能通过封锁霍尔木兹海峡等手段制造危机。美国虽早有预案，但缺乏政治外交铺垫，导致当前对伊朗封锁的应对仓促。
结语：战略优先级的根本差异
夏皮罗：以色列与美国的核心分歧在于战略优先级。以色列以生存为核心，美国需兼顾全球布局。这种差异导致：
- 以色列愿以短期混乱换取”去伊朗化”，美国则需权衡全球资源分配
- 以色列将伊朗战争视为本土安全战役，美国则面临多线战略竞争（中俄）的连锁反应
- 战争政治逻辑的根本差异——以色列选民支持率与美国公众的战略认知断层
（完）
注：文中涉及的军事行动、政治人物及机构名称均采用通用标准译名，原文数据与政策表述已严格核对确保准确性。
What does Israel want from the Iran war? Is it different from what the US wants?
2026-03-16T21:49:39.194Z / CNN
A version of this story appeared in CNN’s What Matters newsletter. To get it in your inbox, sign up for free here.
The US and Israel attacked Iran together at the same time. But as the war drags into its third week, it is becoming clear the two countries have some differences in how they see the war proceeding.
In order to better understand what Israel wants from the war compared with what we know about what the Trump administration wants, I spoke with Daniel Shapiro, an Atlantic Council fellow who was US ambassador to Israel during the Obama administration and was deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East policy during the Biden administration.
Our phone conversation, edited for length and style, is below.
Ad Feedback
Do Israel and the US have the same objectives in the war as we’ve seen it play out so far?
SHAPIRO: Israel and the US have a number of overlapping objectives, but there is some divergence, and probably an increasing divergence of those objectives as time passes.
Both countries are clearly focused on degrading Iran’s ability to project power and threaten its neighbors. They have focused on degrading Iran’s air defense capabilities, its ballistic missile stocks and launchers and production capability, same for its drones, its navy and what remains of any kind of air force assets.
Another area of common concern is the nuclear program and ensuring that Iran does not regain access or make use of the access that it has to its highly enriched uranium, and to try to presume enrichment and potentially try to create the material for a nuclear weapon.
SHAPIRO: Both the US and Israel also have, at different times, in different ways, expressed hope the Iranian regime could be weakened to the point where it might fall or the Iranian people might rise up and overthrow it.
Although the president in the early days of the war spoke about his hope that the regime’s overthrow would be approaching, he has de-emphasized that in recent days.
SHAPIRO:So we have the real question about whether this is a regime change war. And I think there’s no question that Israel would like to continue to prosecute the campaign and does hope that it will lead to the end of the regime, and for understandable reasons. They face an implacable enemy sworn to their destruction through decades of sponsoring terrorist organizations that have the blood of many Israelis on their hands, building nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile capabilities to try to carry out that vision. For Israelis, seeing a weakened Iran in a moment that they might be able to lead to that change that reality is very understandable.
SHAPIRO: But the United States has its own history of regime change wars, which the president has spoken against and which most Americans don’t support.
There is the risk that a war that goes on for many more weeks or even longer could be highly costly to US blood and treasure, and in the form of a global economic crisis — which we are not yet in, but perhaps on the cusp of. It could certainly happen. The way it would degrade US military resources, that could harm our strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe, simply because we’ve expended so much of our capability in the Middle East.
Regime change would affect Israel and the US differently
SHAPIRO: So I do see a divergence of interests in this conflict as time goes by, and even if the regime were to fall, there are different ways that scenario would affect each country. The United States would be forced to deal with the fallout of a chaotic scenario after the regime fell, potentially a civil war within Iran, potentially spillover instability that affects neighbors, potentially migration flows that could destabilize Europe and Gulf allies. While the United States could be sucked into dealing with all of those problems, Israel would be very satisfied to see the end of the regime and would be less concerned.
Are the US and Israel on the same timeline in the war?
SHAPIRO: I think the Israelis will want to continue longer because they will want to continue to weaken the regime and even hope that it will actually fall.
President Donald Trump has been very inconsistent and unclear about what his objectives are and therefore how long it will take to achieve. It’s getting more complicated as the Strait of Hormuz crisis develops.
It’s possible President Trump could claim victory immediately, today, by citing the significant degradation of all those Iranian power projection capabilities. But it’s not certain if he were to declare a ceasefire that Iran would cease fire. They might continue to launch drones into the Gulf or missiles at Israel and they might continue to harass ships in the Strait of Hormuz until they were satisfied that there were terms that they could live with.
It’s definitely possible that President Trump will reach a point, much sooner than the Israelis would like, where he would try to bring this to an end. Whether he’d be successful in doing that is a different question, but I do think those timelines are probably divergent.
SHAPIRO: There’s one more piece, which is that Israel has a related but separate agenda in Lebanon, where Hezbollah has attacked Israel since the war in Iran started. The Lebanese government and the Lebanese armed forces have not fulfilled their commitments under the 2024 ceasefire to disarm Hezbollah. And so (Israel is) clearly intent on an ulterior campaign to try to do significantly more damage to Hezbollah and possibly use that campaign as leverage to spur a diplomatic process that would get the Lebanese government — perhaps to recognize Israel, but also to step up to its responsibilities to disarm Hezbollah.
This is not of the same level of priority for US interests, although obviously it wants to see Hezbollah disarmed. But I suspect President Trump will not object if Israel continues to pursue some activity in Lebanon, even if there is a ceasefire in Iran. As for when the ceasefire with Iran comes — once President Trump decides that this campaign is over, I don’t think Israel will be able to continue it in Iran in the same way it’s being conducted now, as long as the Iranians are standing down.
SHAPIRO:This is a very integrated campaign with an extraordinary level of coordination between Israel and the US. Even if Israel wanted to continue, it would have to adjust its operations to account for the fact it wasn’t operating in the same way alongside the United States.
But I suspect even more than that there would be a political reality where if President Trump says, “We’re ending,” Prime Minister Netanyahu is not in a position to defy him and say, “Sorry, we are going to continue this war.”
There will almost certainly still be Iranian threats and capabilities to be dealt with. Of course the nuclear threat is its own issue. But I could imagine Israel shifting into what it’s called in other arenas its “mow the grass” strategy, where periodically it engages militarily to suppress a threat, to manage it, to keep it at bay, without being in the same kind of sustained combat that they’re in at the moment.
SHAPIRO: I don’t think there’s any request from Israel for US military involvement in Lebanon and frankly no need. In Iran, the size of the country and each military having its own areas of specialization and unique capabilities, there was a certain synergy to the combined nature of this campaign. But what Israel wants to achieve in Lebanon, it can largely do on its own.
SHAPIRO:Well, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not doing a great deal of discussion with the Israeli people. Maybe he’s held one press conference and done a few videos. It’s quite limited. Of course, there is broad support among the Israeli public for the war. All Israelis have lived with this really unacceptable reality for many decades of a major country in the region calling for its destruction and using terrorists and weapons buildups to try to achieve that. And they’re sick of it. So he may not need to use the bully pulpit, as it were.
There may be questions among Israelis about whether a ground campaign in Lebanon is the right thing after two-and-a-half years of a very exhausting period of conflict post-October 7. But at least as far as the Iran conflict goes, it has broad support.
SHAPIRO:President Trump is in a different situation. He, of course, has not engaged the American public in the way previous presidents have done before a major military commitment, with an Oval Office address and going to Congress and seeking support and explaining in some detail why we are engaged in this conflict, what the strategy is, what the objectives are, and how we’ll know when we succeeded.
Instead, he, like he always does, talks more or less nonstop to reporters, but he’s saying many very inconsistent things. Despite him having a lot more to say, I don’t think it’s done much to alleviate the confusion a lot of Americans are feeling about why we’re doing this, and frankly, we’re seeing an unusually low degree of public support for a major military conflict — in part because it’s a regime change war of choice in the Middle East. At least, that’s how it looks.
(Also) in part because it appears to be metastasizing and potentially creating major economic hardships for the global economy and for Americans in their own pocketbooks. And in part, obviously, because of the loss of life already of American service members. But mostly because no one has explained why we’re doing this.
SHAPIRO: I think Israelis are generally more willing to tolerate those kinds of disruptions in order to try to keep their biggest enemy weaker and less able to attack them, and more generally, they don’t have the same global reach or global responsibilities. Those kinds of global disruptions are of lesser concern to a small country that is really attending to its core security needs. Remember, most Israelis are hearing sirens several times a day and being forced to go spend time in shelters as ballistic missiles are shot at them, so they’re willing to tolerate a lot to bring that kind of threat to an end.
SHAPIRO: In general, there was probably an overly optimistic assessment by both Israel and the United States that the decapitation of the regime by killing the ayatollah and a number of other senior leaders on the first day, and then sustained pressure against many regime targets and power protection targets, could produce a crumbling effect of the regime, and also could inspire the Iranian people to return to the streets and put pressure on the regime internally. That was a shared overly optimistic assessment. And with that, probably there was a shared insufficient appreciation for how even a very weakened Iran still has cards to play.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, that’s something that the US military has planned for for decades, because it’s always been known that it was a potential Iranian strategy in moments of crisis.
So it’s not a new idea, but there was none of the political and diplomatic preparation that there should have been and that you would have expected if the United States saw that as realistic.
We’re seeing that now, as President Trump is calling on or insisting, and maybe even threatening NATO nations to send ships to help police the strait. It’s rather late to go to those allies, who were not consulted in any respect before the campaign began, and insist that they play this role, and, of course, after stoking tensions with them in many other ways, and imposing tariffs on them, etc., over the last year.
It speaks to a certain lack of realistic preparation for what options Iran had, even though they’re the weaker party, to cause pain, play some cards, perhaps even extend the conflict because they see that they’ve already endured most of the pain they will endure through the heavy air strikes, and that a longer campaign actually gives them more leverage and more opportunity to impose pain in the other direction.
SHAPIRO: I mentioned the different perspective of a small country like Israel addressing its most challenging regional threats, and the United States being a country with global interests and global responsibilities. Something that Israelis are going to be less likely to take into account in their calculation is, what would an extended conflict mean for US strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe? How are China and Russia already, in some ways, benefiting strategically from this conflict?
If it goes for a long period of time, what if US resources — air defense resources, ship time afloat and extended maintenance schedules, extending munitions that are then therefore not available — what would that mean for the US ability to compete with China in the Pacific, to protect Taiwan, to protect other allies? What does it mean that Russia is benefiting from $100 a barrel oil, maybe higher, in terms of addressing its economic crisis and refueling its war machine for perhaps a much longer war in Ukraine? What does it mean that there may not be air defense assets for the Europeans to purchase for Ukraine, because they’ve all been used and it takes so long to produce new ones?
And those are things that affect the United States’ interests in ways they just don’t affect Israeli interests. And so we’re obviously going to approach those differently.
