用联盟换岛屿?这是笔糟糕的交易


分析:布雷特·H·麦格鲁克(Brett H. McGurk),15小时前发布,2026年1月25日,美国东部时间上午6:00

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2026年1月23日(周五),格陵兰岛努克市的居民房屋上空,北极光点亮夜空。
乔纳森·纳克斯塔德(Jonathan Nackstrand)/法新社/盖蒂图片社

公元前416年,雅典城邦与宿敌斯巴达陷入长期冲突。多年来,雅典凭借与较小城邦的联盟和互助防御条约(即提洛同盟),一直享有相对优势。到公元前416年,提洛同盟已存在近70年,其时间跨度与现代北约(NATO)相当,后者是一个长期成功的互助防御联盟。

那一年,雅典认为地中海岛屿米洛斯(Melos)具有战略要地的重要性。米洛斯虽无自身军队,但其地理位置处于海上航线的交汇点,既能保护雅典势力,也能向外投射影响力。米洛斯长期奉行中立政策,但对雅典而言,这已不再足够。

当雅典代表团要求米洛斯并入其版图时,米洛斯人拒绝了,并援引雅典的逻辑与正义传统,寻求妥协方案。雅典人的回应是一句关于权力的名言:“正如世界所知,正义仅存在于实力相当的国家之间——强者为所欲为,弱者忍辱负重。”

得岛失帝国

雅典强行占领米洛斯,这一行为违背了其传统,并破坏了数十年来建立在共识基础上的联盟。此后不久,这些联盟因雅典依赖胁迫而非说服来维系而逐渐瓦解。不到十年,雅典战败,帝国崩塌。

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19世纪描绘爱琴海中火山岛米洛斯的插图(1860年)
环球历史档案馆/环球图像集团/盖蒂图片社

古希腊历史学家修昔底德(Thucydides)在《伯罗奔尼撒战争史》中记载了米洛斯事件及雅典帝国的衰落。他的“米洛斯对话”(Melian Dialogue)描述了该岛与雅典人的互动,并引用了那句关于全球权力政治的名言。然而,这个永恒的教训并非仅关于蛮力——而是警示:以牺牲联盟为代价使用蛮力,风险巨大。

特朗普的“格陵兰式对话”

在最近接受美国有线电视新闻网(CNN)杰克·塔珀(Jake Tapper)采访时,美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的高级顾问斯蒂芬·米勒(Stephen Miller)借鉴了修昔底德的思想,阐述了白宫获取格陵兰岛的逻辑:

“你可以大谈国际礼仪和其他一切,但我们生活在一个由实力、武力和权力支配的现实世界,杰克。这些是自时间伊始就存在的‘铁律’。”

米勒的观点有一定道理:权力及其投射仍是全球事务中不可分割的部分。从军事力量、经济韧性和推动全球创新的创业体系来看,美国当前仍是世界上最强大的国家。

但雅典也曾如此。正如当时的斯巴达之于雅典,中国如今也在快速追赶美国。这正是米勒的“铁律”存在重大缺陷的地方:它忽视了一个核心事实——长期维持全球权力的关键在于互利的联盟,而非蛮力与胁迫

格陵兰=米洛斯

现在,我们将这一历史教训应用到格陵兰岛的争议中。特朗普并非首位意识到格陵兰岛战略价值的人——它对美国防御而言,就如同雅典眼中的米洛斯。

1867年,林肯和约翰逊政府的国务卿威廉·西沃德(William Seward)以每英亩2美分的价格从俄罗斯购得阿拉斯加后,便将目光投向格陵兰。1868年,西沃德与丹麦谈判购买格陵兰,据传报价550万美元黄金,但因国会兴趣寥寥及战后美国的更大问题而搁置。

1946年,哈里·S·杜鲁门(Harry S. Truman)总统向丹麦出价1亿美元黄金,欲购格陵兰。冷战初期,格陵兰因其靠近苏联及北极地区的战略位置,被美军指挥部一致认为必须掌控。

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丹麦海军“埃纳尔·米克尔森”号(HDMS Ejnar Mikkelsen)于1月20日在格陵兰努克附近巡逻。
肖恩·加卢普(Sean Gallup)/盖蒂图片社

丹麦拒绝了杜鲁门的直接收购,但同意谈判军事协议,允许美国在全岛拥有无限期使用权和基地权利。1951年,《格陵兰防御协定》(Defense of Greenland Agreement)获国会批准。冷战高峰期,美国在格陵兰拥有数十个军事基地,而如今仅保留一个——这是美国的自主选择。1951年条约至今有效。

这段与格陵兰的历史,足以让修昔底德感到欣慰:美国通过联盟建设和共识式权力投射,最终击败苏联,实现了战略目标,而非依赖蛮力。

特朗普的永恒教训

特朗普将格陵兰视为美国战略优先事项,这一判断正确。事实上,在北极冰盖融化、新航道开通的背景下,格陵兰的战略价值远超杜鲁门时代。北极不再是缓冲地带,而是全球竞争的战略竞技场。俄罗斯已投入巨资打造破冰船队,掌控北极航道;中国虽无领土主张,却以“近北极国家”自居,联合俄罗斯建设“北极丝绸之路”,意图重塑全球贸易格局。

展望未来,北极航道(从东亚到欧洲)比苏伊士运河传统航线缩短5000英里,航行时间减少14天。格陵兰的地理规模和中心位置,能抵消俄罗斯在该地区对美国的部分优势,为美国提供一个北极支点——这是中国难以企及的。

然而,仅靠美国自身,无法在竞争激烈的北极与俄罗斯抗衡:俄罗斯北极海岸线长达15000英里(远超美国阿拉斯加的有限海岸线),拥有50艘破冰船(包括核动力),而美国仅有3艘非核动力破冰船。

但只要美国与北约盟友保持一致,一切都会改变:北约有8个北极沿岸成员国(加拿大、挪威、丹麦、冰岛、芬兰、瑞典等),总北极海岸线超10万英里(是俄罗斯的5倍以上),破冰船队规模也开始接近俄罗斯。所有这些领土和影响力,都通过共同防御协议紧密相连。

美国在北极的力量,如同雅典在地中海的霸权,不依赖单一岛屿(格陵兰),而依靠共识构建的联盟网络。任何试图以牺牲北约为代价,为北极或全球对抗俄罗斯/中国而强行获取格陵兰的政策,都是极度愚蠢的。

暂时的“下台阶”

本周在达沃斯论坛上,特朗普似乎放弃了通过武力或购买获取格陵兰的强硬立场,转而依靠杜鲁门时期的条约——该条约已为美国提供了岛上所需的一切。特朗普所谓的“无限”“无限制”交易细节尚未公布,但这两个形容词完美契合1951年的《格陵兰防御协定》。

特朗普或许未能得到全部想要的东西,但美国早已通过数十年建立的共识联盟,获得了中国或俄罗斯无法匹敌的真正超级力量。

关键问题在于:这场风波中可能被挥霍的是什么? 盟友的信任与信心需要数十年积累,却可能在数周内瓦解。希望本周的波折能成为加强联盟、巩固格陵兰地位的契机,并修复北约内部松动的信任纽带。正如修昔底德所言:任何大国都能夺取一片土地,但只有真正的强国才能维系其盟友。

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2026年1月21日,格陵兰努克,当地人在黄昏的雪岸线上站立。
乔纳森·纳克斯塔德(Jonathan Nackstrand)/法新社/盖蒂图片社

核心启示:权力的本质是联盟的延续,而非孤立的土地占有。美国若想在北极和全球维持领导地位,必须守护好以信任为基石的同盟网络。

Trade an alliance for an island? That’s a bad deal

Analysis by Brett H. McGurk, 15 hr ago, PUBLISHED Jan 25, 2026, 6:00 AM ET

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Aurora borealis lights up the night sky over residential houses in Nuuk, Greenland, on Friday, January 23.
Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty Images

In 416 BC, the city-state of Athens was in a prolonged conflict with Sparta, its archrival. For years, Athens had enjoyed comparative advantage over Sparta, particularly alliances and mutual defense pacts with smaller city-states known as the Delian League. By 416 BC, the Delian League had been in place for nearly 70 years, roughly the same as NATO, the modern equivalent of a prolonged and successful mutual defense alliance.

That was also the year that Athens came to view the Mediterranean island of Melos as vital for its strategic position. Melos had no military of its own, but it sat geographically at the intersection of maritime routes that helped both protect and project Athenian power. The island had long claimed neutrality, but for Athens, that would no longer suffice.

When an Athenian delegation demanded that Melos become a part of Athens, the Melians refused and appealed to Athenian traditions of logic and justice to work out a compromise. The Athenians responded with a famous line about power: “You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only a question between equals in power — while the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

Gain an island, lose an empire
Athens seized Melos, an exercise of brute force that was contrary to its traditions and what had built its consent-based alliances over decades. Shortly thereafter, these alliances frayed as Athens relied on coercion over persuasion to maintain them. Within a decade, Athens was defeated, and its empire collapsed.

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19th Century illustration depicting the volcanic Greek island of Melos in the Aegean Sea. Dated 1860
Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group/Getty Images

This account of Melos and the fall of the Athenian empire is recounted by the ancient Greek historian Thucydides. His “Melian Dialogue” describes the interaction between the island and the Athenians, together with the famous line about global power politics. The timeless lesson, however, is not about brute force alone — but rather the risks of using brute force at the expense of alliances.

Trump’s ‘Greenlandian’ dialogue
In a recent interview with CNN’s Jake Tapper, President Donald Trump’s senior advisor Stephen Miller took a page from Thucydides when he described the White House’s logic of acquiring Greenland:

“You can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else. But we live in a world, in the real world, Jake, that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power. These are the iron laws of the world that have existed since the beginning of time.”

Miller was correct that power and its projection remain an irreducible component of global affairs. He was also correct that the United States today remains the most powerful state in the world when measured by its military strength, economic resiliency, and entrepreneurial system that drives global innovations.

But that was also true of Athens, and like Sparta was for Athens back then, China is not far behind the United States today. That’s where Miller’s “iron laws of the world” fall well short: They fail to recognize that the lasting formula for maintaining and sustaining global power over time is through mutually beneficial alliances, not brute strength and coercion.

Greenland as Melos
Now, let’s apply all of this to what just happened with Greenland. Trump is not the first to recognize that Greenland, like Melos for Athens, is strategic ground for US defense

William Seward, Secretary of State for Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, after successfully negotiating to purchase Alaska from Russia for 2 cents per acre, set his sights on Greenland. By 1868, Seward’s negotiations with Denmark to buy the island made some progress, with an offer of $5.5 million in gold reportedly on the table, but they stalled as Congress showed no interest, and post-Civil War America had larger problems.

In 1946, President Harry S. Truman offered Denmark $100 million in gold for Greenland, driven by its strategic location at the start of the Cold War. Truman’s military command had unanimously urged the White House to acquire the territory given its proximity to Russia, and Moscow’s designs on the arctic region.

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The HDMS Ejnar Mikkelsen ship of the Danish Navy patrols on January 20, near Nuuk, Greenland.
Sean Gallup/Getty Images

Denmark turned down Truman’s offer, but it agreed to negotiate a military pact that gave Washington open-ended access and basing rights to the entirety the island. This treaty — the Defense of Greenland Agreement — was ratified by Congress in 1951. At the height of the Cold War, the United States had dozens of military bases and positions in Greenland. Today, there is only one — but that’s by choice. The 1951 treaty is in full effect.

This historical experience with Greenland would make Thucydides proud. America got all it wanted — and ultimately defeated the Soviet Union — through alliance building and power projection through consensus, not brute force and coercion.

The timeless lesson for Trump
Trump is right to identify Greenland as a strategic priority for the United States. In fact, the island matters even more today than in Truman’s time. As polar ice melts and new sea lanes open, the Arctic region is not a buffer but a strategic arena. Russia has invested massively in ice breaking ships to forge and control access routes. China, despite having no territorial access to the region, has declared itself a “near arctic state” and aims to build a “Polar Silk Road” together with Russia to rebalance global trading patterns.

Looking ahead, the Arctic region may soon be central to global commerce. Its Northern Sea Route from East Asia to Europe is 5,000 miles shorter (and fourteen days shorter in transit time) as compared to traditional routes through the Suez Canal. Greenland’s size and central location offset some advantages enjoyed by Russia over the United States in the region, and it provides an Arctic foothold that Beijing can never hope to match.

The US on its own, however, cannot effectively compete with Russia in a contested Arctic region. Russia’s Arctic coastline stretches 15,000 miles. That’s over ten times the size of America’s, limited to Alaska. Russia has a fleet of 50 icebreaking ships, including some that are nuclear powered. The United States has three, which are non-nuclear powered.

That all changes so long as the United States remains aligned with NATO. Together with the United States, NATO includes eight allies with arctic access — Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden. Combined, they have over 100,000 miles of Arctic coast — over five times Russia’s — and a fleet of ice breakers that begins to match Russia’s. All of this territory and the projection outward is linked through mutual defense agreements.

America’s strength and power in the Arctic region, like Athens in the Mediterranean, comes not from one remote island, Greenland, but rather from its web of consent-based alliances. Accordingly, any policy that would effectively risk jettisoning NATO to acquire Greenland for perceived advantage over Russia or China in the Arctic region or globally would be the height of folly.

A welcome off-ramp — for now
This week in Davos, Trump appeared to retreat from his insistence on acquiring Greenland through use of force or purchase — relying instead on the treaty Truman worked out that offers the United States everything it could possibly need on the island. Details of what Trump has called an “infinite” and “unlimited” deal are still unclear, but both of those adjectives aptly describe the Defense of Greenland Agreement of 1951. Trump may not get all he wanted, but America already has what it needs through consensual alliances built over decades — America’s true superpower that China or Russia can never match.

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Locals stand on a snowy shoreline at dusk in Nuuk, Greenland, on January 21.
Jonathan Nackstrand/AFP/Getty Images

The open question is what might have been squandered in this exercise. Confidence and trust with allies are earned over decades but can be lost in weeks. Let’s hope the twists over this past week result in a strengthened alliance — and a strengthened Greenland — and can begin to mend the frayed seems of trust within NATO. Because as Thucydides teaches, while any great power can seize a patch of land, only lasting powers sustain their friends.

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