2026-03-19T11:27:00-0400 / CBS新闻
以下是对国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·格罗西的采访完整实录，其中部分内容将于2026年3月22日在《Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan》中播出。
玛格丽特·布伦南：我们现在请到的是国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·格罗西。很高兴您能来到这里。
拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西总干事：谢谢。很高兴能在这里。
玛格丽特·布伦南：现在形势非常严峻，尤其是对您所负责的领域而言。您能向我们的观众解释一下吗？伊朗的核野心是否只能通过军事行动来摧毁？
格罗西总干事：当然，已经造成了大量损害。去年的12天战争在某种程度上非常有效。如果我可以用这个词的话，就是那种效果。从物理层面上分散了三个主要设施——或者我应该说是更多的建筑群，因为有很多建筑被……福特杜、纳坦兹和伊斯法罕，我们一直在关注这些。这一次，我认为行动的重点似乎并不是针对核设施，尽管纳坦兹、伊斯法罕以及帕琴附近的另一个地方也遭到了一些打击，那个地方曾经是与武器化努力更相关的设施，但那是在21世纪初。所以，虽然有一些打击，但我认为在考虑到目前军事行动的整体性质时，这些打击相对来说是边缘性的。回到您的问题，对该计划已经产生了很大影响。我们不能否认这确实大大延缓了该计划，但我对这些指标、天数、分钟、月份持非常怀疑态度，因为一切都是相对的。但我的印象是，一旦军事行动结束，我们仍然会面临一系列主要问题，这些问题一直是所有争议的核心。首先，最值得注意的是，60%浓缩铀的库存，这非常接近制造炸弹所需的浓度，它仍然会存在，很大程度上——
玛格丽特·布伦南：——在废墟之下。
格罗西总干事：——在废墟之下，有时可能没有废墟。而且在某些地方。此外，重要的是，一些设施、基础设施、设备很可能在一些袭击中幸存下来——它们可能受到了严重破坏，但我们只有在检查人员返回后才能确定。所以——
玛格丽特·布伦南：我们来谈谈这个。我听到您说，根据美国情报，伊朗的核武器计划在2003年就停止了。但正如您所知，关于伊朗的核计划是否真的有武器野心存在争议。您从来没有明确说是或否。
格罗西总干事：嗯，因为我们是——我们不是分析人员或有观点的人。我们是国际原子能机构。所以每当我们说某事时，都必须基于实际检查。但我们尽可能精确地描述我们所看到的情况。其中一个重要结论是，我认为我已经——我多次重复这一点，鉴于存在相互矛盾的说法，尤其是在美国，他们说有，他们说没有，什么——而且特别是人们往往喜欢我所说的句子的一部分而不是另一部分，或者忘记了两部分。问题是，而且一直是，是的，正如你所说，我们没有看到像艾哈迈德计划那样的系统性计划，有办公室人员向其他人汇报，以及一系列你在做事情的地方。但有很多令人担忧的事情，很多未解答的问题，尤其是自2019年、2020年我成为——或多或少，当我成为总干事时，在2015年、2016年《联合全面行动计划》（JCPOA），也就是之前的协议，你记得——
玛格丽特·布伦南：奥巴马政府时期的核协议——
格罗西总干事：没错。当该协议开始实施时，伊朗遵守了一些规定，但我们开始看到新的东西。我们开始看到并获得了新的元素，这些元素引起了担忧，我们一直在与伊朗讨论这些问题。你见过我很多次去德黑兰，签署声明并看到他们的承诺。然后到了一个非常重要的时刻，我说，你知道，鉴于此，我必须说，我不再能够说一切都井然有序——
玛格丽特·布伦南：因为您发现铀出现在不应该出现的地方，因为他们不允许您不受限制地进入。您无法明确地说，是或否。
格罗西总干事：正是如此。
玛格丽特·布伦南：我们回到这一点。根据您所知道的并能够在这些国际原子能机构报告中声明的内容，伊朗已经浓缩铀至60%，我理解武器级浓缩铀是90%。
格罗西总干事：是的。
玛格丽特·布伦南：如果战斗结束后这些材料仍然留在伊朗，那么如果它有浓缩材料和离心机，它还会有核能力吗？
格罗西总干事：嗯，你记得，为此，我会引用，或者部分提及伊朗人说过的话。你记得非常重要的官员说过，我们拥有了拼图的所有部分。你记得这个。当然，不是记者或报纸说的，而是参与该计划的重要人士说的。当这被说出来时，我们告诉他们，这没有帮助，或者至少你应该解释这意味着什么。这是一个庞大的计划，好吧，尽管已经对这些设施进行了物理上的分散，但仍然有很多事情在进行。而且不要忘记，玛格丽特。当我们谈论离心机时，当我们谈论这类设施时，这是一项相对来说——我不会说容易，但非常有可能重建的活动，这需要冶金学，是一种复杂的“洗衣机”。如果我可以这样说的话，你有舵。你有舵、波纹管，但这是关于金属，能够以某种方式弯曲金属，能够以某种方式焊接金属，能够让它高速旋转，还有膜。这没什么——我的意思是，你无法忘记你所学到的东西。
玛格丽特·布伦南：对，你不能用炸弹摧毁知识。所以这种能力在战斗后仍然存在——
格罗西总干事：——没错，而且非常复杂。我们不要忘记，再次回到《联合全面行动计划》。《联合全面行动计划》是基于或依赖于一种非常原始的离心机类型。现在伊朗拥有最复杂、最快、最有效的机器，他们知道如何制造它们，他们知道。除此之外，可能存在一些地方——可能不是核设施。我的意思是，可能是一个车间，数十个车间存在。而且——这种能力是存在的。这就是为什么我说我们仍然需要找到一个框架，一个商定的框架，它将为我们提供必要的可见性，并明确了解他们在哪里，他们想去哪里。
玛格丽特·布伦南：因为这场战争不会摧毁伊朗的核野心——
格罗西总干事：——任何战争——
玛格丽特·布伦南：——和能力。
格罗西总干事：——任何战争——
玛格丽特·布伦南：——任何战争。
格罗西总干事：——除非是核战争，并且以无法想象的方式进行破坏，当然我们希望这种情况永远不会发生。
玛格丽特·布伦南：那么，谈谈美国目前正在讨论的选择。包括特朗普总统和以色列谈到派遣特种部队去获取一些浓缩材料的可能性。您去过伊斯法罕，您见过一些地下设施。移动那里装满化学物质的圆柱体有多困难？
格罗西总干事：听着，当然，我不是军事专家，我不知道那里可能有什么能力，我毫不怀疑，你知道，考虑到美国今年进行的军事行动的效率，特别是从今年年初开始，也许他们有办法做到这一点，我不会对此进行评估。但我必须说，我们谈论的是装有高度污染六氟化铀的圆柱体，浓度为60%，这非常难以处理。正是因为这个原因，在谈判中，我们可能会讨论这个问题，但这并没有取得成果。我们讨论的事情之一是将其降级，因为在比如船只运出材料、偷运材料的情况下，处理起来非常困难。所以这非常困难。当然，我猜那里会有很多诱饵，很多分散注意力的圆柱体、材料，这会使事情变得非常困难。我不是说这是不可能的。我知道这里有难以置信的军事能力来做到这一点，但这肯定是一项非常具有挑战性的行动。
玛格丽特·布伦南：进行军事行动。战斗结束后，伊朗的外交部长上周在这个项目上告诉我们，他们的核材料在废墟之下，并且愿意与您的机构合作。就像美国开始轰炸之前他们进行谈判那样。您是否与白宫讨论过这样的想法，即您的检查人员可以进去收集这些材料并将其运出？
格罗西总干事：我们当然在考虑这些选择。我们与伊朗的关系是基于条约的义务，因为即使在这场战争和我们所处的形势下，伊朗仍是《不扩散核武器条约》的签署国，因此他们有法律义务允许我们的检查人员进入。当然，有常识。炸弹落下时什么都不能发生。但是的，我一直在白宫进行重要的谈话，也与伊朗进行。有一些接触，我们希望能够重新建立这条沟通线。
玛格丽特·布伦南：您认为您能够恢复在轰炸开始前正在制定的部分协议，比如伊朗将进行降级？我的意思是，阿曼外交部长在这个项目上说，伊朗同意零库存，他们同意将材料运出并稀释、降级。
格罗西总干事：是的。
玛格丽特·布伦南：真的有可能达成协议吗？因为就在轰炸开始前几个小时，他告诉我们和平是可能的。
格罗西总干事：当进行谈判时，总是有可能达成协议的。我们不能否认这一点。
玛格丽特·布伦南：但您认为伊朗真的在提供选择吗？
格罗西总干事：有过讨论，但没有达成协议。
玛格丽特·布伦南：在轰炸开始的那个周五并没有达成协议。阿曼外交部长说他需要再90天。真正的协议有可能达成吗？
格罗西总干事：嗯——也许，我想——我赞扬他的努力。我非常尊重他。我认为他真的非常非常努力，我们进行了长时间的讨论。他邀请我参加，当然，和今天的两个交战国一起。所以我们进行了非常坦诚和深入的讨论。我们不能否认有人试图阻止战争的努力是高尚的，我作为一名外交官和公民对此表示赞赏。但当时没有达成协议。正是因为如此——记住这一点，你记得我们同意在周末行动开始后的周一举行技术会议。这应该告诉你，当时存在非常重大的分歧，如果不是分歧的话，我们对很多讨论的内容没有达成一致。这就是为什么我提出，我说，好吧，让我们——技术层面，派你的人到维也纳。我们会仔细研究，看看这个或那个可能意味着什么。
玛格丽特·布伦南：您希望继续对话以避免军事行动？
格罗西总干事：嗯，我觉得那是我的义务。我被邀请提供技术支持。
玛格丽特·布伦南：好的，我们来谈谈这个。因为，你知道，伊朗否认他们现在有武器计划，但他们确实有核计划，包括德黑兰的一个用于医疗同位素的研究堆。特朗普总统告诉记者，这是“一个完全虚假的借口，以掩盖他们在那里囤积的事实。”他指的是核燃料。国际原子能机构监测那个地点。伊朗在那里做的是不是秘密囤积材料？
格罗西总干事：让我们试着澄清一下，稍微展开一下，因为我看到对德黑兰研究堆是什么、那里发生了什么存在很多混淆。对于谈判中可能发生的事情，相关的重要点是，这个研究堆，一般来说，研究堆需要20%浓度的燃料。
玛格丽特·布伦南：这在现有协议中是允许的。
格罗西总干事：是的，但——是的，一般来说是允许的。但问题是，我们当时正在进行的谈判是基于不进行任何浓缩的假设。
玛格丽特·布伦南：零浓缩？
格罗西总干事：零或非常非常有限的浓缩。所以当你谈论20%时，你超过了那个数量。不管是否有囤积。这个概念，我希望观众能理解，如果你达成一项协议，该协议假设你可以有20%的浓缩，这是《联合全面行动计划》允许的三倍或四倍。你记得，《联合全面行动计划》中同意的浓缩水平是3.6。一般来说，浓缩——
玛格丽特·布伦南：但有允许用于这些医疗——我应该澄清一下。我说的是特朗普总统。我指的是他的官员，他的代表说。但对你来说，你——你确实对德黑兰研究堆有疑问。我提到这个是因为这些特朗普官员一直指向国际原子能机构，认为该机构提供的信息让他们说，等等，伊朗从未用这些材料制造过哪怕一种药物，他们在那里所做的一切都是为了掩盖可能的核计划。这是你告诉美国的吗？
格罗西总干事：嗯，你在那里把与意图相关的话放进去了。我不介入“掩盖”或类似的事情。我能说的是，这是一个潜在可用于放射性同位素生产的反应堆。使用非常非常有限。我们正在检查这个设施。实际上，我们一直在检查它。所以使用是有限的。当然，伊朗完全有权说，不，我们将有一个用于放射性同位素的大型计划，你知道，这是用来检测甚至治疗癌症的。所以这是一个[听不清]。
玛格丽特·布伦南：但国际原子能机构是联合国，这应该只是像我们这里常说的那样，只根据事实来判断，只根据他们所看到的来判断？
格罗西总干事：是的。
玛格丽特·布伦南：正如您所看到的，伊朗可能一直在作弊？
格罗西总干事：我认为，再次回到判断的问题，我们必须有确定性。我们——我回到我们在对话开始时讨论的内容，玛格丽特。有很多未解答的问题，很多未解答的问题，很多令人担忧的事实。我们向伊朗提出的要求是，给我们所需的清晰度。如果你说有一个宗教法令禁止该国发展核武器，那么让我们核实。如果你没有什么可隐瞒的，顺便说一句，这是我们在国际原子能机构告诉每个人的，如果你说，你没有什么可隐瞒的？让我们看看。
玛格丽特·布伦南：对，您想要，您现在想要那种访问权限。美国国家情报局局长昨天告诉国会，伊朗的浓缩计划被摧毁了，美国没有看到他们试图重建浓缩能力的任何努力。您同意这个评估吗？您有任何迹象表明新的最高领袖想要核武器计划吗？
格罗西总干事：嗯，我不否认这一点。我们没有看到大规模活动，这是合乎逻辑的，因为有——有一场军事行动正在进行，无论如何——你不会开始，你知道，用起重机和工人——
玛格丽特·布伦南：——但根据国务卿的说法，在战争爆发前他们也没有这样做。
格罗西总干事：也许吧。顺便说一句，我们拥有卫星图像，对吧？至少国际原子能机构可能有其他技术手段或人员手段来检查正在发生的事情。就我们而言，我们没有看到活动。但正如我所说，仍然有很多东西幸存下来。他们有能力，有知识，有工业能力来做到这一点。这就是为什么我们需要回到谈判桌。这是必要的。
玛格丽特·布伦南：美国在外交过程中九个月内轰炸了两次。现在谁有信誉来领导谈判？您认为需要区域对话吗？
格罗西总干事：我认为区域对话不会——任何事情都可能发生，国际原子能机构会提供帮助。但这是关于一个高度敏感的国家安全问题，比如核计划的国家层面的计划。所以，我看不出区域会议或对话如何比必要的对话更有效。当然，我们需要美国和伊朗坐到谈判桌前。国际原子能机构可能会提供帮助，我不知道。阿曼的努力可能会恢复，我不知道，这不是我的讨论，这是政治讨论。但我认为任何人都不会不同意，即使在华盛顿这里，为了持久、长期的解决方案，我们将不得不再次坐在谈判桌前。
玛格丽特·布伦南：伊朗已经联系您了吗？他们的外交部长说他有兴趣进行谈判？
格罗西总干事：这——我不会这么说，那样对他不公平。但有一些接触。
玛格丽特·布伦南：让我再问您一个问题。您说大约一半的核材料在伊斯法罕附近。
格罗西总干事：嗯，稍微多一点。有——但大部分材料在那里。这不是秘密，因为我看到了很多关于它的炒作。这已经在我们的报告中提到了。绝大多数都在那里。纳坦兹也有一些，还有其他一些地方。
玛格丽特·布伦南：现在重点是这些特朗普官员提出的其他未申报设施。例如，有一个叫Pickaxe Mountain的设施出现了。您对那些其他设施有担忧吗？
格罗西总干事：嗯，我们应该——我们应该去检查那些。它们当时并不在运转。这就是为什么我们没有去。你可能记得，在2025年6月行动前夕，伊朗宣布他们在伊斯法罕有一个新的浓缩设施。
玛格丽特·布伦南：是的。
格罗西总干事：就在同一天，我发出了紧急检查的请求，这得到了批准，检查人员在那里，然后袭击发生的那个晚上。所以我们从未有机会看到那个地方。我们最终必须去那里检查。
玛格丽特·布伦南：但最后——最后一个想法。您认为特朗普总统支持我听到您说的话，即军事行动无法摧毁伊朗的核计划，并且了解他们真正在做什么的唯一方法是实地检查，而这也无法被美国军方完全做到？
格罗西总干事：嗯，我认为——我不知道他是否会支持这一点，但他也说过，当然，外交是首选方案。我认为这是令人鼓舞的，我们过去和现在都进行了非常有建设性的对话。所以——
玛格丽特·布伦南：您和他谈过吗？
格罗西总干事：没有和总统谈过，没有。我还没有荣幸和他谈过。但我在和过去我一直交谈的人交谈。我们继续——我们继续这种——这种努力。我认为这一点的本质是，在最黑暗的时刻，我们永远不应该失去希望。
玛格丽特·布伦南：格罗西总干事，感谢您的时间。
格罗西总干事：非常感谢。
玛格丽特·布伦南：我们稍后回来。
Transcript: International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi on “Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan,” March 22, 2026
2026-03-19T11:27:00-0400 / CBS News
The following is the full transcript of the interview with International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi, a portion of which will air on “Face the Nation with Margaret Brennan” on March 22, 2026.
*
MARGARET BRENNAN: And we’re joined now by the Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi. It’s good to have you here.
DIRECTOR GENERAL RAFAEL MARIANO GROSSI: Thank you. It’s good to be here.
MARGARET BRENNAN: These are some very serious times, particularly for you and your portfolio. Can you explain to our audience, can Iran’s nuclear ambitions be destroyed through military action only?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, of course, there has already been a lot of damage done. Last year, the 12 Day War was, in that sense, quite effective. If I can use that, that word, that kind of word. In terms of the physical distraction at three of the major facilities- or more compounds, I should say, because you have many buildings that have been- Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan, we have been covering, covering that. This time around, I think the focus of the campaign does not seem to be specifically the nuclear facilities, although there have been some hits in Natanz and Isfahan and also at another place near Parchin, which used to be a facility more related to the weaponization efforts, but back in the early 2000’s. So, there has been some, but I would say they have been relatively marginal when you consider the overall nature of the military campaign so far. So, going back to your question, there has been a lot of impact on the program. One cannot deny that this has really rolled back the program considerably, although, you know, I’m very skeptical about these metrics, days, minutes, months, because everything is relative. But my impression is that once the military effort comes to an end, we will still inherit a number of major issues that have been at the center of all of this. One, most notably, the inventory of enriched uranium at 60%, which is very close to the degree you need to make a bomb, that is going to still be where it is, largely–
MARGARET BRENNAN: –Under the rubble.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: –Under the rubble, and in some cases no rubble. And some- somewhere under. And also, importantly, some facilities, infrastructure, equipment, which have most probably survived some of the attacks, even- they could be damaged, seriously damaged, but that is something that we will only be able to ascertain once our inspectors go back. So–
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let’s talk about that. What I heard you say there is, Iran had that nuclear weapons program that in 2003, according to U.S. intelligence, was halted. But as you know, there’s this debate over whether Iran’s nuclear program actually did have a weapons ambition. You were never quite able to say yes or no.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, because we are- we are not analysts or people having opinions. We are the IAEA. So whenever we say something, it has to be based on actual inspection. But, we were as precise as we could be in terms of characterizing what we were seeing. And one important conclusion of that was, and I think I have- I have repeated that in view of the conflicting narratives that are out there, especially here in the United States, they have it, they don’t have it, what- and in particular, people tend to like part of a sentence I pronounce and not the other, or forget the two. And the thing is, and continues to be one, yes, like you say, yes, we haven’t seen a systematic program like the Ahmad plan, with offices people reporting to people, and an array of places where you are doing stuff. But there were many, many concerning things, many unanswered questions, and especially since 2019, 2020 when I became- more or less, when I became director general, where yes, in 2015 in 2016 when the JCPOA, the previous agreement, you remember–
MARGARET BRENNAN: The Obama-era nuclear accord–
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Exactly. When that started to be applied, Iran was complying with a number of things, but we started seeing new stuff. We started seeing and getting new elements that gave rise to concerns, and we were talking about them with Iran. You’ve seen me many times go to Tehran, sign declarations and see commitments on their part. And then it came a point, very important point, when I said, you know, in view of this, I have to say that I’m no longer able, I’m no longer able to say that everything is in order–
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because you were finding uranium in places it wasn’t supposed to be because they weren’t allowing you unfettered access. You couldn’t say clearly, one way or the other.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Exactly that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let’s come back to that. I- according to what you did know and did- were able to declare in these IAEA reports, Iran had uranium enriched up to 60%, weapons-grade is 90 as I understand it.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yeah.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And if that material remains now in Iran after combat ends, will it still have nuclear capabilities if it has the enriched material and the centrifuges?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, you remember, and for this, I would quote, or partially refer to things that have been said in Iran by Iranians. You remember very important officials saying, we have all the elements of the puzzle. You remember that. So, of course, and not said by a journalist or a newspaper, important people that had been working in the program. So when this is said, we were telling them, this is unhelpful, or at least you should explain what is- what is meant by that. The- it’s a vast program, all right, and so albeit the physical distraction that has been operated, acted upon these facilities, there’s a lot going on. And don’t forget something, Margaret. When we talk about centrifuges, when we talk about this kind of facilities, this is an activity that can be relatively, I wouldn’t say easily, but it is very possible to reconstruct this effort is metallurgy, is a sophisticated washing machine. If I can put it like that, you have rudders. You have rudders, bellows, but it’s about metal, the ability to curve metal in a certain way, the ability to weld it in a certain way, the ability to have it spin at great speed, membranes. It’s nothing- I mean, and you cannot unlearn what you’ve learned.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right, you can’t bomb away the knowledge. So that capability will exist after combat–
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: –Exactly, and it was very sophisticated. Let’s not forget, again, referring back to JCPOA. JCPOA was based, or predicated upon a very primitive type of centrifuge. Now Iran has the most sophisticated, fast and efficient machine that exists, and they know how to make them, they know. And on top of that, there might- there may be places out there which are not nuclear places. So, I mean, could be a workshop, dozens of workshops that exist. And they- this capability exists. This is why, what I say is that we still need to find a framework, an agreed framework, that is going to be providing us with the necessary [sic] visibility and sense of a clear idea of where they are, where they want to go.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Because this war will not destroy Iran’s nuclear ambitions–
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: –any war–
MARGARET BRENNAN: –and capabilities.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: I would say any war–
MARGARET BRENNAN: –Any war.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: –unless it was nuclear war and you go for destruction in an unfathomable way, which we hope, of course, will not- never be the case.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Well, talk to me about the options that we know are being discussed by the United States right now. Including President Trump and Israel have talked about the potential of sending special forces in to secure some of this enriched material. You have been to Isfahan, you have seen some of the underground facilities. How difficult would it be to move these cylinders that are there full of chemicals?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Listen, of course, I’m not, I’m not a military expert, and I don’t know what kind of abilities there could be out there, and I have no doubt that, you know, looking at the efficiency of military operations that the United States has been performing this year, in particular from the beginning of the year, perhaps there are ways that they can do that, and I will not enter into- into that assessment. But I have to say that we’re talking about cylinders containing gas of highly contaminated uranium hexafluoride at 60%, so it’s very difficult to handle. So much so that, for example, in terms, of this negotiation, we might perhaps discuss that a little bit, that did not bear fruit. One of the things that we were discussing was downblending it because of its difficulty in terms of handling in the scenario, for example, of a ship out of the material, exfiltrating the material. So it is very difficult. Then, of course, I guess there will be a number of decoys, a number of distracting cylinders, materials over there, which would make it very difficult. I’m not saying it’s impossible. I know that here there are incredible military capacities to do that, but it would be very challenging operation for sure.
MARGARET BRENNAN: For special- for a military operation to be carried out. After combat ends, Iran’s foreign minister on this program last week told us their nuclear material is under the rubble and they’d be willing to deal with your agency. Just like they were negotiating before the U.S. started bombing. Have you talked to the White House about this idea that your inspectors can go in and gather that material and take it out?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: We are considering these options, of course. Our relationship with Iran is a treaty-based obligation, because even in the context of this war and the situation that we are in, Iran is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, so they have a contractual obligation to allow our inspectors in. Of course, there’s common sense. Nothing can happen while bombs are falling. But yes, I’ve been having important conversations here at the White House, and also with Iran. There are some contacts, and we hope to be able to reestablish that line.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Do you think you can revive parts of that deal that were being put together before the bombing began, where Iran would downblend? I mean, Oman’s Foreign Minister on this program said that Iran had agreed to zero stockpiling, that they had agreed to send that material out and to dilute it down, downblend it.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yes.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Was there really the possibility of a deal? Because it was just hours before the bombing began that he told us peace was possible.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: While, while there’s a negotiation, there’s always a possibility of an agreement. We cannot deny that.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But you believed Iran truly was offering an option?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: There was a discussion, but there was no agreement.
MARGARET BRENNAN: There was no agreement that Friday that the bombing began. The Omani foreign minister said he needed another 90 days. Would a real deal have been possible?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well- maybe, I think- I praise his efforts. I respect him enormously. I think he was really trying very, very hard, and we had long discussions. He invited me in, of course, together with the two belligerents today. So we were having very frank and very deep discussions. So one cannot deny the nobility of the effort of someone who’s trying to prevent a war, and I applaud that as a diplomat and as a citizen. But there was no agreement at that point. So much so- remember this, you remember that we had agreed to have a technical meeting on the Monday after the weekend where the operation started. That should tell you that there were very significant, if not disagreements, there was no alignment on what we- what many of the things that were discussed that really meant. And this is why I offered and I said, well, let’s- the technical level piece, send me your people to Vienna. We will go through this and see what this or that may- may mean.
MARGARET BRENNAN: You wanted to keep talking to avoid military action?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, I felt that that was my obligation. I was invited to provide my technical support.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Well, let’s talk about that. Because, you know, Iran disputes that they have a weapons program now, but they do have a nuclear program, including a research reactor in Tehran for medical isotopes. President Trump told reporters that this was “a complete and false pretense to hide the fact that they were stockpiling there.” He meant nuclear fuel. The IAEA monitors that location. Is that what Iran was doing, secretly stockpiling material?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Let’s try to clarify, unpack that a little bit, because there’s also a lot of confusion that I see in characterizing, what the- what the Tehran Research Reactor is, what is happening there. The relevant point for and in terms of this negotiation and what could have happened is that this research reactor, and in general research reactors, require for their fuel a level of enrichment which is 20%.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Which was permitted under existing agreements.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yes, but- yeah, it’s permitted in general. But the thing is that we were in the middle of a negotiation which was proceeding from the assumption that there wouldn’t be any enrichment.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Zero enrichment?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Zero or something very, very limited. So when you, when you talk about 20%, you are exceeding that amount. Forget about if there was stockpile or not. The concept, and this is what I would like your audience to grasp, that the idea that if you go for an agreement that presupposes that you can have 20%, this is three or four times more what the JCPOA was permitting. You remember, the level of enrichment agreed in the JCPOA was 3.6. In general, enrichment–
MARGARET BRENNAN: But there were allowments for these medical- I should just clarify. I said President Trump. I meant President Trump’s officials, his representatives said that. But for you, you- you did have questions about this Tehran Research Reactor. I’m bringing it up because these Trump officials keep pointing to the IAEA as providing information that made them say, wait a second, Iran’s not being honest. Is that what you were telling the U.S.?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Not about- we don’t discuss honesty or dishonesty. What we discuss is technical capabilities, and what technical capabilities may allow you to do or not. Intentions are legitimately discussed at the national level, and I won’t get into that discussion because every country and the United States and the President of the United States has every right to believe that they were going to do something or that they have an intention. My job is a different job, it is to explain, on the basis of the technologies that are there, what can happen and what is the impact vis a vis the negotiation you’re trying to get. And 20% is a lot of enrichment.
MARGARET BRENNAN: So then, was it correct for those Trump officials to say that the agency, your agency, provided the U.S. information that Iran never once used that material to make even a single medicine, that everything that was being done there was a cover for what could be a nuclear program?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, there you’re putting words that relate to intentions. And I don’t get into the cover or something like this. What I can say is that this is a reactor that potentially could be used for radio isotope production. There was very, very limited. We were inspecting this facility. We are inspecting it, actually. So there was limited use. Of course, Iran has every right to say, no, we are going to have a big program for radio isotope you know, this is what is used to detect and sometimes cure cancer. So it’s a [unintelligible].
MARGARET BRENNAN: But the IAEA is the UN, is this supposed to be just calling balls and strikes, as we say here, just calling it as they see it?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Yeah.
MARGARET BRENNAN: As you saw it, Iran might have been cheating?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: I think, again, to come to the judgment, we have to have certainties. What we- and I go back to what we were discussing at the beginning of the conversation, Margaret. There were many unanswered questions, many unanswered questions, many concerning facts. And what we were asking Iran is, give us the clarity that we need. If you say that you have a fatwa that prohibits the country to develop nuclear weapons, well, let us check. If you don’t have anything to hide, and this is, by the way, what we tell everybody in the IAEA, let’s say, operation, you don’t have anything to hide? Show us.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Right, and you want, you want that access now. U.S.- the U.S. Director of National Intelligence told Congress yesterday that Iran’s enrichment program was obliterated, that the U.S. has seen no efforts to try to rebuild their enrichment capability. Do you agree with that assessment? Do you have any indication that the new Supreme Leader would want a weapons program?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, I don’t disagree with that. We don’t see major activity, which is logical, because there is a- there is a military campaign ongoing, whatever- you’re not going to start, you know, bringing cranes and workers–
MARGARET BRENNAN: –but they weren’t doing it in the lead up to the war, either, according to the Secretary of State.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Maybe. By the way, what we have is satellite imagery, all right? So at least the IAEA, maybe others have other technical means or personal means to check what is happening. As far as we are concerned, we haven’t seen activity. But as I was saying, a lot still has survived. They have the capabilities, they have the knowledge, they have the industrial ability to do that. This is why we need to go back to a negotiating table. It’s going to be needed.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And the U.S. has bombed twice in nine months during the course of diplomacy. Who has the credibility to lead negotiations now? Do you think it needs to be a regional conversation?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: I don’t think a regional conversation would be- anything can happen, and the IAEA will help. But this is about a national program on a highly sensitive national security issue, like a nuclear program. So, I don’t see how a regional conference or conversation could be more effective than what is needed. We need the United States, of course, and Iran at the table. The IEA can help, maybe, I don’t know. The Omani effort could be revived, I don’t know, that is not my discussion, which is a political discussion. But I don’t think anybody would disagree, even here in Washington, that- that for a durable, long-standing solution, we will have to see each other again around the table.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And Iran has reached out to you? Their foreign minister has said he’s interested in a negotiation?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: It’s- I wouldn’t say that, it would be unfair to him. But there are contacts.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Let me just ask you about one other thing. You said about half the nuclear material was around Isfahan.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, it’s a little bit more. There is- but the majority of the material is there. And this is no secret, because I’ve seen a lot of hype about it. This has been in our reports. The vast majority is there. There is some in Natanz as well, and some other parts.
MARGARET BRENNAN: There is focus on these other undeclared facilities President Trump has brought up. There’s a facility called Pickaxe Mountain, for example, that comes up. Are you concerned about those others?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well we should have- we should visit those. They were not operational. So this is why we hadn’t. You may remember that on the- on the eve of the June 2025 campaign, Iran announced that they had a new enrichment facility in Isfahan.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Yes.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: On the same day, I issued a request for an urgent inspection, which was granted, and the inspectors were there, and the morning where the- or the, you know, late night when the attacks happened. So we never got to see the place. We will have to go there eventually.
MARGARET BRENNAN: But just- final thought here. Do you think President Trump supports what I heard you say, which is that a military campaign cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear program, and that the only way to understand what they’re really doing is to be on the ground inspecting it, and that can’t be done by the United States military fully either?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Well, I think- I don’t know what he- whether he would endorse this or not, but he has said also that, of course, diplomacy is the preferred option. I think that is encouraging, and we have had a very constructive conversation in the past, and now. So–
MARGARET BRENNAN: Have you spoken to him?
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Not to the president, no. I hadn’t had the honor. But I was talking to people that I have been talking in the past. And we continue- we continue this- this effort. I think the essence of this is that in the bleakest hour, we should never lose hope.
MARGARET BRENNAN: Director Grossi, thank you for your time.
DIRECTOR GENERAL GROSSI: Thank you very much.
MARGARET BRENNAN: And we’ll be right back.