签署一周后:美伊协议究竟为双方带来了什么?


2026-06-26T09:00:25.677Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/26/business/america-iran-agreement-one-week-later

最重大的消息是,美国与伊朗不再处于公开交战状态。

就其本身而言,这已是一场胜利——在唐纳德·特朗普总统在法国签署暂停战斗的谅解备忘录一周后,这一协议很可能挽救了无数生命。考虑到华盛顿与德黑兰半个世纪的宿怨,以及该地区屡遭破坏的和平协议历史,此次停火绝非板上钉钉之事。

到目前为止,这份旨在展开永久和平谈判的14点框架谅解备忘录,也经受住了美国许多议员的质疑——他们曾认为该协议等同于美国的失败。

这是因为,如今重新陷入冲突的代价对美伊双方都高得令人望而却步,而此时正值美国中期选举前国内政治风云变幻的背景之下。特朗普上周透露,他不愿为更多战争付出经济代价。而伊朗现在又为何要打破停战协议呢?毕竟它无需放弃多少核心谈判筹码,就能立即获得诸多好处。

尽管该协议或许指明了一条脱离战争的道路,但它并非持久和平。这是典型的特朗普式策略:争取时间,将艰难的政治抉择延后至未来。

不过,双方的好处正陆续显现。

可以说,美国从该谅解备忘录中获得的最切实利益,来自伊朗重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。

根据使用应答器和卫星数据追踪航运活动的Kpler公司的数据,近日通过该海峡的船舶通行量大幅回升,周三达到70艘次。这一数字是周二的两倍多,但仍低于战争爆发前日均100艘次以上的正常水平。

海峡并未完全重新开放:伊朗仍要求船只在这条约23英里宽航道的北部航道航行时需获得许可,而海峡中部的水雷将通行限制在紧靠阿曼海岸的单一航道内。一名美国官员告诉CNN,周四有一艘货船在海峡内遭伊朗无人机袭击,这一迹象表明紧张局势仍在持续。该事件打乱了一项撤离行动——自战争爆发以来,数千名海员被困在波斯湾的船只上,此次行动正是为了疏散他们。

但日益增加的油轮通行量,仍是全球石油流通正常化的可喜一步。

霍尔木兹海峡的封锁曾造成史上最严重的石油冲击,据摩根大通预计,这将使全球石油供应减少创纪录的16亿桶。这带来了双重影响:油价高企,石油库存大幅减少,导致消费者信心暴跌至历史低点,并威胁通过石油短缺扰乱美国经济——特朗普上周承认,这一问题可能引发“经济灾难”,甚至会将他与大萧条时期的总统赫伯特·胡佛相提并论。

重新开放海峡——战争前该海峡一直处于完全开放状态——不会立即解决上述两个问题。而且,允许船只免费通行的协议仅在签署当周周四起生效,有效期为60天。此后,伊朗(可能还有阿曼)可能会收取通行费——此前通行费约为每桶1至2美元——这可能让伊朗每日获得数百万美元的收入。

关于海峡重新开放的好消息,附带了一个前提条件:伊朗可以再次开始出售石油。与战前不同,在美国财政部豁免制裁后,伊朗现在可以向任何国家出售石油。许多批评人士担心,伊朗将迅速借此重建其受损的军事力量,补充无人机和导弹项目,并重振包括黎巴嫩真主党和也门胡塞武装在内的代理人网络威胁。

伊朗已经重新开始运油,尽管目前几乎没有证据表明除中国外,它已向其他国家出售石油。据海事情报公司TankerTrackers的数据,在美国同意结束海军封锁后的第一周,伊朗就通过霍尔木兹海峡成功出口了380万桶石油。自那以来,其航运活动已大幅增加。

咨询公司Rystad的地缘政治分析主管豪尔赫·莱昂表示,伊朗目前每天的石油销量可能约为200万桶——比战前多出约三分之一。而且由于这些销售将合法化,伊朗将不再需要提供大幅折扣。

伊朗方面坚称,在获得超过1000亿美元目前被冻结在全球各地银行的资产之前,它不会同意任何长期协议。美国官员上周告诉CNN,在伊朗履行其承诺之前,不会解冻任何被冻结的资金。

谅解备忘录提到,伊朗的冻结资金和资产将“完全可供”伊朗央行使用,但未提及具体时间和范围。

该协议还可能设立一个3000亿美元的投资基金,助力伊朗重建。细节仍不明朗,但据政府透露,该投资基金将由私人出资,而非美国纳税人。特朗普上周在G7峰会期间对记者表示,其他国家和金融机构将可投资伊朗经济重建,但他认为,未来相当长一段时间内,外国投资者不会有太大兴趣。

该协议设想达成最终协议,取消对伊朗的制裁,使其能够与世界其他国家自由开展贸易。

一些外国金融机构可能更愿意与伊朗开展业务,不过许多机构可能仍会犹豫,除非美国财政部为特定交易颁发专门许可。一个重要的警告是:目前尚不清楚特朗普单方面解除制裁拥有多大权限。持怀疑态度的国会可能必须批准部分制裁豁免。

特朗普本周在社交媒体上表示,联合国核视察员将“无限期”获准进入伊朗。副总统JD·万斯称赞德黑兰同意让视察员入境是“一个重要里程碑”。

实际情况则更为复杂。目前尚不清楚伊朗伊斯兰共和国是否同意了任何条款。伊朗外交部发言人伊斯梅尔·巴盖伊暗示,在美国去年轰炸伊朗核设施后,伊朗暂停了与国际原子能机构的合作,德黑兰只是在履行其根据《不扩散核武器条约》承担的义务。国际原子能机构则认为,谅解备忘录要求其发挥关键作用。伊朗反驳称,任何视察都必须等到最终协议达成后。

围绕国际视察员的争端,曾导致美国与萨达姆·侯赛因时期的伊拉克持续数年的纠纷,近期也在伊朗上演。双方在联合国核查小组的具体法律权限和任务授权、人员构成,以及是否有权访问所有核设施或大规模杀伤性武器设施,包括疑似未申报地点等问题上僵持不下。

伊朗几乎肯定会重蹈覆辙。如果最终协议缺乏严格的核查程序来监督伊朗的遵守情况,那么这份协议将毫无价值。

谅解备忘录要求立即且永久停止所有战线的军事行动,包括黎巴嫩战线。但这个多次陷入内战、长期处于以色列与伊朗支持的真主党交战战场的国家,可能是该协议最脆弱的支柱。特朗普的批评者,尤其是以色列方面,担心该协议实际上会让伊朗得以重建一支因数月以色列打击而被削弱的代理人武装。通过说服特朗普将黎巴嫩纳入协议,伊朗可以向以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡施压,要求其限制以色列的军事行动——否则就可能导致这份在象征意义、政治和经济层面对特朗普都至关重要的协议破裂。

不过,以色列并不认为自己受该协议约束。过去以色列与真主党在黎巴嫩达成的停火协议往往以失败告终,而且在谅解备忘录签署前夕,以色列军队发动了25年来最深入黎巴嫩的军事行动。

特朗普政府和内塔尼亚胡团队毫不掩饰对战争结束的复杂情绪。随着美国与伊朗的谈判深入,以色列坚持保留为保护自身安全在黎巴嫩乃至整个中东地区采取行动的自由,这将考验特朗普的权威。

而伊朗几乎肯定会提醒所有人,它握有一张新王牌——威胁再次封锁霍尔木兹海峡。

One week in, what exactly are America and Iran getting from their agreement?

2026-06-26T09:00:25.677Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/26/business/america-iran-agreement-one-week-later

The big news is that the United States and Iran are no longer openly at war.

That is, in itself, a win that likely saved lives a week after President Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding in France to halt the fighting. That pause was never a given, considering a half-century of hatred between Washington and Tehran and a regional history of eviscerated peace deals.

So far, the MOU, a 14-point framework for talks on a permanent peace, has also survived the suspicions of many US lawmakers that it enshrines an American defeat.

That’s because the costs of plunging back into the conflict now are prohibitive for both the US and Iran and that comes against the backdrop of some heady domestic political winds ahead of the midterms. Trump revealed last week that he’s not prepared to pay the economic price of more war. And why would Iran break the truce now, since it’s getting an immediate flow of benefits without having to give up much of its core bargaining position?

Although the agreement may point to an off-ramp from the war, it’s not a durable peace. It’s a classic Trumpian device to buy time while shelving tough political choices for later.

Still, benefits for both sides are rolling out.

Arguably, the United States’ most tangible benefit from the MOU comes from Iran reopening the strait.

Vessel traffic through the strait has picked up dramatically in recent days, with 70 crossings on Wednesday, according to Kpler, which tracks activity using transponder and satellite data. That’s more than double Tuesday’s total, although still lower than the 100+ crossings typical before the war started.

The strait isn’t fully reopen: Iran continues to require permits to travel along the northern corridor of the around 23-mile-wide channel, and mines in the center restrict traffic to a single shipping lane that hugs the Omani coast. In a sign of persistent tensions, a cargo vessel was struck by an Iranian drone in the strait on Thursday, a US official told CNN. The incident disrupted an operation to evacuate thousands of seafarers from vessels stuck in the Persian Gulf since the war broke out.

But the increasing tanker traffic is an encouraging step toward normalization of global oil flows.

The strait’s closure created the largest oil shock in history and is expected to cost the world a record 1.6 billion barrels of oil supply, according to JPMorgan. That created a double-barreled effect of high prices and dramatically reduced oil inventories that sent consumer sentiment plunging to record lows and threatened to disrupt the US economy with oil shortages – a problem that Trump last week acknowledged could have led to “economic catastrophe” that would have earned him comparisons to Depression-era President Herbert Hoover.

Reopening the strait – which was fully open before the war – won’t immediately solve either of those problems. And the agreement to allow vessels to cross toll-free lasts just 60 days from last Thursday’s signing. Afterward, Iran (and, possibly, Oman) could charge tolls, which have amounted to around $1 to $2 a barrel – potentially giving Iran access to millions of dollars in revenue each day.

The good news about the strait’s reopening comes with the caveat that Iran can start selling oil again. And unlike before the war, Iran can sell to literally anyone after the US Treasury waived its sanctions. Many critics worry that Iran will quickly seek to rebuild its shattered military, replenish its drone and missile programs and revive the threat of its proxy network that includes Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen.

Iran has already started to ship oil again, although there’s yet scant evidence that it’s selling to anyone but China. It successfully exported 3.8 million barrels of oil from the Strait of Hormuz last week, immediately after the US agreed to end its naval blockade, according to maritime intelligence company TankerTrackers. It has ramped up its activity considerably since then.

It can probably sell roughly 2 million barrels of oil a day – about a third more than before the war, according to Jorge León, head of geopolitical analysis at consultancy Rystad. And because those sales would be on the up-and-up, Iran would no longer need to offer steep discounts.

Iran has insisted that it won’t agree to any long-term deal until it gains access to more than $100 billion of assets currently frozen in banks around the world. US officials told CNN last week that no frozen funds will be released until Iran makes good on its commitments.

The MOU states that Iran’s frozen funds and assets will be made “fully available” for use by Iran’s central bank but does not detail timing or scope.

The agreement could also establish a $300 billion investment fund, which could help the country rebuild. The details remain murky, but the investment fund would be financed privately and not by US taxpayers, according to the administration. Trump told reporters at the G7 meeting last week that other countries and financiers will be able to invest in rebuilding Iran’s economy, but he doubts foreign investors will have significant interest for quite some time.

The agreement envisages a final deal removing sanctions on Iran to allow it to freely trade with the rest of the world.

Some foreign financial institutions could be more willing to do business with Iran, though many will probably hesitate unless the US Treasury issues specific licenses for particular transactions. A major caveat: It’s not clear how much authority Trump has to lift sanctions unilaterally. A skeptical Congress may have to approve some sanctions relief.

Trump said on social media this week that UN nuclear inspectors would be allowed access to Iran for “Infinity!!!” Vice President JD Vance hailed Tehran’s agreement to let inspectors in as a “major milestone.”

The reality is more complex. It’s not clear that the Islamic Republic has agreed to anything. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei suggested that Tehran was merely recognizing its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty after it suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the wake of US bombardment of its nuclear sites last year. The IAEA argues that the MOU requires it to play a key role. Iran counters that any inspections must await a final deal.

Showdowns over international inspectors caused years of disputes between the US and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and more recently Iran. Both sides dug in on the specific legal authority and mandates for UN teams, their make-up and whether they had freedom to visit all nuclear or weapons of mass destruction sites, including suspected undeclared locations.

Iran is almost certain to roll out the old playbook. And a final deal that lacks stringent verification procedures to monitor Iran’s compliance will not be worth the paper that it’s printed on.

The MOU requires the immediate and permanent halting of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon. But that country, repeatedly torn apart by civil war and a perpetual battleground between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, could be the deal’s most vulnerable pillar. Trump’s critics, especially in Israel, worry that the agreement effectively allows Iran to repair a proxy force diminished by months of Israeli pummeling. By convincing Trump to include Lebanon, Iran can pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to curtail Israeli military action — or risk the collapse of a deal hugely important to Trump, symbolically, politically and economically.

However, Israel does not consider itself bound by the deal. Past Israel-Hezbollah ceasefires in Lebanon have often failed, and, in the run-up to the MOU, Israeli forces made their deepest incursions into Lebanon in the past quarter century.

The Trump administration and the Netanyahu team have made no secret of raw feelings over the war’s end. And Israel’s insistence that it maintains the freedom to act to protect its own security in Lebanon — and across the Middle East — will test Trump’s authority as US talks with Iran deepen.

And Iran is virtually certain to remind everyone it’s holding a new ace — the threat of closing the strait.

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