分析：斯蒂芬·科林森（Stephen Collinson），发布时间：2026年3月3日，美国东部时间上午12:00
周一，国防部长彼得·赫格塞斯（Pete Hegseth）展现了美国战争“震慑”开局时典型的夸夸其谈，他承诺将战胜伊朗。
“我们将在总统特朗普选定的‘美国优先’条件下结束这场战争，没有其他人的条件，这也本应如此。”他在五角大楼表示。
但他的言论不幸让人回想起2001年的另一个承诺。
“这场冲突始于他人选定的时间和条件；它将以我们选定的方式和时刻结束。”在“9·11”袭击创伤笼罩的美国，时任总统乔治·W·布什（George W. Bush）如此告诉国民。不久之后，他将美国带入了持续近二十年的战争。
历史的回响只会加剧人们的担忧：本届政府似乎未能铭记近期战争的血腥教训。
唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）发动了一场与以色列并肩的战争，已导致伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊（Ayatollah Ali Khamenei）遇刺。这场赌博的规模，从可能结果的范围可见一斑。
风险在于，这场基于有问题的理由的冲突，将在中东引发连锁混乱，最终导致数千名平民死亡，并在未来几年埋下针对美国人的新恐怖袭击的种子。
然而，对于一位发起了其前任从未敢尝试的伊朗攻击的总统而言，存在另一种可能的情景：如果他能消除这个美国近半个世纪的死敌的地区威胁，并催化伊朗自由的诞生，他或许能取得战略胜利。
“特朗普发动的这场战争毫无道理且不合法，但这并不意味着它会失败。”历史学家兼外交政策学者马克斯·布特（Max Boot）在周一的外交关系委员会（Council on Foreign Relations）电话会议上表示，同时批评总统的傲慢。
美国承诺升级战争
战争进入第四天，美国和以色列誓言升级对伊朗的袭击。德黑兰残存的领导层决心煽动地区混乱。
三种主要结果似乎可能发生：
► 最乐观的情景：对伊朗国家镇压工具的数日空袭可能引发民众起义。一个新的伊朗可能会改变中东格局。
► 更混乱、也可能更有可能的情景：伊朗幸存的领导层建立新政权。但美国行动可能通过摧毁使伊朗成为地区威胁的核、导弹和军事能力而取得成功。这对以色列而言或许是可接受的结果，但可能导致未来为阻止伊朗新政权重建能力而再次发生战争。
► 最糟糕的情景：伊朗在经历多年极权统治的国家陷入权力真空后，将重蹈利比亚的覆辙。派系斗争或内战可能爆发，蔓延混乱，引发难民危机，并使伊朗的铀储备易受极端组织控制。
可能出错的地方
如果美国人对未来感到困惑，这并不奇怪，因为政府不断改变其战争理由。
特朗普提出政权更迭，并声称希望给予伊朗人民自由。他誓言摧毁一个他此前声称已彻底消灭的核计划。赫格塞斯周一强调，有必要为美国占领伊拉克期间被伊朗恐怖袭击或伊朗支持的民兵杀害的美国人复仇。国务卿马尔科·卢比奥（Marco Rubio）辩称，美国进行预防性战争是因为以色列计划攻击伊朗，而美国在该地区的军队将面临报复。
如果这种模糊的推理反映出政府连为何开战都不清楚，那么这场战役可能已经陷入困境。
“实际上并没有明确的战略。我们需要听到总统说明他的意图。”民主党参议员吉恩·沙欣（Jeanne Shaheen）周一告诉美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）。“如果我们成功，这将是中东真正转折点的机会。但目前尚不清楚结果如何。”
然而，对特朗普而言，不明确是特点而非异常。
通过模糊战争目标，他为自己随时宣布胜利创造了政治空间。他似乎从伊拉克和阿富汗战争学到了一个教训：大规模地面战争有陷入泥潭的风险。
但很难找到一个例子，证明空中力量能直接引发政权更迭并催生稳定的继任国家。尽管特朗普周一坚称他不会“感到无聊”，但一些批评者怀疑，如果政权持续存在，他的耐力是否足够。
而且特朗普似乎已经在缩小战争目标。周一他表示，计划是摧毁伊朗的海军、导弹项目和未来的核野心。他和赫格塞斯似乎还为政权重建埋下了一个借口：暗示如果伊朗人未能抓住机会，将只能自食其果。“我认为总统传递的信息很明确。致伊朗人民：这是你们的时刻。”赫格塞斯说。
一些分析人士将其与特朗普在委内瑞拉的政权更迭策略相比较，在那次特别行动突袭后，临时领导人德尔西·罗德里格斯（Delcy Rodríguez）与华盛顿合作。
但几十年来，华盛顿一直试图——并未能——找到可合作的温和派伊朗官员。哈梅内伊遇刺后，这样的人物出现的可能性甚至更低。
不过，最坏情况下，美国军事成功若未伴随更广泛的政治转变，仍可能使该地区更安全。
“我认为这场战争的结果将是一个发生巨大变化的政权，即使它仍在苟延残喘。”外交关系委员会高级研究员、前布什政府高级外交政策官员埃利奥特·艾布拉姆斯（Elliott Abrams）表示。“将不会再有像（阿亚图拉·鲁霍拉）霍梅尼和哈梅内伊那样真正至高无上的最高领袖。”
他继续说道：“这个国家将在很大程度上失去使用武力的能力。我认为在战争结束时，即使只有一周，他们将完全没有核计划。他们可能没有导弹发射器，也许没有导弹。他们将没有海军。”
一个被削弱的伊朗还将产生更广泛的地缘政治影响。它将剥夺俄罗斯和中国反西方轴心的第三个成员。这可能还会减缓无人机和导弹流向俄罗斯在乌克兰的军事行动。
可能出错的地方
然而，即便为伊朗描绘积极情景，也忽视了二战后美国外交政策的诅咒。在西翼内部看似合乎逻辑甚至可能的事情，在接触中东现实时可能会枯萎。
华盛顿提出了无数新策略，试图最终赢得阿富汗战争，并增兵镇压伊拉克叛乱。但美国最终还是输掉了这些战争。
具有讽刺意味的是，特朗普在其第二任期首次外访沙特阿拉伯时，曾谈到这种失败。“所谓的‘国家建设者’破坏的国家远比建设的多——而干预主义者干预了他们甚至不了解的复杂社会。”特朗普说。
但特朗普可能犯了另一种理解失败的错误。
尽管他似乎在与德黑兰达成核协议方面取得进展，但他从未为哈梅内伊提供一个保全面子的退路，而是要求彻底投降。特朗普将自己的声誉过多投入谈判，以至于除了坚持红线或失去全球信誉外别无选择。
特朗普周一告诉美国有线电视新闻网记者杰克·塔珀（Jake Tapper），美国现在打算帮助抗议者起来反抗。但他补充道：“现在我们希望所有人待在室内。外面不安全。”
但在一个渗透到伊朗社会各个层面的镇压国家，政权崩溃的可能性似乎牵强。即使轰炸严重削弱了伊斯兰共和国的安全部队，他们仍将比政权反对者更强大，而反对者缺乏有组织的领导者。哈梅内伊的殉道可能使他的基层忠诚者比上一次2025年12月至1月针对神权统治的起义中杀害数千名抗议者的人更加残忍。
极权政权何时倒台总是难以预测。但政权坚持越久，政治变革的可能性就越小。
“从伊朗的角度看，他们的策略已经转变。”责任国家政策研究所（Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft）联合创始人特里塔·帕西（Trita Parsi）表示。“他们的计算和成功标准不是能否赢得战争。他们只需要在输掉战争前尽可能接近摧毁特朗普的总统任期。”
美国在伊朗的长期介入，即使如官员预测是数周而非数月的行动，也将给总统带来巨大政治压力——他在中期选举年需要快速胜利。
周一的一项新CNN民调显示，近60%的美国人不赞成特朗普对伊朗采取军事行动。虽然大多数共和党人支持他，但如果发生连锁危机（例如油价冲击推高国内通胀），这一支持可能改变。总统未寻求国会对冲突的授权，且未对此做任何深入解释，这可能成为他的隐患。
美国近代史表明，战争不仅会在外国战场失败，也常常因国内舆论而受挫。
与赫格塞斯的保证相反，没有人能确定这场战争将如何结束。
How Trump’s war on Iran could succeed — or go disastrously wrong
Analysis by Stephen Collinson, Published Mar 3, 2026, 12:00 AM ET
Pete Hegseth on Monday showed the bombast typical of the shock and awe start of America’s wars as he promised victory over Iran.
“We will finish this on ‘America first’ conditions of President Trump’s choosing, nobody else’s, as it should be,” the defense secretary said at the Pentagon.
But his comment fatefully recalled another promise, made in 2001.
“This conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others; it will end in a way and at an hour of our choosing,” President George W. Bush told a nation traumatized by the 9/11 attacks. Shortly afterward, he took America into wars that lasted for most of two decades.
History’s echo will only fuel fears that this administration is failing to remember the bloody lessons of the recent past.
The size of Donald Trump’s gamble in launching a war alongside Israel that has already led to the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is encapsulated by the scale of possible outcomes.
The risk is that the conflict rooted in a questionable rationale will ricochet chaos across the Middle East and end up killing thousands of civilians while seeding new terror attacks against Americans in years to come.
Yet there’s an alternative scenario for a president who launched an attack on Iran that his predecessors never dared. He could forge a strategic victory if he neutralizes the regional threat from a sworn US enemy for nearly 50 years and catalyzes the birth of freedom in Iran.
“This war that Trump launched is unwarranted and illegal. That doesn’t necessarily mean it’ll be unsuccessful,” historian and foreign policy scholar Max Boot said on a Council on Foreign Relations Conference call on Monday, while criticizing the president for hubris.
The US promises to escalate the war
As the war enters its fourth day, the US and Israel are vowing to escalate the assault on Iran. Tehran’s remnant leadership is determined to foment regional chaos.
Three broad outcomes seem possible:
► The rosiest scenario is that days of air attacks on instruments of Iranian state repression could precipitate a popular uprising. A new Iran could transform the Middle East.
► A messier, and perhaps more likely, possibility is that Iran’s surviving leaders build a new regime. But the US operation could still succeed by gutting the nuclear, missile and military capacity that makes Iran a regional threat. This may be an acceptable outcome for Israel but could lead to future wars to prevent Iran’s new regime rebuilding its capabilities.
► The worst-case scenario is that Iran mirrors Libya amid a power vacuum in a state destroyed by years of authoritarianism. Factional fighting or a civil war could erupt, exporting chaos, causing a refugee crisis and leaving Iran’s uranium stocks vulnerable to extremist groups.
Where it could all go wrong
If Americans are confused by what’s ahead, it’s not surprising, since the administration keeps changing its rationale for war.
Trump has posited regime change and a desire to give Iranians their freedom. He’s pledged to destroy a nuclear program he’d already claimed to have obliterated. Hegseth on Monday stressed the need to avenge Americans killed by Iranian terror attacks or by Iranian-backed militia during the US occupation of Iraq. Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that the US staged preemptive war because Israel planned to attack Iran and American troops in the region would face reprisals.
If this fuzzy reasoning reflects an administration that doesn’t know why it went to war, the campaign could already be in trouble.
“There isn’t really a clear strategy. And we need to hear from the president what he wants,” Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen told CNN on Monday. “This is an opportunity for a real inflection point in the Middle East if we’re successful. But it’s not at all clear how that’s going to play out.”
Yet for Trump, imprecision is a feature, not an anomaly.
By keeping war aims vague, he builds political room to declare victory whenever he wants. He seems to have learned one lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan: Large-scale land wars risk quagmires.
But it’s hard to think of a single example of air power triggering regime change and the birth of a stable successor state. While Trump insisted Monday he won’t get “bored,” some of his critics doubt his staying power if the regime survives.
And Trump already seems to be narrowing his war aims. On Monday he said the plan was to eradicate Iran’s navy, missile programs and future nuclear aspirations. Both he and Hegseth seemed also to lay the groundwork for an excuse if the regime reconstitutes, implying that Iranians would only have themselves to blame if they failed to seize their chance. “I think the message the president has given has been clear. To the people of Iran: This is your moment,” Hegseth said.
Some analysts have drawn comparisons to Trump’s regime-toppling strategy in Venezuela, where interim leader Delcy Rodríguez emerged to work with Washington after the special forces raid that extracted President Nicolás Maduro.
But Washington has been trying — and failing — for decades to find moderate Iranian officials with whom to work. After the assassination of the ayatollah, there seem even fewer incentives for such figures to emerge.
Still, at worst, US military success that is not accompanied by a broader political shift could still make the region safer.
“I think what will clearly emerge from this war is a very, very much changed regime, even if it hangs on,” said Elliott Abrams, a Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow and former top foreign policy official in the Bush administration. “There won’t be a supreme leader who’s truly supreme in the way that (Ayatollah Ruhollah) Khomeini and Khamenei have been,” Abrams said.
He continued: “This will be a country largely without the ability to use force. I think by the time this is done, even if it’s only another week, they will have no nuclear program at all. They’ll probably have no missile launchers and maybe no missiles. They will have no navy.”
A neutered Iran would also have wider geopolitical implications. It would deprive Russia and China of the third member of their anti-Western axis. It might also slow the flow of drones and missiles into the Russian military effort in Ukraine.
Where it could all go wrong
Still, even the act of drawing up positive scenarios for Iran ignores the curse of post-World War II US foreign policy. What seems logical and even probable inside the West Wing can wither on contact with Middle Eastern reality.
Washington came up with umpteen new strategies to finally win the war in Afghanistan and troops surges to quell the insurgency in Iraq. But America still left those wars defeated.
Ironically, Trump touched on this failure himself during the first foreign tour of his second term, in Saudi Arabia. “The so-called ‘nation-builders’ wrecked far more nations than they built — and the interventionists were intervening in complex societies that they did not even understand themselves,” Trump said.
But Trump may be guilty of a different failure of understanding.
Although he had appeared to be making progress in forging a nuclear deal with Tehran, he never offered Khamenei a face-saving off-ramp. Instead he demanded total capitulation. And Trump invested so much of his own prestige in the negotiations that he left himself little option but to impose his red lines or shed global credibility.
Trump told CNN’s Jake Tapper on Monday that the US now intended help protesters to rise, up. But he added: “Right now we want everyone staying inside. It’s not safe out there.”
But the chances of regime collapse in a repressive state that penetrates every level of Iranian society seem far-fetched. And even if the bombing seriously degrades the Islamic Republic’s security forces, they’d outgun regime opponents, who lack organized leaders. Khamenei’s martyrdom may make his street-level loyalists even more ruthless than those who killed thousands of protests in the last uprising against the theocracy in December and January.
It’s always hard to predict when totalitarian regimes may fall. But the longer the regime clings on, the worse the chances of a political transformation.
“From the Iranian perspective, their strategy has shifted,” said Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “Their calculation, their metric of success, is not that they can necessarily win the war. They just need to get as close as possible to destroying Trump’s presidency before they lose the war.”
A prolonged US engagement in Iran, even as US officials predict weeks and not months of action, would heap intense political pressure on the president — who needs a quick victory in a midterm election year.
A new CNN poll Monday showed that nearly 6 in 10 Americans disapprove of Trump’s decision to take military action in Iran. While a majority of Republicans support him, that could change in a knock-on crisis — for instance, if oil shocks spike domestic inflation. The president’s decision not to seek congressional authorization for the conflict, and his refusal to explain it in any more than a cursory way, may come back to haunt him.
America’s modern history shows that wars do not simply founder on foreign battlefields. They are just as often lost to public opinion at home.
And contrary to Hegseth’s assurance, no one can yet know how this one will end.