2026-06-17T16:18:24.304Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/politics/how-to-read-us-iran-agreement-mcgurk-analysis
- 布雷特·麦古克写道，美伊协议草案包含华盛顿作出的重大承诺。
- 这份谅解备忘录（MOU）的实际核心内容是，伊朗眼下将获得大量好处，包括数百亿美元，作为交换，伊朗不会向霍尔木兹海峡的船只开火。
- 该协议分为两个阶段：第一阶段现已启动，第二阶段的所有内容将在未来60天内通过谈判达成的“最终协议”中解决。
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布雷特·麦古克是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登任内担任高级国家安全职位。
如今CNN获取了美伊协议草案的完整文本，我们可以开始更公允地评估其利弊。当然，在白宫正式公布文本之前，CNN拿到的内容可能并非最终版本，或会有所调整。但我们目前掌握的信息已足够评估协议条款，我将尽力作出解读。
从我们目前看到的文本来看，美国作出了巨大让步，却几乎没有获得对等回报。我曾参与过艰难的伊朗问题协议谈判，这份文件格外引人注目，它为伊朗提供了其过去多次要求却极少得到的大部分条件。
特朗普似乎认定，达成一项协议——任何协议——都比维持现状更好。就伊朗而言，它实际上将霍尔木兹海峡作为人质，要求美国满足其要价。这一策略似乎取得了成功。
这份谅解备忘录的实际核心内容是，伊朗眼下将获得大量好处，包括数百亿美元，作为交换，伊朗不会向霍尔木兹海峡的船只开火。
解读协议文本
根据CNN获取的草案副本，协议的全部14个条款可在此处查阅。要理解其运作方式，我们需要区分签署后立即生效的内容和未来预期的安排。可以将本协议分为两个阶段：第一阶段现已启动，第二阶段的所有内容将在未来60天内通过谈判达成的“最终协议”中解决。这60天的谈判期经双方同意可延长。
与许多与伊朗达成的协议一样，这份文本有点像拼图游戏，有些条款相互引用——一些条款着眼于未来，而另一些则立即生效。
要了解当前必须落实的内容，请参阅第13条。该条款规定，签署后立即启动谅解备忘录的第4、5、10和11条。因此，这些是立即适用的条款，必须在第二阶段谈判开始前生效。
我们来逐一解读：
第4条和第5条（霍尔木兹海峡）： 根据这两条，美国解除海军封锁，伊朗移除水雷等障碍，确保霍尔木兹海峡的航运在未来30天内恢复至战前水平。如果协议仅止于此，对美国和全球经济而言都是一项利好协议，因为它解决了海峡的核心问题，两国均同意恢复战前船舶通行。
但协议并未止步于此。事实上，这就是伊朗义务的终点，也是美国义务的起点。
第10条（制裁豁免）： 根据本条，美国“在签署后立即……将发布豁免令，允许伊朗原油、石化产品及其衍生品，以及所有相关服务，包括银行、保险、运输等的出口”。
这是一项重大让步。表面上看，这让伊朗恢复至奥巴马时期核协议（JCPOA）下的状态，能够以市场价格无限量出口石油和石化产品。一些能源专家已经评估，仅这一条就能每年为伊朗直接带来600亿至700亿美元的收入。
这意味着，伊朗只需恢复战前就已畅通的霍尔木兹海峡通航，就能获得600亿至700亿美元的收益。
第11条（冻结资产）： 本条较为复杂，可谓拼图中的拼图。它规定：“美国承诺……伊朗伊斯兰共和国的冻结或受限资金和资产将被解冻并完全可用。”在该省略号内部，文本写道“根据朝着最终协议的谈判进展情况”。
这可能被解读为，解冻资金的前提是伊朗在60天的永久协议谈判中履行义务。但请回顾第13条：除非落实有关冻结资产的本条规定，否则60天的谈判无法启动。因此，冻结资产必须以某种形式立即处理，甚至可能早于伊朗落实海峡通航的义务。
同样重要的是，本条规定伊朗央行可以决定解冻资金的受益人。这与其他伊朗协议截然不同——比如2023年的人质换俘协议，当时这些资金只能用于非制裁用途（如人道主义物资）。尽管措辞可能会调整，但我不记得除JCPOA之外，有任何协议仅根据伊朗指定的受益人就解冻其冻结资产。
伊朗是否为这些让步向美国作出了任何长期新承诺？从我们掌握的文本来看，似乎没有。
第8条（核武器）： 根据CNN获取的文本，伊朗“重申其永远不会生产核武器”。
特朗普将本条吹捧为某种能阻止伊朗永远拥有核武器的条款。但奥巴马时期的JCPOA文本措辞更为强硬：“伊朗重申，在任何情况下，伊朗都绝不会寻求、发展或获取核武器。”这不是政治观点，而是事实。有关核武器的表述并非新内容，实际上比特朗普在第一任期内废除的协议中的条款还要薄弱。
公平地说，特朗普政府已经重创了伊朗的核计划，而本谅解备忘录确保了在60天谈判期间维持现状。伊朗目前无法突破核门槛，其初始核状态远比奥巴马时期更糟。
但就目前的文本而言，谅解备忘录并未规划出达成更广泛、永久协议的路径。相反，由于伊朗在一开始就获得了救济，这反而让达成永久协议的道路更加艰难。
至于核材料和核计划本身，这些问题“将在最终协议中得到充分处理”。换言之，伊朗在这些问题上没有作出任何承诺。
第9条（重建基金）： 这就是备受讨论的3000亿美元伊朗重建基金。谅解备忘录并未立即设立该基金，但它要求美国“与其地区伙伴一起，制定双方同意的全面计划，用于伊朗伊斯兰共和国的重建和经济发展，并确保至少提供3000亿美元的融资”。
该计划需“在60天内制定完成”，并将成为与伊朗最终协议的一部分。
我们要明确这意味着什么：没有3000亿美元重建基金，就不存在“最终协议”。伊朗不会同意任何核承诺或其他条款，除非该基金成为现实。他们肯定会这样解读第8条，而第8条也确实如此规定。没有该基金，就没有协议。
第7条（全面制裁）： 这可能是最重要的条款，也将让长期谈判变得极为困难。它规定：“美国承诺将按照最终协议中商定的时间表，终止目前针对伊朗伊斯兰共和国的所有类型制裁。”随后它列出了联合国安理会制裁、国际原子能机构（IAEA）决议，以及“所有单边美国制裁，包括一级制裁和二级制裁”。
德黑兰会按字面意思解读本条：美国已承诺在核计划“最终协议”框架内，解除伊朗所有与恐怖主义、导弹、人权、无人机、武器扩散等相关的制裁——强调“所有”制裁。这超出了美国过去任何时候的作为或承诺。要为美国的这一举措正名，伊朗想必需要放弃对恐怖组织的支持，并彻底改变伊斯兰共和国的性质。很难想象美国仅为换取伊朗在核问题上的让步就解除所有制裁。但就目前的文本而言，谅解备忘录仅设想达成一项核问题最终协议。
文本中完全没有提及伊朗对恐怖组织的支持、对本国人民的人权侵犯、暗杀美国人的阴谋、其导弹和无人机计划，或是其在中东各地的代理人武装。
至于国际原子能机构，伊朗想要的是一份干净的核查报告，尽管其此前已知的武器化工作是事实。这一点不应被纳入谈判范围。伊朗曾有过武器计划，人人都知道这一点。伊朗尚未承认这一点。在其承认之前，不可能有干净的核查报告。
最后，谅解备忘录声称要“在所有战线立即永久结束战争，包括黎巴嫩”，并承诺美国和伊朗不会使用武力或威胁使用武力对付彼此。
特朗普可能已经违反了这一条款：在法国G7峰会上，他当天谈及伊朗及其未来行为时称：“如果我不满意，我们就回到向他们开枪的老路，直接把炸弹扔在他们脑袋中间。”
无论如何，在文件中宣称结束中东地区的战争，却没有要求伊朗停止支持那些在中东（包括黎巴嫩真主党）煽动战争的恐怖组织，实际上收效甚微。只要真主党在黎巴嫩集结并向以色列开火，以色列就会反击自卫。结束黎巴嫩战争的途径在于以色列和黎巴嫩，而非德黑兰。
至于伊朗人民，美国现已承诺不干涉伊朗内政，伊朗会将此解读为，不会再因侵犯人权或应对街头杀害无辜伊朗人事件实施制裁。伊朗会喜欢这一条款，而这一切都无需伊朗作出任何回报，该条款载于第2条。
根据这份文本以及我们对伊朗47年来的谈判策略和其在中东乃至全球的行为的了解，美国不太可能成功地从这份一边倒的谅解备忘录，过渡到一项涵盖核计划或其他领域的全面协议。
美国似乎已经放弃了大部分谈判筹码，只是换来了霍尔木兹海峡的通航。随着谈判陷入拖延或僵局，谅解备忘录声称要建立的和平可能无法持久。
How to read the US-Iran draft agreement: Big commitments from Washington, not from Tehran
2026-06-17T16:18:24.304Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/politics/how-to-read-us-iran-agreement-mcgurk-analysis
- The draft US-Iran agreement includes big commitments from Washington, Brett McGurk writes.
- The essence of this memorandum of understanding (MOU) in practice is that Iran gets a lot now, including tens of billions of dollars, in exchange for not shooting at ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
- The agreement has two phases: Phase 1 gets underway now and phase 2 kicks everything else to be resolved in a “final agreement” to be negotiated over the next 60 days.
AI-generated summary was reviewed by a CNN editor.
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
Now that CNN has received a full text of the draft agreement between the US and Iran, we can begin to more fairly assess its merits. Of course, before the White House officially releases the text, what CNN received may not be final or could change. But we now know enough to assess the terms, and I’ll try my best to do so.
From the text we have now seen, it’s remarkable how much the United States is offering for little in return. I’ve negotiated difficult agreements with Iran and this document stands out in providing Iran much of what it’s demanded in the past — and rarely gotten.
Trump appears to have determined that a deal — any deal — was a better alternative to the status quo. For its part, Iran effectively held the Strait of Hormuz hostage and demanded that the US meet its price. The tactic appears to have succeeded.
The essence of this memorandum of understanding (MOU) in practice is that Iran gets a lot now, including tens of billions of dollars, in exchange for not shooting at ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
Understanding the text
According to a draft copy obtained by CNN, the full 14 points of the agreement can be read here. To understand how it works, we need to break out what happens immediately upon signing (now) and what is anticipated in the future. Think of the agreement as two phases. Phase 1 gets underway now and phase 2 kicks everything else to be resolved in a “final agreement” to be negotiated over the next 60 days. That 60-day period can be extended by mutual consent.
Like many deals with Iran, this text is a bit of a jigsaw puzzle with some articles referencing others — and some provisions focused on the future whereas others apply immediately.
To unlock what must happen now, go to Article 13. It states that immediately upon signing, “Articles 4, 5, 10 and 11” of the MOU must be underway. So those are the articles that apply right now, and must be in effect before phase 2 talks even begin.
Let’s review them:
Article 4 and 5 (Strait of Hormuz): Under these two articles, the United States lifts its naval blockade and Iran removes obstacles (such as mines) to ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within the next 30 days. If the agreement stopped here, it’s a good one for the US and the global economy as it solves the core problem of the strait with both countries agreeing to allow ships to transfer at pre-war levels.
But the agreement does not stop there. In fact, this is where Iranian obligations end and American obligations begin.
Article 10 (sanctions waiver):Under this article, the United States “immediately after the signing … will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.”
This a significant concession. On its face, it returns Iran to the status it enjoyed under the Obama-era nuclear deal (the JCPOA) with unlimited oil and petrochemical sales at market prices. Some energy experts have already assessed that this article alone would deliver $60-$70 billion a year directly to Iran.
That’s $60-$70 billion for doing nothing other than opening the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war.
Article 11 (frozen funds):This article is tricky, a jigsaw-within-the-jigsaw. It says: “The United States undertakes that … frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available.” Inside that ellipse, the text reads “in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement.”
That might be read to caveat the release of funds in exchange for Iran’s performance in the 60-day talks towards a more permanent deal. But recall Article 13: those 60-day talks do not begin without “implementation” of this article on frozen funds. Thus, the frozen funds must be dealt with in some form now and perhaps even before Iran is required to meet its requirements in the strait.
Also significant, this article states that Iran’s central bank can determine the beneficiary of the funds once released. That is entirely different from other deals with Iran — such as a hostage deal in 2023 — that made these funds available solely for non-sanctioned beneficiaries (such as humanitarian goods). While the language could certainly change, I do not recall any deals separate from the JCPOA that simply released Iran’s frozen assets for any beneficiary as designated by Iran.
Has Iran made any new commitments to the United States over the longer term in exchange for these concessions? From the text we have, it does not appear so.
Article 8 (nuclear weapons):According to the text received by CNN, Iran “reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons.”
Trump is touting this article as somehow preventing Iran from ever having a nuclear weapon. But the Obama-era JCPOA text was stronger: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.” This is not a political point. It’s a fact. The language on nuclear weapons is not new, and it’s actually weaker than what the United States had in the deal that Trump abandoned during his first term.
To be fair, the Trump administration has destroyed much of Iran’s nuclear program, and the MOU ensures the status quo during the 60-day talks. Iran is not in position to breakout to a bomb, and its starting position is far worse than during the Obama-era.
But the MOU as currently written does not map out the path to a broader and more permanent deal. Instead, it makes such a path more difficult given the relief provided to Iran at the outset.
As for the nuclear material and the nuclear program itself, those “will be adequately addressed in a final agreement.” In other words, Iran has made no commitments on these issues whatsoever.
Article 9 (reconstruction fund):This is the much discussed $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran. The MOU does not establish such a fund right away, but it does require the United States “together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while ensuring financing of at least $300 billion.”
This plan is to be “formulated within 60 days” and would be a part of a final agreement with Iran.
Let’s be clear what this means: There is no “final agreement” without a $300 billion reconstruction fund. Iran will not agree to nuclear commitments or anything else unless this fund is a reality. That is surely how they read Article 8, and it’s what Article 8 says. No deal without the fund.
Article 7 (all sanctions):This is perhaps the most important article, and it will make negotiating a longer-term deal quite difficult. It states: “The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran.” It then goes on to list UN Security Council Sanctions, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions, and “all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.”
Tehran will read this for what it says: the United States has committed to lifting all (emphasize “all”) sanctions on Iran — for terrorism, missiles, human rights, drones, proliferation of weapons, etc. — as part of a “final agreement” on the nuclear program. That goes beyond anything the US has ever done or offered in the past. To justify such a move from the United States, Iran would presumably need to foreswear its support for terrorism and change the entire character of the Islamic Republic. It’s hard to imagine the United States lifting all sanctions solely in exchange for nuclear steps. But the MOU as currently written only envisions a final nuclear deal.
There is nothing whatsoever in this text about Iran’s support for terrorism groups, human rights abuses against its own people, plots to assassinate Americans, its missile and drone program or its proxies across the Middle East region.
As for the IAEA, what Iran is talking about there is a clean bill of health despite its known prior weaponization work. That should not be on the table. Iran had a weapons program. Everyone knows it. Iran has not acknowledged it. Until it does so, there is no clean bill of health.
Finally, the MOU purports to establish “an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon” and commits the United States and Iran from using force — or threatening force — against each other.
Trump may have already violated this provision when, at the G7 summit in France, he said today of Iran and future behavior: “If I don’t like it, we’ll back to shooting at them, dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their heads.”
In any case, stating on paper that a war ends across the Middle East without any commitments from Iran to stop supporting the terrorist groups that foment war across the Middle East (including Hezbollah in Lebanon) does little in fact. So long as Hezbollah is massed in Lebanon and shooting at Israel, Israel will shoot back to defend itself. The path to ending the war in Lebanon runs through Israel and Lebanon, not through Tehran.
As for the Iranian people, the United States has now committed to non-interference in Iran’s affairs, which Iran will read to mean no further sanctions for human rights abusers or those responsible for killing innocent Iranians in the streets. Iran will like that provision. It’s stated in Article 2, for nothing in return from Iran.
Based on this text and what we know about Iran’s negotiating strategy as well as its behaviors across the Middle East and globally over 47-years, it’s unlikely the United States will succeed in moving from this one-sided MOU to a comprehensive deal on the nuclear program or anything else.
The United States appears to have given away much of its leverage in exchange for opening the Strait of Hormuz. And as those talks drag on or deadlock, the peace the MOU purports to establish may not last.