2026-03-20T12:27:19-0400 / CBS News
联合国最高核监督机构表示，尽管美国军事打击已削弱伊朗的核计划，但伊朗仍可能恢复部分核项目，并且称任何回收伊朗浓缩铀库存的任务都将极其困难。
国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·格罗西（Rafael Grossi）周四接受《面对国家》主持人玛格丽特·布伦南（Margaret Brennan）采访时表示，美国与以色列对伊朗的战争已接近三周。特朗普总统将伊朗核计划视为战争的一个催化剂，指责伊朗有制造核武器的野心，而伊朗对此予以否认。
格罗西谈到了伊朗核计划的可能状态、重启的前景以及战争前达成限制该计划协议的可能性。
以下是最重要的要点：
战争结束后，“我们仍将面临诸多重大问题”
格罗西表示，美国的军事行动已使伊朗核计划降级——但该计划的部分内容得以保留，伊朗仍拥有浓缩铀的技术专长。
格罗西称，去年6月美国对伊朗三个核设施（福特多和纳坦兹浓缩设施以及伊斯法罕研究设施）的轰炸行动“相当有效”。尽管格罗西表示，考虑到战争的广泛范围，当前军事行动中也有报道称对核设施进行了打击，但这些打击“相对有限”。
“不能否认，这确实大大倒退了该计划，”他说。“但我的印象是，一旦军事行动结束，我们仍将面临一系列在这一切中处于核心位置的重大问题。”
据格罗西称，这些长期存在的问题包括伊朗储存的60%丰度浓缩铀，这一步已接近武器级材料，以及一些可能在美军轰炸中幸存下来的设施。
美国国家情报总监图尔西·加巴德（Tulsi Gabbard）本周向议员作证时表示，伊朗在6月的打击后并未试图重建其铀浓缩能力。格罗西表示，国际原子能机构也没有“看到”表明正在进行重建的活动。
但“很多东西仍然存在，”格罗西补充道。“他们有能力，有知识，有工业能力去做。”
军事行动中移除高浓缩铀将“极具挑战性”
在去年6月的空袭之前，国际原子能机构评估伊朗已将约972磅铀浓缩至60%纯度。根据国际原子能机构的标准，约92.5磅铀在浓缩至90%时理论上足以制造一枚核武器。
格罗西指出，大部分材料可能仍埋在废墟之下。
据哥伦比亚广播公司新闻报道，特朗普尚未决定是否派遣美军进入伊朗夺取这些材料，这将是一次危险的行动。白宫新闻秘书卡罗琳·莱维特（Karoline Leavitt）并未排除这种可能性，告诉记者地面行动“是他考虑的一个选项”。
格罗西表示，回收这些材料将非常困难。
“我们谈论的是含有60%浓度高度污染铀六氟化物气体的钢瓶，因此很难处理，”他说。“我不是说这不可能。我知道这里有难以置信的军事能力去做到这一点，但这肯定是一个非常具有挑战性的行动。”
格罗西指出，在美国与伊朗在战争前举行间接和平谈判期间，谈判代表讨论了将伊朗高浓缩铀“降级”以使其更容易处理的问题。
伊朗可以重建离心机：“你无法忘记已经学到的知识”
格罗西表示，他认为伊朗的核浓缩计划“非常有可能重建”。
格罗西指出，即使空袭摧毁了伊朗的许多离心机，制造它们所需的知识也无法被炸毁。
“你无法忘记已经学到的知识，”他说。
格罗西将离心机——通过高速旋转分离出一种称为U-235的铀裂变同位素来浓缩铀——描述为“精密的洗衣机”。
他补充说，2015年美国与伊朗的核协议是以伊朗拥有“非常原始”的离心机为前提的，但从那以后，伊朗已开发出“最精密、快速和高效的机器，他们知道如何制造它们。”
与伊朗达成避免战争的核协议是否可能？
在当前战争爆发前的几周里，美国和伊朗的谈判代表就伊朗核计划进行了几轮间接谈判。在2月下旬美国和以色列的轰炸行动开始前几小时，调解谈判的阿曼外交大臣巴德尔·阿尔布赛迪（Badr Albusaidi）告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，“和平协议就在我们触手可及的地方。”
阿尔布赛迪描述了潜在的美伊协议的大致轮廓，包括伊朗同意“永远不会拥有……会制造炸弹的核材料”，以及一项将伊朗现有高浓缩铀库存降级的计划。
格罗西表示，与伊朗的协议尚未达成，但“只要有谈判，就总有达成协议的可能。”他指出，在敌对行动开始之前，谈判代表原计划在维也纳举行技术会谈，那里是国际原子能机构的总部所在地。
“我们进行了非常坦率和深入的讨论。因此，不能否认有人试图防止战争的努力的高尚性，作为一名外交官和公民，我对此表示赞赏，”他说。“但当时没有达成协议。”
德黑兰研究堆是否是一个问题？
美伊谈判中一个明显的障碍是德黑兰研究堆，这是一个20世纪60年代的核反应堆，在美国当前政权（伊朗伊斯兰革命后）上台前由美国提供给伊朗。该反应堆——可生产用于医疗目的的核材料——由20%丰度的铀提供动力，这是向武器级90%丰度铀迈出的重要一步。
但特朗普曾推动伊朗终止所有铀浓缩，防止其为研究堆制造燃料。2015年伊朗、美国和其他几个大国达成的核协议（特朗普在其第一个任期内退出）只允许伊朗将铀浓缩至3.67%，但协议称如果需要，伊朗可以从国外购买研究堆的燃料。
战争开始后，一位特朗普政府高级官员向记者声称，伊朗实际上在研究堆储存铀，称其用于医疗目的的说法是“虚假借口”。该官员表示，美国谈判代表在国际原子能机构的帮助下发现了这一点，国际原子能机构透露伊朗在该设施储存的燃料超出了必要量。
当被问及这些指控时，格罗西表示，他的角色是提供技术专业知识，而不是权衡伊朗是否诚实或不诚实。但他说“20%的浓缩程度很高。”
格罗西指出，“我们当时正在进行的谈判是基于不会有任何浓缩的假设，或者‘非常非常有限的浓缩’。”
“所以……当你谈论20%时，你已经超出了这个数量。不管是否有库存，都无关紧要，”格罗西说。
国际原子能机构在伊朗发现的“新情况”
美国情报界去年春天评估称，伊朗并未积极制造核武器，而此前的武器化计划已于2003年暂停。但近年来，伊朗已将铀浓缩至60%，接近制造炸弹所需的水平。（伊朗长期否认有制造核武器的兴趣，并表示其项目是和平的。）
格罗西告诉哥伦比亚广播公司新闻，“我们没有看到系统性的项目”，如据称2003年前存在的核武器开发项目。
“但有很多令人担忧的事情，很多悬而未决的问题，”格罗西说。
他表示，2019年他成为国际原子能机构总干事，即特朗普退出奥巴马时代核协议一年半后，“我们开始看到新的情况。我们开始看到并获得新的要素，引起了担忧，我们正在与伊朗讨论这些问题。”
他称这些担忧包括在伊朗未正式申报为核设施的地方发现铀颗粒，格罗西在2024年的一份声明中公开了这一点。
去年，国际原子能机构正式宣布“无法核实是否有核材料被转移至核武器或其他核爆炸装置”。
标签:
- 拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西
- 伊朗
- 伊朗核计划
IAEA chief says “major issues” with Iran’s nuclear program could linger after war. Here are highlights from his CBS News interview.
2026-03-20T12:27:19-0400 / CBS News
The United Nations’ top nuclear watchdog told CBS News that Iran could revive parts of its nuclear program, though U.S. military strikes have dented it — and said any mission to recover Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium would be extremely difficult.
Rafael Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, spoke with “Face the Nation” moderator Margaret Brennan on Thursday, as the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran nears the three-week mark. President Trump has pointed to Iran’s nuclear program as one catalyst for the war, accusing Iran of harboring ambitions to build nuclear weapons, which Iran denies.
Grossi spoke about the likely state of Iran’s nuclear program, the prospect of restarting it and whether a deal to curb the program was possible before the war.
Here are the biggest takeaways:
After war ends, “we will still inherit a number of major issues”
Grossi said U.S. military action has degraded Iran’s nuclear program — but parts of the program have survived, and Iran still has the technical know-how to enrich uranium.
Last June’s U.S. bombing campaign against three Iranian nuclear facilities — the Fordo and Natanz enrichment sites and the Isfahan research site — was “quite effective,” Grossi said. Some strikes have also been reported on nuclear facilities in the current military operation, though Grossi said they have been “relatively marginal” considering the war’s broader scope.
“One cannot deny that this has really rolled back the program considerably,” he said. “But my impression is that once the military effort comes to an end, we will still inherit a number of major issues that have been at the center of all of this.”
Those lingering issues include Iran’s stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium, which is a short step away from weapons-grade material, and some facilities that have likely survived the U.S. bombing campaign, according to Grossi.
Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified to lawmakers this week that Iran did not attempt to rebuild its uranium enrichment capabilities following the June strikes. Grossi said the IAEA also has not “seen activity” suggesting a rebuilding effort.
But “a lot still has survived,” Grossi added. “They have the capabilities, they have the knowledge, they have the industrial ability to do that.”
Military operation to remove highly enriched uranium would be “very challenging”
Before last June’s airstrikes, the IAEA assessed that Iran had enriched some 972 pounds of uranium to 60% purity. According to the IAEA’s metrics, about 92.5 pounds is theoretically enough to build a single nuclear weapon if enriched to 90%.
Much of that material is likely still buried underneath the rubble, Grossi noted.
Mr. Trump has not made up his mind on whether to send U.S. forces into Iran to seize that material in what would be a dangerous operation, CBS News reported earlier this week. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt did not rule out the idea, telling reporters a ground operation is “an option on the table for him.”
Grossi said recovering that material would be tough.
“We’re talking about cylinders containing gas of highly contaminated uranium hexafluoride at 60%, so it’s very difficult to handle,” he said. “I’m not saying it’s impossible. I know that here there are incredible military capacities to do that, but it would be [a] very challenging operation for sure.”
Grossi noted that when the U.S. and Iran held indirect peace talks prior to the war, negotiators discussed “downblending” Iran’s highly enriched uranium to make it easier to handle.
Iran can rebuild centrifuges: “You cannot unlearn what you’ve learned”
Grossi said he believes it would be “very possible to reconstruct” Iran’s enrichment program.
Even if airstrikes have destroyed many of Iran’s centrifuges, the knowledge required to build them cannot be bombed away, Grossi noted.
“You cannot unlearn what you’ve learned,” he said.
Grossi described a centrifuge — which enriches uranium by spinning at high speeds to separate out a fissile isotope of uranium called U-235 — as a “sophisticated washing machine.”
He added that the 2015 nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran was predicated on Iran having “very primitive” centrifuges, but since then, Iran has developed “the most sophisticated, fast and efficient machine that exists, and they know how to make them.”
Was a nuclear deal to avert war with Iran possible?
In the weeks leading up to the current war, negotiators from the U.S. and Iran held several rounds of indirect talks over Iran’s nuclear program. Hours before the U.S. and Israel’s bombing campaign began in late February, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, who mediated the negotiations, told CBS News that a “peace deal is within our reach.”
Albusaidi described the broad contours of a potential U.S.-Iran deal, including an Iranian agreement to “never, ever have … nuclear material that will create a bomb,” and a plan to blend down Iran’s existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium.
Grossi said a deal with Iran had not yet been reached, but “while there’s a negotiation, there’s always a possibility of an agreement.” Prior to the start of hostilities, negotiators were set to hold technical talks in Vienna, home to the IAEA’s headquarters, he pointed out.
“We were having very frank and very deep discussions. So one cannot deny the nobility of the effort of someone who’s trying to prevent a war, and I applaud that as a diplomat and as a citizen,” he said. “But there was no agreement at that point.”
Was the Tehran Research Reactor a problem?
One apparent stumbling block in the U.S.-Iran negotiations was the Tehran Research Reactor, a 1960s-era nuclear reactor that the U.S. supplied to Iran before the country’s current regime rose to power during the Islamic Revolution. The reactor — which can produce nuclear material for medical purposes — is powered by 20%-enriched uranium, which is a significant step toward the 90%-enriched material used in weapons.
But Mr. Trump had pushed for Iran to end all uranium enrichment, preventing it from making fuel for the research reactor. A 2015 nuclear deal between Iran, the U.S. and several other major powers — which Mr. Trump withdrew from during his first term — only allowed Iran to enrich uranium to 3.67%, though it said Iran can buy fuel for the Tehran facility from abroad if needed.
After the war started, a senior Trump administration official alleged to reporters that Iran was actually stockpiling uranium at the research reactor, calling claims that it was needed for medical purposes a “false pretense.” The official said U.S. negotiators made that discovery with the help of the IAEA, which revealed that Iran had stored more fuel at the facility than necessary.
Asked about those allegations, Grossi said his role is to provide technical expertise, not to weigh in on whether Iran was honest or dishonest. But he said that “20% is a lot of enrichment.”
Grossi noted that “we were in the middle of a negotiation which was proceeding from the assumption that there wouldn’t be any enrichment,” or “something very, very limited.”
“So … when you talk about 20%, you are exceeding that amount. Forget about if there was [a] stockpile or not,” said Grossi.
The “new stuff” the IAEA saw in Iran
The U.S. intelligence community assessed last spring that Iran was not actively building a nuclear weapon, and a prior weaponization program was suspended in 2003. But in recent years, Iran has enriched uranium to 60%, near the level required to build a bomb. (Iran has long denied any interest in building a nuclear weapon and says its program is peaceful.)
Grossi told CBS News that “we haven’t seen a systematic program” like the alleged nuclear weapons development program that existed prior to 2003.
“But there were many, many concerning things, many unanswered questions,” said Grossi.
He said that after he became the IAEA’s director-general in 2019, a year and a half after Mr. Trump withdrew from the Obama-era nuclear deal, “we started seeing new stuff. We started seeing and getting new elements that gave rise to concerns, and we were talking about them with Iran.”
He said those concerns included the discovery of uranium particles in places that Iran had not formally declared as nuclear sites, which Grossi described publicly in a 2024 statement.
Last year, the IAEA formally declared that it “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material … to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
In:
- Rafael Mariano Grossi
- Iran
- Iran Nuclear Program