3小时前 发布于2026年3月17日，美国东部时间上午12:00 / 分析文章 布雷特·H·麦格克
Brett McGurk是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登总统任内担任高级国家安全职务。
伊朗危机的前两周已展现出美国和以色列的军事主导地位，以及伊朗的非对称回应。未来几周局势的发展将决定最终结果。容我解释。
在军事冲突中，存在三种升级类型：
- 垂直升级是直接的，军事目标针对军事目标。在此方面，美国和以色列保持着升级优势。伊朗继续试图打击美国军事设施和以色列，但效果逐渐减弱。
- 水平升级试图扩大冲突——伊朗对海湾邻国、约旦、土耳其和阿塞拜疆发动攻击。德黑兰的目标是让这些国家向华盛顿施压，在军事行动结束前停止战争。到目前为止，其努力均告失败。遭受攻击的国家已联合起来，坚决反抗伊朗。
- 非对称升级试图改变游戏规则——例如恐怖主义、网络攻击或经济破坏。这是伊朗拥有杠杆作用的领域。伊朗利用地理优势关闭了霍尔木兹海峡这一世界能源动脉。海峡关闭时间越长，对华盛顿的压力就越大。伊朗希望并相信唐纳德·特朗普总统会在军事行动达到顶点前结束这场“战役”。
应对非对称升级的最佳方式是志同道合的国家结成联盟，但正如特朗普目前发现的那样，说起来容易做起来难。
联盟建立入门知识
我曾协助建立大小不一的联盟以应对安全挑战。2014年至2018年，我担任奥巴马和特朗普总统的特使，协助组建了一个最终扩大到近80个国家的联盟，以打击恐怖组织“伊斯兰国”（ISIS）。该联盟不仅在军事上合作，还通过国际制裁和新法规在全球范围内行动，阻止恐怖分子越境或乘坐飞机旅行。这个联盟取得了成功，至今仍在运作。
2023年和2024年，我协助建立了一支海军联盟，以保护红海的一个狭窄通道——曼德海峡（“眼泪之门”）。由于伊朗支持的胡塞武装向军舰和货船发射导弹和无人机，该海峡一度关闭。最终，这个联盟扩大到近20个国家。联盟由美军领导，但包括英国和丹麦在内的其他国家击落了导弹和无人机，并支持美军行动。
红海联盟或许能为霍尔木兹海峡提供借鉴。如果伊朗唆使胡塞武装在红海重新发动恐怖主义行动，这个联盟也可能被重新启用。
建立联盟需要以下条件：
法律基础
军事联盟实际上是各国做出的一系列法律和政治决定。大多数国家，包括长期以来的美国盟友，在向海外部署军事力量（尤其是可能涉及使用武力时）前，都有自己的法律和标准需要克服。对美国而言，这需要耐心，并与各国政府合作，帮助它们建立必要的外交和法律依据，以确保各国参与。
这通常始于联合国。针对ISIS，伊拉克政府援引《联合国宪章》第五十一条，请求对该恐怖组织进行集体自卫。根据国际法，这足以让大多数北约盟友提供援助。针对胡塞武装，联合国安理会在2024年初通过决议，谴责红海袭击，并确认国际水域的航行自由这一国际权利。同样，这一决议满足了许多国家参与军事行动的门槛。
在当前危机中，特朗普政府在这方面的工作做得扎实。上周，创纪录的135个国家联合发起了一项联合国安理会决议，谴责伊朗对海湾地区的袭击，并呼吁停止这些袭击。与十年前针对ISIS的决议一样，这项决议也援引了《联合国宪章》第五十一条规定的集体自卫权。仅这一点就应该满足各国参与针对霍尔木兹海峡军事行动的法律门槛。
政治基础
复杂之处在于各国首都的国内政治。即使跨越了法律门槛，民选领导人也面临政治约束，在向海外部署军事力量前需要一定程度的国内支持。
这正是特朗普政府可能不足的地方。
英国和丹麦是两个拥有强大海军能力且在打击反舰导弹和无人机方面有可靠记录的关键国家。就在上周，特朗普在社交媒体帖子中拒绝了英国的援助请求，称其为时已晚。而就在上个月，华盛顿还因格陵兰岛问题与丹麦发生争执。在现在要求这些国家领导人将人员置于危险境地，并且是一场他们并未参与发起的战争中时，这些过往的矛盾都无济于事。
毫无疑问，霍尔木兹海峡是一个必须通过国际合作解决的国际挑战。伊朗的策略可预测但也令人发指，对全球经济构成威胁。这是一个各国应基于自身利益参与的任务。
不幸的是，美国发动这场战争时与盟友协商有限，现在在军事行动开始两周后才请求支持。这可以克服——幕后正在进行外交努力——但如果能有一个先发制人的开端会更好。
军事基础
假设法律和政治前提均已满足，真正的艰巨工作才开始：建立军事需求、任务分配和交战规则。这是一项细致且耗时的工作，也可能从一开始就分裂联盟。
例如，在红海联盟中，法国对指挥关系感到不满，选择平行组建自己的联盟，而非直接接受美国（或英国）的指挥。针对霍尔木兹海峡的联盟肯定会由美军指挥，因为军事行动仍在进行中。有些国家可能会对这一要求表示犹豫。交战规则也难以在军队间协商。例如，英国驱逐舰是否会批准攻击伊朗境内导弹发射装置的交战规则，还是仅防御空中来袭的导弹？
特朗普要求中国以某种方式参与，这又增加了一个问题，因为美军或其他伙伴国军队绝无可能与中国组成军事联盟，中国也绝无可能将其舰船置于美军指挥之下。诚然，海湾地区的大量石油运往中国——但维护全球公域安全是美国的历史责任，我们应努力保持这一地位。
至少需要几周时间
如果这一切听起来很复杂，那只是轻描淡写。建立联盟耗时、资源密集且需要精心细致的工作。但即便只是组建军事联盟的行动本身，也可能影响战争进程。伊朗会发现，其非对称战术将适得其反，因为他们很快不仅要面对海峡中的美军，还要面对来自世界各地的多国军队。国际社会介入的前景也可能有助于稳定全球市场。
与此同时，美军正在为联盟的成功创造条件：摧毁伊朗剩余的导弹、无人机和海军能力。
因此，虽然我们不应期望很快就能看到海军联盟出现在海上，但我们应该希望在未来一周内看到联盟建立的艺术和实践开始成形。如果没有联盟，伊朗即使在垂直和水平冲突中失利，也可能保留其非对称优势。
Strait of Hormuz: Trump needs a coalition. Here’s how to build one
3 hr ago PUBLISHED Mar 17, 2026, 12:00 AM ET / Analysis by Brett H. McGurk
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
The first two weeks of the Iran crisis have demonstrated military dominance by the US and Israel, with asymmetrical responses from Iran. How this plays out over the coming weeks will determine the outcome. Let me explain.
In a military conflict, there are three types of escalations:
- Vertical escalation is direct, military targets against military targets. Here, the US and Israel retain escalation dominance. Iran is continuing attempts to strike US military facilities and Israel directly, but with diminishing effect.
- Horizontal escalation attempts to widen the conflict — Iran’s attacks against Gulf neighbors, Jordan, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Tehran aims for these countries to pressure Washington to stop the war before the military campaign has concluded. Thus far, its efforts are failing. The countries that have come under attack have banded together in defiance of Iran.
- Asymmetrical escalation seeks to change the rules of the game — think, terrorism, cyber-attacks, or economic sabotage. This is where Iran holds leverage. It’s taken advantage of geography to shut down the world’s energy artery in the Strait of Hormuz. The longer the strait remains closed, the greater the pressure rises on Washington. Iran hopes and believes that President Donald Trump will call the campaign short before it culminates.
The best counter to asymmetrical escalation is a coalition of like-minded countries banding together, but this is easier to say than do in practice, as Trump is currently discovering.
Coalition-building 101
I’ve helped build coalitions large and small to tackle security challenges. Between 2014 and 2018, I served as an envoy for Presidents Obama and Trump and helped assemble a coalition that grew to nearly 80 countries to combat the terrorist group ISIS. Members of this coalition worked together not just militarily but also globally through international sanctions and new regulations to deter terrorists from crossing borders or traveling on airplanes. That coalition was successful and still exists today.
In 2023 and 2024, I helped build a naval coalition to protect a narrow passageway in the Red Sea called the Bab el Mandeb (“Gate of Tears”). This passage had been shut after the Houthis — an Iranian proxy — fired missiles and drones at military and cargo ships. This coalition ultimately grew to nearly 20 countries. It was led by the US military, but others, including the UK and Denmark, shot down missiles and drones and supported US military operations.
That Red Sea coalition might now serve as a model for the Strait of Hormuz. It might also be recalled should the Houthis at Iran’s urging renew their campaign of terrorism in the Red Sea.
Here’s what it would take:
Legal basis
A military coalition is in fact a series of legal and political decisions taken in individual countries. Most, including longstanding US allies, have their own laws and standards that must be overcome before deploying military forces abroad, particularly if use of force might be involved. For the US, that requires patience and working with individual governments to help marshal the diplomatic and legal predicates required to secure participation.
This often starts with the United Nations. For ISIS, the government of Iraq invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter requesting collective self-defense against the terrorist group. That was enough for most NATO allies under international law to come to its assistance. For the Houthis, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution in early 2024 condemning the attacks in the Red Sea and affirming the international right to freedom of navigation in international waters. Similarly, that met the threshold for many countries to participate militarily.
In this current crisis, the Trump administration has done solid work in this regard. Last week, a record setting 135 countries co-sponsored a UN Security Council resolution that condemned Iran’s attacks into the Gulf and called on those attacks to stop. Like the ISIS resolution 10 years ago, this resolution also invoked the right of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter. That alone should meet the legal threshold for countries to participate in a military mission focused on the Strait of Hormuz.
Political basis
Where this gets trickier is domestic politics in individual capitals. Even with legal thresholds crossed, elected leaders face political constraints and require a base level of domestic support before deploying their military forces abroad.
This is where the Trump administration may fall short.
Two of the critical countries with superior naval capabilities and proven track records against ship-seeking missiles and drones include the UK and Denmark. It was only last week that Trump in a social media post turned down the UK’s offer of assistance as coming too late. It was only last month that Washington was in a feud with Denmark over the island of Greenland. None of that helps when now asking the leaders to place personnel in harm’s way, and for a war they had no say in launching.
No doubt, the Strait of Hormuz is an international challenge that must be addressed internationally. Iran’s tactics are predictable but also outrageous and a threat to the entire global economy. It’s the sort of mission that countries should aim to join in their own interests.
Unfortunately, the US launched this war with limited consultation with allies and has now come in with requests for support two weeks into the campaign. This can be overcome — and there is diplomacy ongoing behind the scenes — but it’s better to have had a head start.
Military basis
Presuming the legal and political predicates are met, then the really hard work begins to establish military requirements, assignments, and rules of engagement. This is detailed and time-consuming work. It can also divide coalitions from the start.
In the Red Sea coalition, for example, the French bristled at command relationships and chose to form its own coalition in parallel rather than work directly under US (or UK) command. A Strait of Hormuz coalition would surely be under US command given the ongoing military operations. Some countries might balk at this requirement. Rules of engagement are also difficult to negotiate between militaries. Would a UK destroyer, for example, have approved engagement rules to target missile launchers inside Iran or only to defend against missiles in the air?
Trump’s request for China to somehow participate adds another problem, as there is no chance of the US military or other partnered militaries participating in a military coalition with China, nor is there any chance China would place its ships under US command. True, much of the oil from the Gulf travels to China — but securing the global commons is a historic US responsibility and we should aim to keep it that way.
Weeks, at least
If this all sounds complex, that’s an understatement. Building a coalition is time-consuming, resource intensive, and painstaking work. But even the motion of putting together a military coalition can have an impact on the course of war. Iran would see that its asymmetrical tactics will backfire as they’ll soon be facing not just the US military in the strait but a collection of militaries from around the world. The prospect for an internationalized effort might also help stabilize global markets.
In the meantime, the US military is setting conditions for such a coalition to succeed by destroying what’s left of Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities.
So, while we should not expect to see a naval coalition in the water anytime soon, we should hope to see the art and practice of coalition-building take shape over the coming week. Without it, Iran may retain its asymmetrical advantage even while losing the vertical and horizontal contest.