By [琼·比斯库皮克]，CNN最高法院首席分析师
3小时前
发布于2026年2月27日，美国东部时间凌晨4:00
最高法院关税案中，大量相互对立的意见不仅暴露了大法官们的分歧，也成了一句玩笑的来源。
本周在一家能源管道公司与密歇根州的纠纷法庭上，律师约翰·伯奇称自己的立场可能会带来一个简单的判决：“我的意思是，它的意见篇幅可以比上周的关税案少160页。”
“嗯，”塞缪尔·阿利托大法官笑着说，其他大法官也随之笑了起来，“这当然是一个值得追求的目标。”
首席大法官约翰·罗伯茨的脸上露出喜色，这场对话展开时他显得尤为开心。罗伯茨曾撰写法院的主意见书，推翻了特朗普政府的关税政策，之后他等待同事们完成各自的补充意见，这一等就是数周。
在[Learning Resources诉特朗普]关税案中，七份独立意见书展示了一个案件如何成为阐明更大法律教义分歧的论坛。
或者，有时大法官们只是想发泄。
结果是法律缺乏清晰度——普通民众、律师和法官都在面对相互竞争的观点时感到困惑。
在当代最高法院，附议意见（即法官认同多数意见的底线，但补充单独角度的文书）的数量一直在上升。这反映了极化程度的加剧，也表明标准保守派和自由派集团内部的大法官们在法律推理和方法上常常出现分裂。
罗伯茨在关税纠纷中代表多数派撰写的意见书简洁明了，仅21页。主要异议意见书由布雷特·卡瓦诺大法官撰写，长达63页。但另外四位支持罗伯茨的大法官也分别撰写了附议意见：尼尔·戈萨奇、艾米·科尼·巴雷特、埃琳娜·卡根和凯坦吉·布朗·杰克逊。其中篇幅最长的是戈萨奇的，达46页。克拉伦斯·托马斯则补充了一份单独的异议意见。
这些文书总计164页，加上另外6页的配套纲要。
“我在关税案中感觉被完全排除在外了，”阿利托诙谐地对伯奇说，“索托马约尔大法官和我都没有写（附议意见）。”
索尼娅·索托马约尔回应道，其他人哄堂大笑时，“也许我们在这里有机会（写附议意见）。”
玩笑归玩笑，这场关于特朗普宣称对外国商品单方面征收关税的争议中的不同观点，让法律界感到意外。
“我惊讶于这些附议意见的数量之多和篇幅之长，”宾夕法尼亚大学法学院教授让·加尔布雷思表示。“戈萨奇大法官的意见书尤其引人注目，他尖锐地向同事们发起挑战，这让所有人都觉得必须通过撰写更多内容来回应。”
大法官们为何写得更长
加尔布雷思解释道，在过去几十年里，大法官们倾向于通过附议意见明确多数裁决的适用范围。她曾担任已故大法官约翰·保罗·史蒂文斯的法律助理，作为国际法学者，她表示：
“如今的附议意见往往被用作‘大笔书写’的工具，用于阐述和捍卫广泛的司法哲学。这正是关税案中所发生的情况。”
Learning Resources诉特朗普案的争议核心在于法定解释方式，而非关税政策的具体细节。这种看似抽象的差异往往比案件胜负更能占据最高法院成员的注意力。
同样，在2024年关于第二修正案的争议中，大法官以8-1的投票结果（托马斯持异议）[维持了一项联邦法律]，该法律禁止遭受家庭暴力限制令约束的个人拥有枪支。此外，除了罗伯茨的多数意见外，[另外五位大法官还撰写了附议意见]，详细阐述了他们在判断枪支管制措施是否违反第二修正案持枪权时的宪法和历史考量。
研究最高法院模式的亚当·费尔德曼（Adam Feldman）是[Legalytics]子专栏的作者，他记录到：2000年至2024年间，附议意见书的数量增加了42%。2000-2009年，每100份多数意见平均有64份附议意见；而2019-2024年，这一数字上升至约80份，自2010年代中期以来增长显著。
多年来，托马斯一直是撰写此类补充文书最多的大法官，他阐述了自己独特的保守宪法观。如今，左翼的新任大法官杰克逊正接近与托马斯一较高下。
费尔德曼发现，自2022年加入最高法院以来，杰克逊已撰写29份附议意见，仅略低于托马斯同期的35份。
相比之下，在光谱另一端，自由派的卡根在过去三年半中仅撰写了5份附议意见。控制着法院多数重要意见书的罗伯茨，仅发表了一份附议声明。
大法官们在脚注中日益激烈地交锋
1月份一起鲜为人知的联邦法院程序争议，体现了杰克逊的这种倾向。巴雷特在[Berk诉Choy]案中占多数，撰写了一份11页的判决，除杰克逊外，其他所有大法官都签署了该判决。
杰克逊认同巴雷特关于特拉华州医疗事故案件宣誓书要求不适用于联邦法院的结论，但她强烈反对巴雷特对适用的民事诉讼规则的解释。
杰克逊用13页内容和6个脚注阐述了自己的推理，其中一些脚注与巴雷特就各自如何“解读”（或“歪曲”）规则展开了激烈争论。
有一次，杰克逊断言巴雷特的一个假设“操之过急”。巴雷特在脚注中回应道：“我们没有‘操之过急’，而是直奔主题。”
上周五关税案中，撰写意见书的七位大法官在脚注中都加了旁白。
[罗伯茨将矛头对准]卡瓦诺的异议意见，指出卡瓦诺曾暗示特朗普可以根据《国际紧急经济权力法》以外的法规，实施“大部分甚至全部”有争议的关税。
罗伯茨反驳道：“我们不会对尚未提交法院的假设性案件进行推测。”
随后，当罗伯茨拒绝卡瓦诺对1981年案件的引用时，他坚持法院在意见中至少五次强调了该裁决的狭窄性。“这并非‘不，不，一千次都不’，但本应足以劝阻”卡瓦诺使用该案例。
相互的重大问题分歧
关税案中的大部分单独文书都在探讨一种被称为“重大问题学说”的法律方法应如何适用。该理论认为，如果国会希望向总统下放重大经济或政治权力，必须在法规中明确授予。
罗伯茨得出结论：国会并未根据《国际紧急经济权力法》授予特朗普所说的关税权。
“（总统）必须‘指出明确的国会授权’，才能为其声称的征收关税的非凡权力辩护，”罗伯茨写道。
戈萨奇同意罗伯茨的观点，但借机[批评其他大法官]在重大问题学说下对法规的解释方式，主要依据他们过去的著述。
巴雷特回击称戈萨奇歪曲了她的立场，“他树立了一个稻草人。我从未支持过那种观点。”
卡根是“重大问题”学说限制的批评者，她在单独的文书中指出，戈萨奇“坚持我现在必须适用重大问题学说，而且是他版本的学说。鉴于他显然希望说服更多人接受他的观点，我几乎要遗憾地告诉他，我不是其中之一。”
争取“信徒”的愿望确实能促使一份冗长的附议意见产生。尽管大法官们时而重新审理过去的案件，时而为手头的争议辩护，但他们也在为未来的案件奠定基础。
正如戈萨奇在结束他46页的意见书时所说：“如果历史有任何指引，情况将会逆转……”
Everyone has something to say at the Supreme Court. Why the tariffs ruling had more than 160 pages
By [Joan Biskupic], CNN Chief Supreme Court Analyst
3 hr ago
PUBLISHED Feb 27, 2026, 4:00 AM ET
The extraordinary number of dueling opinions in the Supreme Court’s tariff case, [laying bare divisions among the justices], also became the basis for a punch line.
At the courtroom lectern this week in a dispute between an energy-pipeline company and the state of Michigan, lawyer John Bursch contended his position could lead to an easy decision: “I mean, it could be an opinion that’s 160 pages less than the tariffs opinion last week.”
“Well,” said Justice Samuel Alito as he and other justices began laughing, “That’s certainly a goal to aim for.”
Chief Justice John Roberts’ face brightened, and he appeared especially amused as the exchange played out. Roberts had [written the court’s main opinion] striking down the Trump administration tariffs, then waited weeks as colleagues finished their various additional opinions.
The seven separate opinions in the [Learning Resources v. Trump] tariffs case demonstrated how a case can become a forum for airing larger doctrinal differences.
Or, sometimes, the justices simply want to vent.
The result can be a lack of clarity in the law as the general public, along with lawyers and judges, navigate competing views.
The number of concurrences – writings by a justice who signs onto the majority’s bottom-line but adds a separate angle – has been rising at the contemporary court. That’s a reflection of increased polarization and shows that justices within the standard conservative and liberal blocs often splinter in their legal reasoning and approach.
Roberts’ opinion for the majority in the tariffs dispute was an efficient 21 pages. The principal dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, stretched to 63 pages. But then four other justices, who’d sided with Roberts, wrote concurring opinions: Neil Gorsuch, Amy Coney Barrett, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. The most expansive came from Gorsuch, at 46 pages. Clarence Thomas added a separate dissenting opinion.
The writings totaled 164 pages, with another six for the accompanying syllabus.
“I felt very left out in the tariffs case,” Alito told Bursch drolly. “Justice Sotomayor didn’t write and I didn’t write.”
Rejoined Sonia Sotomayor, as the others chuckled, “Maybe we’ll have a chance here.”
Quips aside, the competing views in the dispute over Trump’s assertion of unilateral power for tariffs on foreign goods surprised the legal community.
“I was struck with just how many and how long the separate opinions were,” said University of Pennsylvania law professor Jean Galbraith. “Justice Gorsuch’s opinion was notable for pointedly throwing down the gauntlet, at his colleagues, which had the effect making all of them feel they had to write more in response.”
Why justices are writing more
In prior decades, justices tended to write concurring opinions to make clear the limits of a majority ruling, said Galbraith, an international law scholar who earlier served as a law clerk to the late Justice John Paul Stevens.
“Concurrences these days are often being used for big brush strokes,” she said, “for laying out and defending broad judicial philosophies. That’s what was going on in the tariff opinions.”
The extended debate in Learning Resources v. Trump concerned modes of statutory interpretation more than the nuts-and-bolts of tariff policy. Such seemingly abstract differences can often consume the members of the country’s highest court more than which side wins or loses.
Similarly, in a 2024 dispute over the Second Amendment, the justices by an 8-1 vote (Thomas dissented) [upheld a federal law] prohibiting individuals subject to a restraining order for domestic violence from possessing a gun. Then, in addition to Roberts’ opinion for the majority, [five other justices wrote concurring opinions] detailing their views on the constitutional and historical inquiry when determining whether a gun-control measure breaches the Second Amendment right to bear arms.
Adam Feldman, who researches Supreme Court patterns and is the author of the [Legalytics] substack, documented a 42% increase in written concurring opinions from 2000 to 2024. He said the court averaged roughly 64 concurrences per 100 majority opinions in 2000–2009, compared to about 80 per 100 opinions in 2019–2024, with a pronounced rise since the mid-2010s.
For years, Thomas led the court in such supplemental writings as he laid out his distinct conservative approach to the Constitution. The newest justice, Jackson, on the left wing, is now close to rivaling Thomas.
Since 2022 when she joined the bench, Jackson has authored 29 concurring opinions, Feldman found, topped only by Thomas at 35 concurrences for the same period.
For comparison, at the other end of the spectrum, the liberal Kagan penned just five concurrences over the past three-and-a-half years. Roberts, who controls many of the court’s most important opinions, wrote only one concurring statement.
Justices increasingly spar in the footnotes
An otherwise little-noticed January dispute over federal court procedure illustrated Jackson’s tendency. Barrett had the majority in the case, [Berk v. Choy], and wrote an 11-page decision signed by all other justices but Jackson.
Jackson agreed with Barrett’s conclusion that a Delaware affidavit requirement for medical malpractice cases does not apply in federal court. But she strongly disagreed with the Barrett majority over which rules of civil procedure applied.
Jackson laid out her reasoning, across 13 pages and six footnotes, some of which tussled with Barrett over how each was interpreting (or “contorting”) the rules.
At one point, Jackson asserted that a Barrett assumption “jumps the gun.” Barrett responded with a footnote asserting, “we do not ‘jump the gun,’ but rather cut to the chase.”
All seven of the justices who wrote opinions in the tariff dispute last Friday dropped asides in the footnotes.
[Roberts trained his fire] on Kavanaugh’s dissent, noting that Kavanaugh had suggested Trump could impose “most if not all” of the disputed tariffs under statutes other than the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Responded Roberts: “We do not speculate on hypothetical cases not before us.”
Later, as he rejected Kavanaugh’s reliance on a 1981 case, Roberts insisted that the court had stressed the narrowness of that ruling at least five times in its opinion. “That is not quite ‘no, no, a thousand times no,’ but should have sufficed to dissuade” Kavanaugh from using it.
Major questions for one another
Much of the separate writing in the tariffs case addressed how a legal approach known as “the major questions doctrine” should be applied. The theory holds that if Congress wants to delegate significant economic or political power to the president, it must do so clearly in a statute.
Roberts concluded that Congress had not granted such tariff power under IEEPA, as Trump had claimed.
“(T)he President must ‘point to clear congressional authorization’ to justify his extraordinary assertion of the power to impose tariffs,” Roberts wrote.
Gorsuch agreed with Roberts’ take but then used the occasion to [criticize other justices’ approaches] to interpreting statutes under the major questions doctrine, largely based on their past writings.
Barrett fired back that Gorsuch was mischaracterizing her position, saying, “he takes down a straw man. I have never espoused that view.”
Kagan, a critic of the constraints imposed by the “major questions” approach, noted in her separate writing that Gorsuch was “insisting that I now must be applying the major-questions doctrine, and his own version of it to boot. Given how strong his apparent desire for converts, I almost regret to inform him that I am not one.”
The desire for converts can indeed motivate a lengthy concurrence. As much as the justices were, by turns, relitigating past cases and defending their positions in the dispute at hand, they were laying out the groundwork for future cases.
As Gorsuch remarked as he closed out his 46 pages, “if history is any guide, the tables will turn….”