2026-05-07T13:45:00-0400 / 哥伦比亚广播公司新闻
特朗普总统称，伊朗执政政权内部的“内讧与混乱”，是为何难以达成协议以结束美国和以色列于2月28日发动的战争的部分原因。
不过，分析人士告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，尽管权力结构正在发生变化，但几乎没有证据表明分歧正在阻碍伊朗领导层，而特朗普的言论可能更多是在白宫努力推行自身政策目标之际，试图寻找替罪羊。
特朗普称“没人知道谁在掌权”
在前最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊在美以对伊朗的首轮空袭中丧生、引发了令全球经济震荡两个多月的战争一个月后，特朗普总统宣布伊朗的政权更迭已“完成”。
“下一个政权基本已经完蛋了，”他在2月28日空袭开始几天后说道，并补充称美国谈判人员正在与一群“完全不同的”“非常通情达理”的人进行接触。
近几周他改变了论调，将结束战争的谈判进展缓慢部分归咎于伊朗近五十年的神权政权“严重分裂”且处于“崩溃状态”。
“他们的‘领导层’内部存在严重的内讧和混乱，”特朗普在4月底的一则社交媒体帖子中说道，“没人知道谁在掌权，包括他们自己。”
长期以来，伊朗的政治、军事和宗教最高权力一直集中在最高领袖一人手中。在其父亲兼前任阿里·哈梅内伊在首轮空袭中丧生后不久，伊朗任命阿亚图拉·穆赫塔巴·哈梅内伊担任这一职位。
2026年5月6日，德黑兰街头一名男子走过一幅大型横幅，横幅上是伊朗现任最高领袖阿亚图拉·穆赫塔巴·哈梅内伊及其前任、已故父亲阿里·哈梅内伊。法新社/盖蒂图片社
美国官员称，小哈梅内伊在杀害其父的空袭中受了重伤，可能已丧失行动能力。目前尚无独立消息证实他的状况，自被宣布为伊朗最高领导人以来，他也从未公开露面或直接发声。
至少在最初阶段，这种隐身状态加剧了人们对权力真空的猜测。但伊朗另有一个长期拥有重要权力的机构，可能已迅速填补了德黑兰的权力真空，那就是伊斯兰革命卫队。
伊朗正经历“从神权……到强权”的转型
革命卫队是一支军事、政治和经济力量，长期以来直接且仅听命于最高领袖。它负责伊朗的对外军事和准军事行动，包括管理与中东各地所谓代理武装网络的联系，同时也协助维护国内安全、镇压异见。
路透社近期一篇援引伊朗官员和分析人士的文章指出，新任最高领袖的角色“主要是为将军们做出的决定提供合法性，而非亲自发布指令”，权力正集中在一个战时领导班子周围，该班子由最高国家安全委员会、最高领袖办公室和如今主导军事战略及关键政治决策的革命卫队组成。
伦敦查塔姆研究所中东和北非项目主任萨纳米·瓦基尔赞同“我们正迎来伊朗领导层的过渡期”这一观点，她告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，这可能会“带来更广泛的决策转变”。
她表示，这种转变已经酝酿了数十年，因为执政的神职人员对权力的47年掌控有所松动，而革命卫队则通过关键商业收购以及前成员从政获得影响力，壮大了自身实力。
曾担任美国政府谈判代表的卡内基国际和平基金会中东问题专家、高级研究员亚伦·大卫·米勒在4月的一档播客中表示，伊朗已经“从神权……转向强权”，如今政权“依附”于革命卫队。
甚至有传言称革命卫队可能会发动政变。但在现实中，这种可能性不大。
革命卫队的权威性部分源于其军事实力，但主要来自该部队与最高领袖职位之间深厚且直接的联系。
一旦失去这种能赋予宗教和意识形态合法性的联系，这支部队在许多伊朗人眼中可能就只是另一支军方分支，而非伊朗共和国政治秩序的天选捍卫者——该国仍有相当一部分民众支持这一秩序。
许多伊朗分析人士认为，只要最高领袖在世，该职位仍将是国家的最高权威。
伊朗政权在“战术层面”存在分歧
伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基扬的职权更类似于美国的副总统，显然处于最高领袖的统领之下，他被视为政权内的温和派。许多人猜测，他和其他政治人士希望重返谈判，因为他们担心与美国全面恢复战争的后果。
另一方面，革命卫队一直试图展现出毫不示弱的姿态。
“如果你们攻击伊朗伊斯兰共和国的基础设施，我们的回应将不再是以眼还眼，而是以头还眼，”革命卫队少将、哈梅内伊的军事顾问穆赫森·礼萨伊3月份说道。
有传言称，革命卫队指挥官艾哈迈德·瓦希迪准将与穆罕默德-巴盖尔·加利巴夫之间存在分歧，加利巴夫是伊朗议会议长，也是战争开始以来与美国官员进行唯一一轮直接会谈的伊朗谈判团队负责人。4月初在伊斯兰堡举行的早期会谈未能达成将停火转化为更广泛和平协议的共识。
周一，同样参与伊朗谈判团队的外交部长阿巴斯·阿拉奇在X平台上发帖称，“政治危机没有军事解决方案”，这可能被解读为对美国和革命卫队的间接批评。
但像佩泽什基扬和阿拉奇这样的政治人物在伊朗权力结构中的影响力有限，分析人士表示，这些意见分歧——或许在战争期间更为公开——并未对政权构成实质性威胁。
瓦基尔告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，伊朗政权无疑在“战术层面存在分歧，尤其是在谈判问题上”。
温和派人士与极端保守派之间曾出现一些隐晦的抨击，例如在对美国做出让步的问题上。
与革命卫队有关联的塔斯米姆新闻社在4月底发布了一篇社论后又将其删除，该社论嘲讽极端保守派，将他们对会谈的期望比作“魔法豆茎”。
另一方面，极端保守派神职人员、伊朗议会议员马哈茂德·纳瓦比安甚至批评与美国进行谈判是“纯粹的损害”，他在X平台上称，“伊朗的石油售价是战前的两倍”，并暗示那些主张通过谈判结束战争的人是“懦夫”。
但极端保守派只是少数派。伊朗议会近期以压倒性多数投票支持一份支持谈判团队的声明。
特朗普政府是否比伊朗政权“更不团结”？
尽管存在不同观点，但瓦基尔告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，德黑兰的政治分歧与她在华盛顿看到的情况颇为相似。
她说，国防部长皮特·赫格西“专注于打赢一场成功的军事战役”，而财政部长斯科特·贝森特“则专注于美国的经济利益议程”。
“所以在我看来，这一切都非常正常，”瓦基尔说道，但在伊朗，“所有不同团体和个人都在为维护政权及其安全与稳定而团结一致。”
德黑兰的权力演变未必意味着伊朗政权的脆弱，但专家告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，白宫可能有既得利益宣称政权确实脆弱。
“尽管特朗普政府最初曾希望出现‘委内瑞拉模式’，即类似德尔西·罗德里格斯的人物上台掌权，但这种情况在伊朗并不存在，”战略与国际研究中心中东项目主任莫娜·亚科比安告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻。
“相反，我们看到最初的斩首行动导致伊朗形成了一个由革命卫队主导的政权，该政权采取了更强硬的立场，”她说道，“最高领袖似乎不再拥有最终决策权……相反，有关伊朗与美国谈判立场的决定似乎是由革命卫队领导人组成的集体做出的。”
瓦基尔表示，她认为特朗普可能“夸大或歪曲了伊朗的分歧”，以此作为“借口”，为“谈判进程不像华盛顿方面希望的那样容易或迅速取得成果”辩解。
“把责任推给[伊朗]很容易，”她说。
瓦基尔称，她认为伊朗统治者“有着非常明确的红线，他们试图实现的目标也更加明确，即政权的存续——达成一项有保障的制裁减免的永久协议”，而美国的立场则更不团结、更不明确。
Trump says Iran’s government is in a “state of collapse,” but analysts see evolution, not fractures
2026-05-07T13:45:00-0400 / CBS News
President Trump has said “infighting and confusion” within Iran’s ruling regime is partly why it’s been so difficult to strike a deal to end the war launched by the U.S. and Israel on Feb. 28.
Analysts tell CBS News, however, that while power structures are shifting, there’s little evidence of divisions hampering Iran’s leadership, and Mr. Trump’s rhetoric may be more an effort to find a scapegoat as the White House grapples to present its own policy objectives.
Trump says “nobody knows who is in charge”
A month after former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in the first wave of U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, sparking a war that has shocked the global economy for more than two months, President Trump announced that regime change in Iran was “complete.”
“The next regime is mostly dead,” he said just days after strikes began on Feb. 28, adding that U.S. negotiators were speaking to “a whole different group” of “very reasonable” people.
He’s changed tack in recent weeks, attributing slow diplomatic progress on a deal to end the war at least partially to Iran’s nearly five decade-old theocratic regime being “seriously fractured” and in a “state of collapse.”
“There is tremendous infighting and confusion within their ‘leadership,” Mr. Trump said in a late April social media post. “Nobody knows who is in charge, including them.”
Ultimate political, military and religious authority has long rested with a single figure in Iran, the supreme leader. Iran named Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei as the new holder of that title not long after his father and predecessor, Ali Khamenei, was killed in the first wave of strikes.
A man walks past a large banner depicting Iran’s current supreme leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and his predecessor and late father Ali Khamenei along a street in Tehran on May 6, 2026. AFP via Getty Images
U.S. officials say the younger Khamenei was seriously wounded, possibly incapacitated, in the strike that killed his father. There has been no independent confirmation of his condition, and he has not been seen or heard from directly since being announced as the country’s top authority.
At least initially, that invisibility helped fuel perceptions of a power vacuum.But there’s another institution in Iran that has long held significant power, and which may have quickly stepped into any vacuum in Tehran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
An Iranian transition “from divine power … to hard power”
The IRGC is a military, political and economic force that has long answered directly — and only — to the supreme leader. It is responsible for Iran’s external military and paramilitary efforts, including managing ties with a network of so-called proxy forces across the Middle East, and also helping to enforce domestic security, quashing dissent.
A recent article by the Reuters news agency, citing Iranian officials and analysts, suggested the new supreme leader’s role was “largely to legitimize decisions made by his generals rather than issue directives himself,” with power coalescing around a wartime leadership contingent consisting of the Supreme National Security Council, the supreme leader’s office and the IRGC, “which now dominates both military strategy and key political decisions.”
Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at London’s Chatham House think tank, agrees that “we are moving into a transition of leadership in Iran,” which she told CBS News could bring “shifts in decision-making more broadly.”
The change has been brewing for a few decades, she said, as the ruling clerics have seen their 47-year grip on power loosen while the IRGC has increased its own, through key business acquisitions and by gaining influence as former members have become politicians.
Aaron David Miller, a Mideast expert and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who previously served as a U.S. government negotiator, said on a podcast in April that Iran has “moved from divine power … to hard power” – with the regime now “tethered” to the IRGC.
There have even been rumors that the IRGC could try to stage a coup. But on the ground, that seems unlikely.
The IRGC has always derived some authority from its military strength, but it comes mainly from the unit’s deep and direct connection to the institution of the supreme leader.
Without that link to lend religious and ideological legitimacy, the force could appear to many Iranians simply as another branch of the military, rather than as anointed defenders of the Islamic Republic political order, which a significant portion of the country still supports.
Many Iranian analysts believe that as long as the supreme leader is alive that office will remain the highest authority in the nation.
A regime factionalized “on tactics”
Iran’s President Masound Pezeshkian, whose office is more akin to the vice presidency in the U.S. — decidedly under the supreme leader — is considered a moderate within the regime. Many suspect that he and other political figures favor a return to negotiations, fearful of the consequences of a return to full-scale war with the U.S.
The IRGC, on the other hand, has sought to project no weakness.
“If you attack the infrastructure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, our response will no longer be an eye for an eye, but rather a head for an eye,” IRGC Major General Mohsen Reza’i, a military adviser to Khamenei, said in March.
There have been rumors of a split between IRGC commander Brigadier General Ahmed Vahidi and Mohammed-Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker who led Iran’s negotiating team during the only round of direct talks with U.S. officials since the war began. Those early April talks in Islamabad ended with no agreement to convert the ceasefire into a wider peace deal.
On Monday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, also part of the Iranian negotiating team, said in a post on X that, “there’s no military solution to a political crisis,” which could be interpreted as a dig at both the U.S., and the IRGC.
Political figures such as Pezeshkian and Araghchi have limited clout in Iran’s power structure, however, and analysts say these differences of opinion – perhaps more public now during the war – pose little threat to the regime.
Vakil told CBS News the regime is, without doubt, factionalized “on tactics, particularly with regard to the negotiations.”
There have been some thinly veiled jabs between the more moderate figures and ultraconservatives, over making concessions to the U.S., for instance.
The IRGC-linked Tasnim news agency published (and then deleted) an editorial in late April mocking ultraconservatives, comparing their expectations for the talks to a “magic beanstalk.”
Ultraconservative cleric and member of Iran’s parliament Mahmoud Navabian, on the other hand, criticized even holding negotiations with the U.S. as “pure damage” for the country, saying on X that, “Iran’s oil is selling for double the pre-war price,” and implying that those who favor a negotiated end to the war are “cowards.”
But the ultraconservatives are a small minority. Iran’s parliament recently voted overwhelmingly in support of a statement backing the negotiating team.
Trump administration “a bit less aligned” than Iran’s regime?
While there are competing viewpoints, Vakil told CBS News the political differences in Tehran look a lot like what she sees in Washington.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, she says, “is focused on delivering a successful military campaign, whereas Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is focused on the economic portfolio of interests for the U.S.”
“So to me, this is all very normal,” Vakil said, but in Iran, “all of the different groups and individuals are aligned in the preservation of the regime and its security and stability.”
The evolution of power in Tehran does not necessarily indicate fragility in the Iranian regime, but experts tell CBS News the White House may have a vested interest in claiming it does.
“While the Trump administration may have initially hoped for a ‘Venezuela option,’ featuring a Delcy Rodriguez-like figure stepping into leadership, no such option existed” in Iran, Mona Yacoubian, Director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told CBS News.
“Instead, we have seen that initial decapitation strikes have led to an IRGC-dominated regime in Iran that has adopted a harder-line posture,” she said. “The supreme leader no longer appears to have the final word on decision-making … Instead, decisions regarding Iran’s negotiating posture with the United States appear to be taken by a collective group of IRGC leaders.”
Vakil said she believed Mr. Trump had likely “exaggerated or misrepresented the divisions” in Iran “as an excuse” for a negotiating process that “hasn’t been as easy or quick to deliver on Washington’s side than perhaps Trump has wanted.”
“It’s easy to blame it on [Iran],” she said.
Vakil said she believes Iran’s rulers “have very clear red lines, and it’s much more clear in terms of what they’re trying to achieve, which is the regime’s survival — a permanent deal with guaranteed sanctions relief — whereas the U.S. has been a bit less aligned and less clear.”