2026-04-10T07:00:00 ET / CNN 政治频道
专栏作者：
艾伦·布莱克
北约 唐纳德·特朗普 中东
2025年6月25日，在荷兰海牙世界论坛举行的第76届北约峰会上，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普、北约秘书长马克·吕特及其他国家元首出席全体会议。
比阿塔·扎维泽尔/努雷照片/盖蒂图片社/资料图
在仍处于初期阶段的2026年里，唐纳德·特朗普总统第二次威胁要解散北大西洋公约组织——美国人明确支持这一联盟，却明确反对他此次出于外交政策冒险之举提出的理由。
上一次是他图谋收购格陵兰岛。现在则是针对伊朗的战争。
特朗普多次因北约成员国未协助美国对抗伊朗而迁怒于这些国家。上周他称北约是“纸老虎”，并表示正考虑退出该联盟，之后他于周三接待了北约秘书长马克·吕特。吕特告诉CNN，特朗普对北约许多盟友“明显感到失望”。
随后特朗普在社交媒体上抱怨该联盟，提及盟友们曾抵制他接管格陵兰岛的努力。格陵兰岛是北约盟友丹麦自治的领土。
“我们需要他们的时候北约不在，下次我们需要他们时他们也不会来，”特朗普在其Truth Social平台上写道，“还记得格陵兰岛吗？那块又大又管理糟糕的冰块！”
特朗普合法退出该联盟的可能性仍然极小；这是特朗普第一任期和第二任期之间国会为美国政府设置的少数几处“特朗普防线”之一。2023年，时任联邦参议员、现任国务卿的马可·卢比奥推动国会通过一项条款，要求美国退出北约必须经国会批准。
特朗普此番言论也有可能是虚张声势，目的是迫使北约以某种方式协助美国对抗伊朗（目前美伊之间处于脆弱的休战状态）。吕特周四暗示，在霍尔木兹海峡通航问题上，该方面可能会有一些进展。
但我们在格陵兰岛事件中也看到，即便不退出联盟，仅采取类似威胁的行动也会损害北约。加拿大总理马克·卡尼等盟友开始讨论不再以美国为中心重建联盟。
北约支持率居高不下，但分歧日益加剧
民意调查清晰显示：如果针对伊朗的战争进一步削弱北约联盟，这似乎会成为美国人比以往更强烈反对这场冲突的又一个理由。
近几个月的民调显示，绝大多数美国人支持北约并认为其重要——尽管这个曾属于无党派的议题变得愈发两极分化。
2月，特朗普称已就格陵兰岛问题达成模糊的“未来协议框架”，且伊朗战争尚未爆发，当时美联社-NORC的一项民调显示，70%的美国人认为成为北约成员国对美国“非常”（40%）或“有点”（30%）有利。
这至少是2022年北约团结支持乌克兰抵御俄罗斯入侵以来的最高支持率。
同样，盖洛普同月的民调显示，超过四分之三的美国人支持增加（28%）或维持（49%）美国对北约的现有承诺。这一综合比例是盖洛普自1998年开展相关民调以来的最高值（尽管1998年至2022年间没有相关调查）。
盖洛普民调还显示，约六成共和党人支持增加或维持对北约的现有承诺——较2022年的不足一半有所上升。仅有13%的共和党人希望像特朗普提议的那样完全退出北约。
伊朗战争爆发后，民调似乎出现了一些变化。
皮尤研究中心3月底的民调（距战争爆发约一个月）显示，认为北约“非常”或“相当”有利于美国的共和党及倾向共和党的独立选民比例，从一年前的49%降至如今的38%。
但该民调仍显示，近六成美国人对北约持正面看法，认为其对美国有利。
综合来看，数据表明近期事件影响了美国人对北约的看法。
格陵兰岛事件后，公众对北约的支持似乎有所上升。这合情合理，因为美国人压倒性反对特朗普接管该岛屿的企图。（1月路透社-益普索的民调显示，美国人以2比1的比例担忧该事件会损害北约及美国其他盟友关系。）
而如今这场在右翼群体中比收购格陵兰岛更受欢迎的伊朗战争，似乎让一些共和党人相信特朗普关于北约缺乏效用的说法是对的。
需要强调的是，北约是作为防御联盟创建的——并非为协助成员国发动的任何自选战争。因此，有人可以有理有据地辩称，北约在格陵兰岛事件中已经履行了职责，该事件与伊朗战争没有直接可比性。此外，北约第五条集体防御条款仅在2001年9月11日袭击后为支持美国而被援引过一次。
特朗普如何伤害北约
接下来会发生什么仍是一个巨大的未知数。
特朗普无法在未经国会批准的情况下退出北约，而这将是一项艰巨的任务。
但这并不意味着特朗普无法伤害北约联盟。
《华尔街日报》本周报道了特朗普政府内部流传的一些想法，包括将美军撤出被认为在伊朗问题上尤其不配合的国家，甚至可能关闭其中一国的军事基地。（特朗普2020年从德国撤出1.2万名美军，但后来乔·拜登推翻了这一决定。）
总统还通过关税政策，以及普遍将北约盟友与部分对手同等看待甚至更差的态度，损害了美国与北约及其他盟友的关系。
特朗普损害北约最被低估的手段之一，或许是让俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京在国际舞台上合法化。他推动美国——进而推动世界——更接近“强权即公理”的局面，让大国可以欺凌小国。卡尼将此称为“基于规则的秩序”的衰落。
伊朗战争的后果可能将持续很久。而在几乎所有领域中，北约联盟的未来恐怕是受影响最显著的领域之一。
Trump is bullying NATO again. But Americans like the alliance
2026-04-10T07:00:00 ET / CNN Politics
Analysis by
Aaron Blake
NATO Donald Trump The Middle East
US President Donald Trump, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and other heads of state are seen at the plenary session during the 76th NATO Summit in the World Forum in The Hague, Netherlands on June 25, 2025.
Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto/Getty Images/File
For the second time in the still-quite-young 2026 calendar year, President Donald Trump is threatening to blow up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Americans decidedly like, over a foreign policy adventure they decidedly do not.
First it was his designs on taking Greenland. Now it’s the Iran war.
Trump has repeatedly directed his ire toward NATO members over their lack of assistance to the US against Iran. After calling NATO a “paper tiger” and saying he was considering withdrawing from the alliance last week, he hosted on Wednesday NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who told CNN Trump was “clearly disappointed” with many of its allies.
The president then bemoaned the alliance on social media, referring to when allies resisted his efforts to take control of Greenland, a self-governing territory of fellow NATO ally Denmark.
“NATO WASN’T THERE WHEN WE NEEDED THEM, AND THEY WON’T BE THERE IF WE NEED THEM AGAIN,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. “REMEMBER GREENLAND, THAT BIG, POORLY RUN, PIECE OF ICE!!!”
It remains unlikely that Trump could legally pull the United States out of the alliance; that is one of the few ways in which Congress Trump-proofed the US government between his first and second terms. Thanks in part to now-Secretary of State Marco Rubio when he was a US senator, Congress in 2023 passed a provision requiring it to sign off on a withdrawal.
And it’s possible Trump’s talk is bluster intended to force NATO to help the US in some way against Iran (with whom the US is in a fragile truce). Rutte signaled Thursday there could be some movement on that front when it comes to opening the Strait of Hormuz.
But we also saw during the Greenland saga how even steps short of withdrawal can damage the alliance. Allies like Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney began talking in terms of moving forward without basing the alliance around the United States anymore.
NATO support is high — but it’s increasingly polarized
One thing is clear from public opinion polling: To the extent the Iran war further diminishes the NATO alliance, it would seem to be yet another reason for Americans to oppose the conflict even more strongly than they already do.
Polling in recent months has shown large majorities of Americans like NATO and view it as important — even as the once nonpartisan issue has become somewhat more polarized.
An AP-NORC poll in February, after Trump said he’d secured a vague “framework of a future deal” on Greenland and before the Iran war began, showed 70% of Americans said being a NATO member was “very” (40%) or “somewhat” good (30%) for the United States.
That was the highest reading since at least 2022, when NATO united to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion.
Similarly, Gallup polling the same month showed more than three-quarters of Americans supported increasing (28%) or maintaining (49%) the current US commitment to NATO. That combined total was the highest in Gallup polling dating back to 1998 (albeit with no surveys between 1998 and 2022).
Gallup even showed about 6 in 10 Republicans supported increasing or maintaining the current commitment — up from less than half in 2022. And only 13% of Republicans wanted to withdraw entirely from the alliance, as Trump has floated.
The polling does seem to have shifted a bit since the Iran war started.
The Pew Research Center’s poll in late March, about a month after the war started, showed the percentage of Republicans and GOP-leaning independents who said NATO benefits the United States a “great deal” or a “fair amount” dropped from 49% a year ago to 38% today.
But the poll still showed nearly 6 in 10 Americans viewed NATO favorably and said it was beneficial to the United States.
Taken together, the data suggests recent events have impacted Americans’ views of NATO.
After the Greenland flap, public support for the alliance appeared to increase. Which would make sense given Americans overwhelmingly opposed Trump’s efforts to take over the island. (A Reuters-Ipsos poll in January showed Americans said 2-to-1 that they were concerned the episode would damage NATO and other US alliances.)
And now the Iran war, which is more popular on the right than taking Greenland was, appears to have convinced some Republicans that Trump is right about NATO’s lack of utility.
It does bear emphasizing that NATO was created as a defensive alliance — not to assist in whatever war of choice one of its member states launches. So one could make a convincing case that NATO did its job by standing up for Greenland and that there’s no direct comparison between that and the Iran war. Also, the only time NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision was invoked was to support the United States after the September 11, 2001, attacks.
How Trump can wound NATO
Exactly what happens next is a big open question.
Trump can’t withdraw from NATO without getting sign-off from Congress, which would be a tall task.
But that doesn’t mean Trump can’t wound the alliance.
The Wall Street Journal reported this week on a few ideas circulating inside the Trump administration, including pulling US troops out of countries deemed especially unhelpful with Iran, or possibly even closing a base in one of them. (Trump in 2020 pulled 12,000 troops from Germany, though that move was later reversed by Joe Biden.)
The president has also damaged alliances with NATO and other allies via his tariffs and through his general tendency to treat them no better — if not worse — than some adversaries.
Perhaps one of the most undersold ways Trump has hurt NATO is by legitimizing Russian President Vladimir Putin on the world stage. He’s pushed the United States — and by extension, the world — more toward a situation in which “might makes right” and big countries can pick on smaller ones. Carney labeled this the decline of the “rules-based order.”
The consequences of the Iran war will likely be long lasting. And in few arenas could that be more the case than the future of the NATO alliance.
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