如何解读美伊协议草案：华盛顿作出重大承诺，德黑兰则不然

How to read the US-Iran draft agreement: Big commitments from Washington, not from Tehran

2026-06-17T16:18:24.304Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/17/politics/how-to-read-us-iran-agreement-mcgurk-analysis

• The draft US-Iran agreement includes big commitments from Washington, Brett McGurk writes.
• The essence of this memorandum of understanding (MOU) in practice is that Iran gets a lot now, including tens of billions of dollars, in exchange for not shooting at ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
• The agreement has two phases: Phase 1 gets underway now and phase 2 kicks everything else to be resolved in a “final agreement” to be negotiated over the next 60 days.

AI-generated summary was reviewed by a CNN editor.

Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.

Now that CNN has received a full text of the draft agreement between the US and Iran, we can begin to more fairly assess its merits. Of course, before the White House officially releases the text, what CNN received may not be final or could change. But we now know enough to assess the terms, and I’ll try my best to do so.

From the text we have now seen, it’s remarkable how much the United States is offering for little in return. I’ve negotiated difficult agreements with Iran and this document stands out in providing Iran much of what it’s demanded in the past — and rarely gotten.

Trump appears to have determined that a deal — any deal — was a better alternative to the status quo. For its part, Iran effectively held the Strait of Hormuz hostage and demanded that the US meet its price. The tactic appears to have succeeded.

The essence of this memorandum of understanding (MOU) in practice is that Iran gets a lot now, including tens of billions of dollars, in exchange for not shooting at ships in the Strait of Hormuz.

Understanding the text

According to a draft copy obtained by CNN, the full 14 points of the agreement can be read here. To understand how it works, we need to break out what happens immediately upon signing (now) and what is anticipated in the future. Think of the agreement as two phases. Phase 1 gets underway now and phase 2 kicks everything else to be resolved in a “final agreement” to be negotiated over the next 60 days. That 60-day period can be extended by mutual consent.

Like many deals with Iran, this text is a bit of a jigsaw puzzle with some articles referencing others — and some provisions focused on the future whereas others apply immediately.

To unlock what must happen now, go to Article 13. It states that immediately upon signing, “Articles 4, 5, 10 and 11” of the MOU must be underway. So those are the articles that apply right now, and must be in effect before phase 2 talks even begin.

Let’s review them:

Article 4 and 5 (Strait of Hormuz): Under these two articles, the United States lifts its naval blockade and Iran removes obstacles (such as mines) to ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within the next 30 days. If the agreement stopped here, it’s a good one for the US and the global economy as it solves the core problem of the strait with both countries agreeing to allow ships to transfer at pre-war levels.

But the agreement does not stop there. In fact, this is where Iranian obligations end and American obligations begin.

Article 10 (sanctions waiver):Under this article, the United States “immediately after the signing … will issue waivers for exports of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products and their derivatives, and all related services, including banking, insurance, transportation, and the like.”

This a significant concession. On its face, it returns Iran to the status it enjoyed under the Obama-era nuclear deal (the JCPOA) with unlimited oil and petrochemical sales at market prices. Some energy experts have already assessed that this article alone would deliver $60-$70 billion a year directly to Iran.

That’s $60-$70 billion for doing nothing other than opening the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war.

Article 11 (frozen funds):This article is tricky, a jigsaw-within-the-jigsaw. It says: “The United States undertakes that … frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be released and made fully available.” Inside that ellipse, the text reads “in light of the progress of negotiations towards a final agreement.”

That might be read to caveat the release of funds in exchange for Iran’s performance in the 60-day talks towards a more permanent deal. But recall Article 13: those 60-day talks do not begin without “implementation” of this article on frozen funds. Thus, the frozen funds must be dealt with in some form now and perhaps even before Iran is required to meet its requirements in the strait.

Also significant, this article states that Iran’s central bank can determine the beneficiary of the funds once released. That is entirely different from other deals with Iran — such as a hostage deal in 2023 — that made these funds available solely for non-sanctioned beneficiaries (such as humanitarian goods). While the language could certainly change, I do not recall any deals separate from the JCPOA that simply released Iran’s frozen assets for any beneficiary as designated by Iran.

Has Iran made any new commitments to the United States over the longer term in exchange for these concessions? From the text we have, it does not appear so.

Article 8 (nuclear weapons):According to the text received by CNN, Iran “reiterates that it will never produce nuclear weapons.”

Trump is touting this article as somehow preventing Iran from ever having a nuclear weapon. But the Obama-era JCPOA text was stronger: “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons.” This is not a political point. It’s a fact. The language on nuclear weapons is not new, and it’s actually weaker than what the United States had in the deal that Trump abandoned during his first term.

To be fair, the Trump administration has destroyed much of Iran’s nuclear program, and the MOU ensures the status quo during the 60-day talks. Iran is not in position to breakout to a bomb, and its starting position is far worse than during the Obama-era.

But the MOU as currently written does not map out the path to a broader and more permanent deal. Instead, it makes such a path more difficult given the relief provided to Iran at the outset.

As for the nuclear material and the nuclear program itself, those “will be adequately addressed in a final agreement.” In other words, Iran has made no commitments on these issues whatsoever.

Article 9 (reconstruction fund):This is the much discussed $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran. The MOU does not establish such a fund right away, but it does require the United States “together with its regional partners, to create a comprehensive plan agreed upon by both parties for the rehabilitation and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while ensuring financing of at least $300 billion.”

This plan is to be “formulated within 60 days” and would be a part of a final agreement with Iran.

Let’s be clear what this means: There is no “final agreement” without a $300 billion reconstruction fund. Iran will not agree to nuclear commitments or anything else unless this fund is a reality. That is surely how they read Article 8, and it’s what Article 8 says. No deal without the fund.

Article 7 (all sanctions):This is perhaps the most important article, and it will make negotiating a longer-term deal quite difficult. It states: “The United States commits to ending, on a schedule to be agreed upon as part of the final agreement, all types of sanctions currently facing the Islamic Republic of Iran.” It then goes on to list UN Security Council Sanctions, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions, and “all unilateral U.S. sanctions, both primary and secondary.”

Tehran will read this for what it says: the United States has committed to lifting all (emphasize “all”) sanctions on Iran — for terrorism, missiles, human rights, drones, proliferation of weapons, etc. — as part of a “final agreement” on the nuclear program. That goes beyond anything the US has ever done or offered in the past. To justify such a move from the United States, Iran would presumably need to foreswear its support for terrorism and change the entire character of the Islamic Republic. It’s hard to imagine the United States lifting all sanctions solely in exchange for nuclear steps. But the MOU as currently written only envisions a final nuclear deal.

There is nothing whatsoever in this text about Iran’s support for terrorism groups, human rights abuses against its own people, plots to assassinate Americans, its missile and drone program or its proxies across the Middle East region.

As for the IAEA, what Iran is talking about there is a clean bill of health despite its known prior weaponization work. That should not be on the table. Iran had a weapons program. Everyone knows it. Iran has not acknowledged it. Until it does so, there is no clean bill of health.

Finally, the MOU purports to establish “an immediate and permanent end to the war on all fronts, including Lebanon” and commits the United States and Iran from using force — or threatening force — against each other.

Trump may have already violated this provision when, at the G7 summit in France, he said today of Iran and future behavior: “If I don’t like it, we’ll back to shooting at them, dropping bombs right smack in the middle of their heads.”

In any case, stating on paper that a war ends across the Middle East without any commitments from Iran to stop supporting the terrorist groups that foment war across the Middle East (including Hezbollah in Lebanon) does little in fact. So long as Hezbollah is massed in Lebanon and shooting at Israel, Israel will shoot back to defend itself. The path to ending the war in Lebanon runs through Israel and Lebanon, not through Tehran.

As for the Iranian people, the United States has now committed to non-interference in Iran’s affairs, which Iran will read to mean no further sanctions for human rights abusers or those responsible for killing innocent Iranians in the streets. Iran will like that provision. It’s stated in Article 2, for nothing in return from Iran.

Based on this text and what we know about Iran’s negotiating strategy as well as its behaviors across the Middle East and globally over 47-years, it’s unlikely the United States will succeed in moving from this one-sided MOU to a comprehensive deal on the nuclear program or anything else.

The United States appears to have given away much of its leverage in exchange for opening the Strait of Hormuz. And as those talks drag on or deadlock, the peace the MOU purports to establish may not last.