2026-07-02T08:00:25.476Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/02/politics/us-iran-mou-analysis
布雷特·麦古克是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登任内担任高级国家安全职位。
这份长达14条的“谅解备忘录”是近年来最离奇的国际协议之一。全文仅有两页，细节缺失，却 purportedly 向伊朗作出了重大的前期让步，以换取霍尔木兹海峡的开放——而早在特朗普总统2月发动战争之前，该海峡就已经处于开放状态，如今特朗普又希望结束这场战争。
该协议遭到了许多共和党人的严厉批评，而民主党人则以“早就告诉过你”的口吻回应，他们将这份协议与奥巴马时代的核协议相比较：那份协议长达159页，对伊朗的核项目设置了限制。
与此同时，伊朗方面对该谅解备忘录的解读甚至不要求保障霍尔木兹海峡的无障碍通行——而这恰恰是特朗普政府当初援引为签署该协议的核心理由。伊朗曾向违反其对协议解读的商业船只发射无人机。美国随即打击了伊朗境内的目标作为回应——并以此维护其对协议的解读。
几乎所有美国方面认为协议所代表的含义——从释放资金供伊朗购买美国大豆，到仅在伊朗采取行动后才解除制裁——伊朗方面都给出了截然不同的解读：伊朗认为解冻资金的使用不受任何限制，且解除制裁应作为进一步谈判的先决条件。
情况还在变得更糟。协议的第一段宣布在黎巴嫩停火，却未附带任何细节。伊朗将此解读为要求以色列撤离黎巴嫩南部——而以色列自2024年起就根据此前的停火协议驻扎在该地区。以色列拒绝了这一要求。随后在上周，以色列和黎巴嫩签署了一份单独协议，规定仅在黎巴嫩军队能够在这些地区驱逐真主党之后，以色列才会撤军。
伊朗称这份新协议违反了谅解备忘录。美国则表示，该协议只是纳入了谅解备忘录中已有的内容。
为了解决这种混乱局面，该协议的首席谈判代表、副总统JD·万斯曾表示，“文字并不重要”，而伊朗方面则将该谅解备忘录视为具有约束力的条约。
人们很容易将这种出尔反尔的做法嘲讽为近乎外交渎职。美国总统有史以来首次与伊朗伊斯兰共和国签署协议，但似乎没有人对该谅解备忘录的内容，甚至其目标达成一致意见。
本周在多哈，美国和伊朗团队本应举行会晤，以澄清双方的预期，或许还能启动仍处于停滞状态的核谈判——而谅解备忘录设想通过这些谈判达成一项全面协议。但特朗普政府的谈判代表只与卡塔尔调解人进行了会面，并未与伊朗方面接触，目前就连是否会举行低级别的会谈都存在争议。
无论这些会谈能否举行，我都不指望它们能取得多大成果。如果说谅解备忘录最初公布时就显得语无伦次，那么在实际执行过程中，它只会变得更加混乱。
然而，在或许是最重要的考验——时间与灵活性——面前，该谅解备忘录似乎正在发挥作用。亨利·基辛格曾说过：“当政治家想要争取时间时，他们会提出进行谈判。”
对美国和伊朗双方而言，情况似乎都是如此。霍尔木兹海峡长期的僵局正在损害各方利益。美国军方封锁了伊朗港口，扼杀了伊朗经济，而伊朗则以威胁商业航运的方式挟持了全球经济。
谅解备忘录让双方都得以退一步，喘口气。特朗普曾说过，不签署这份谅解备忘录就会引发全球经济衰退，这番话等于放弃了博弈。支持该协议的伊朗领导人也同样指出了协议将为伊朗带来经济收益。
至于这场争取到的时间会对哪一方更有利，现在还为时过早。如果两周前我刚读完这份谅解备忘录时被问到这个问题，我会认为这显然是伊朗的胜利。华盛顿方面付出了巨大代价，换来的几乎只有霍尔木兹海峡的开放这一点回报。
但快照式的观察，尤其是在中东地区，很少能说明全部真相——而这个故事仍在展开。甚至有一些因素对华盛顿有利。
1. 伊朗并未进行铀浓缩。伊朗的铀浓缩能力已被摧毁，且尚未重启。谅解备忘录要求伊朗维持这一现状，这使得伊朗几乎不可能制造核弹。就目前而言，这一最紧迫的威胁仍处于休眠状态。
2. 伊朗经济摇摇欲坠。国际货币基金组织近期报告称，伊朗经济将收缩6%以上。这是“自20世纪80年代以来最严重的经济收缩”，部分原因在于近期的战争。此外，预计通胀率将接近70%，而谅解备忘录中设想的制裁减免，充其量只能带来缓慢的经济复苏。
3. 美国的经济压力正在缓解。自谅解备忘录签署以来，全球油价已暴跌20%以上。这缓解了宏观经济压力，并且随着夏季度假季的到来，美国国内的汽油价格也有所下降。特朗普再次证实这是主要目标之一，他昨晚在社交媒体上发帖称：“美国人很快就能再次享受到我们在伊朗‘成功远征’前创下的最低油价纪录了。”
4. 伊朗的地区“轴心”趋于紧张。伊朗对谅解备忘录的胜利主义解读，最初给了真主党和整个地区其他伊朗代理人一剂强心针。然而，近期以色列与黎巴嫩达成的协议打乱了德黑兰的胜利节奏，就连在伊拉克——当地民兵曾加入伊朗对海湾国家的战争——新政府也在采取强硬措施，要求所有武装力量都置于国家控制之下。
5. 对霍尔木兹海峡的依赖度降低。伊朗曾通过封锁霍尔木兹海峡扭转局势，如今仍在主张对未来海峡通航的主权。这是一个严重的问题。但伊朗的行动引发了反制措施，包括新建完全绕过霍尔木兹海峡的管道和港口。其近期针对商业船只的袭击对全球油价几乎没有产生影响。
那么，我们现在处于何种境地？没人能给出确切答案。我猜测，目前这种局势还将持续一段时间，至少会延续到今年秋天以色列和美国的选举结束。
就目前而言，我们确切知道的是，大规模战斗已经平息；经济压力有所缓解；外交渠道已经开通——尽管这些渠道混乱且尚不成熟。
尽管存在种种问题，我还是要为这份谅解备忘录喝一声彩。因为在中东地区，情况总是可能变得更糟。
The Iran MOU is a mess. It still might work
2026-07-02T08:00:25.476Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/02/politics/us-iran-mou-analysis
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
The 14-point “Memorandum of Understanding” is among the oddest international agreements in recent memory. Short on detail, its two pages purport to grant significant up-front American concessions to Iran in exchange for opening the Strait of Hormuz, which was already open before the war President Donald Trump started in February and now hopes to end.
The document has come under withering criticism from many Republicans, while being met with a “told you so” flair from Democrats who point to the Obama-era nuclear deal by comparison: a 159-page agreement that placed limits on Iran’s nuclear program.
Meanwhile, Iran has interpreted the MOU to not even require unimpeded access to the Strait of Hormuz — the one issue the Trump administration cited as the reason for the agreement in the first place. Iran has fired drones at commercial ships violating its interpretation of the deal. The US struck targets inside Iran in response — and to uphold its interpretation of the deal.
Nearly everything the US says the deal means — from releasing funds for Iran to buy American soybeans, to sanctions relief only in exchange for Iranian actions — Iran in return says the deal means something different — with no restrictions on where frozen funds are spent, and sanctions relief as a precondition even for further talks.
It gets worse from there. The deal’s first paragraph declares a ceasefire in Lebanon, without any details. Iran read this to require Israel to leave southern Lebanon, where it’s been since 2024 under a prior ceasefire deal. Israel has refused. Then last week, Israel and Lebanon signed a separate agreement requiring Israel to withdraw only after the Lebanese army can displace Hezbollah in these areas.
Iran says that new agreement violates the MOU agreement. The US says it merely incorporates what’s already in the MOU.
To account for this confusion, Vice President JD Vance, the deal’s lead negotiator, has said the “words don’t matter,” whereas Iran cites the MOU as equivalent to a binding treaty.
It’s easy to lampoon such zigzags as borderline diplomatic malpractice. For the first time ever, the President of the United States has signed an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran and yet nobody seems to agree on what the MOU says or even what it’s supposed to do.
This week in Doha, the US and Iranian teams were supposed to meet to provide some clarity on mutual expectations and perhaps to start the still-dormant nuclear talks, which the MOU envisions leading to a comprehensive deal. But Trump’s negotiators met with Qatari mediators, not with Iranians, and there’s a dispute about whether lower-level talks are happening at all.
Whether those talks happen or not, I would not expect much to come from them. If the MOU seemed incoherent when it was first revealed, it’s only become more so in practice.
Yet, on perhaps the most important test of all — time and optionality — the MOU appears to be working. Henry Kissinger once said, “When statesman want to buy time, they offer to talk.”
That appears to be the case here, for both the United States and Iran. The prolonged stalemate in the strait was harming everyone. The US military blockaded Iranian ports, suffocating Iran’s economy, as Iran held the world’s economy hostage with threats to commercial shipping.
The MOU allowed both sides to pull back, and breathe. Trump gave up the game when he said the alternative to the MOU was a global depression. Iran’s leaders supporting the deal have similarly pointed to the economic benefits for Iran under the deal.
As for which side this bought time will advantage, it’s too early to say. If you had asked me two weeks ago and upon first reading the MOU, it appeared to be a clear Iranian victory. Washington was giving up a lot for almost nothing in return other than an opening of the Strait of Hormuz.
But snapshots in time, particularly in the Middle East, rarely tell the full story — and this story is still unfolding. Some factors are even running in Washington’s favor.
1. Iran is not enriching uranium.Iran’s enrichment capacity has been knocked out and has not restarted. The MOU requires Iran to maintain this status quo, making it nearly impossible to produce a bomb. For now, this most acute threat remains dormant.
2. Iran’s economy is reeling.The International Monetary Fund recently reported that Iran’s economy will contract more than 6%. That’s “the steepest contraction since the 1980s,” and it’s due in part to the recent war. In addition, inflation is projected to average nearly 70%, and the sanctions relief contemplated under the MOU means, at best, only a slow rebound.
3. US economic pressure is easing.Since the MOU was signed, global oil prices have plummeted over 20 percent. That has eased macro-economic pressures and reduced gas prices for Americans as the summer vacation season heats up. Trump confirmed again that this was a primary aim, posting on social media last night: “Gas Prices will soon be back to the Record Low Prices Americans enjoyed at the pump before our very successful ‘excursion’ in Iran.”
4. Iran’s regional “axis” is strained.Iran’s triumphalist reading of the MOU initially gave a shot in the arm to Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies across the region. The recent Lebanon deal with Israel, however, tripped up Tehran’s victory lap, and even in Iraq — where militias joined Iran’s war against the Gulf states — a new government is cracking down and calling for all arms to be under state control.
5. Less reliance on the strait.Iran effectively turned the tables on the US with its closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and it continues to assert sovereignty over future traffic. That’s a serious problem. But its actions have caused counter-reactions, to include new pipelines and ports that bypass the strait altogether. Its recent shots at commercial ships had little impact on global prices.
So, where does that leave us? Nobody can say for certain. My bet would be that this current situation sustains for some time, at least through elections this fall in both Israel and here.
For now, what we do know is that the major fighting has subsided; economic pressure has reduced; and diplomatic channels are open — albeit confused and fledgling.
And for all that, I say one cheer for the MOU. Because in the Middle East, things can always be considerably worse.
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