2026-03-31T17:53:00.084Z / 美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）
分析由
亚伦·布莱克撰写
发布时间：2026年3月31日，美国东部时间下午1:53
中东 唐纳德·特朗普 皮特·赫格斯泰特
美国国务卿马可·卢比奥、总统唐纳德·特朗普与国防部长皮特·赫格斯泰特于3月26日在白宫出席内阁会议。
威尔·奥利弗/美联社/彭博社/盖蒂图片社/资料图
特朗普政府不断暗示，对伊朗战争可能很快就会结束。理由是？战争正在达成目标。
“我们将在数周而非数月内实现我们的目标，”美国国务卿马可·卢比奥周一对美国广播公司新闻表示。
但具体而言这些目标究竟是什么，本届政府的表态却相当不一致。
官员们时常列出四项目标，但这些目标往往会随时间和发言人的不同而变化。
即便那些被频繁提及的目标，也一直在调整和缩减。
我们来梳理一下。
四项目标却鲜有一致版本
美国于2月28日对伊朗发动空袭时，政府几乎未做任何铺垫工作来为战争辩护或阐明其作战目标。
但在3月2日，政府终于明确了后者。
在一场简报会上，国防部长皮特·赫格斯泰特列出了四项目标：
- “摧毁伊朗进攻性导弹”
- “摧毁伊朗导弹生产能力”
- “摧毁伊朗海军及其他安全基础设施”
- “伊朗永远不会拥有核武器”
这四项目标与特朗普总统在首轮空袭当日上午发布的视频中提及的内容大致相符。
但就在赫格斯泰特发言数小时后，特朗普在白宫的一场荣誉勋章授予仪式上公布了修改后的目标清单。
第3和第4项保持不变，但第1和第2项被合并为一个目标——“摧毁伊朗的导弹能力”。同时他新增了第四项新目标，涉及伊朗在中东的代理武装团体，如真主党和胡塞武装：“确保伊朗政权无法继续在境外武装、资助和指挥恐怖军队。”
两天后，类似的分歧再次出现。卢比奥在社交媒体帖子中重复了赫格斯泰特的清单。但不久之后，白宫新闻秘书卡洛琳·莱维特则呼应了特朗普修改后的清单。她列出的四项目标再次包含了消除代理武装威胁，而卢比奥并未提及这一点。
这种分歧大体上一直持续至今：莱维特会提及代理武装威胁，但赫格斯泰特和卢比奥等人都未将其纳入目标。
过去一周我们又看到了更多变动。
周五，卢比奥在其此前提出的摧毁伊朗海军的目标之外，新增了“摧毁伊朗空军”。
而在周一接受美国广播公司和半岛电视台采访时，他将摧毁伊朗空军列为四项明确目标之一，取代了“伊朗永远不会获得核武器”这一项。
（卢比奥仍提及了阻止伊朗获取核武器一事，但将其视为已宣布目标的附带效果，而赫格斯泰特和莱维特都将其列为四项明确目标之一。）
你可以对比一下卢比奥3月4日发布的清单（提及核武器但未提及空军）与国务院周一发布的清单（提及空军但未提及核武器）之间的差异。
但即便卢比奥的表态被视为最终定论，莱维特周一又给出了一份与这位国务卿当天早些时候接受采访时所述内容不同的清单。
两者有三处不同：莱维特的清单未提及摧毁伊朗空军；她将“阻止伊朗永远获得核武器”列为一项独立目标，而卢比奥并未如此；她再次提及了打击伊朗代理武装，尽管卢比奥在美国广播公司和半岛电视台的采访中都未提到这一点。
不断变动的目标
即便目标的大体主题保持一致，措辞也一直在演变。
早在战争初期，美国就暗示其追求彻底摧毁伊朗的导弹计划。特朗普2月28日表示，美国将“摧毁他们的导弹，将他们的导弹工业夷为平地”。
“再次强调，这将被彻底摧毁，”总统说道。
到3月2日，赫格斯泰特称目标是“摧毁”伊朗的进攻性导弹及其导弹生产能力。特朗普则表示：“我们正在摧毁伊朗的导弹能力。”
后来，这一目标演变为包括摧毁伊朗制造导弹的能力以及导弹发射装置。
过去一周，卢比奥似乎提出了一个更有限的版本。
他周五表示，目标是“大幅削减”伊朗的导弹发射装置。在半岛电视台的采访中，他称目标是实现导弹发射装置“大幅减少”。而在美国广播公司的采访中，他表示目标是“严重削弱其导弹发射能力”，而非彻底摧毁。
针对代理武装的目标也有所缩减。
特朗普3月2日称，目标是“确保”伊朗“无法继续在境外武装、资助和指挥”代理武装。这似乎极难实现且难以核实。
但莱维特后来将该目标描述为试图“削弱”代理武装，这一说法更加模糊且主观。
这意味着什么
上述两个例子似乎都表明，政府正试图降低对战争必须达成成果的预期。
其最初的目标表明，只有当伊朗丧失所有导弹及发射能力，且黎巴嫩真主党、也门胡塞武装等代理武装被切断补给时，才能算作成功。
卢比奥修改后的目标则留出了调整空间。
另一个关键问题是，政府有多强调消除伊朗的核威胁。卢比奥近期的言论可以被解读为，政府更侧重于打击伊朗的运载系统，而非针对其400公斤高浓缩铀——这项任务很可能需要派出地面部队。
周二上午的一场简报会上，赫格斯泰特将对伊战争与美国近期的其他战争相提并论，称后者的任务定义模糊。
“在那些战争中，一切都只是关于下一轮轮调，年复一年都不知道任务何时结束，也不清楚任务究竟是什么，”赫格斯泰特说道。“但‘史诗之怒’行动不是这样。”
但这恰恰是政府对这场战争的公开表态给人的印象。
当政府甚至无法给出一份一致的四项目标清单时，就很难衡量战争行动的成功与否。
而这些目标变动如此之大，恐怕也无法缓解美国民众的担忧——他们似乎根本不明白这场战争的意义所在。
The Trump administration’s objectives for the Iran war keep changing
2026-03-31T17:53:00.084Z / CNN
Analysis by
Aaron Blake
PUBLISHED Mar 31, 2026, 1:53 PM ET
The Middle East Donald Trump Pete Hegseth
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth attend a Cabinet meeting at the White House on March 26.
Will Oliver/EPA/Bloomberg/Getty Images/File
The Trump administration keeps suggesting that the Iran war could wrap up soon. The reason? Because it’s accomplishing its goals.
“We are going to achieve our objectives in a matter of weeks, not months,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told ABC News on Monday.
But when it comes to precisely what those goals are, the administration has been remarkably inconsistent.
Officials have regularly listed four objectives, but they’ve often changed depending upon the date and who’s providing them.
And even the frequently mentioned ones have been adjusted and scaled back.
Let’s recap.
Four goals but rarely the same four
When the US launched strikes on Iran on February 28, the administration had done remarkably little legwork in building a case for war or laying out its objectives.
But it finally clarified the latter on March 2.
At a briefing, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth described four objectives:
- “Destroy Iranian offensive missiles”
- “Destroy Iranian missile production”
- “Destroy their navy and other security infrastructure” and
- “They will never have nuclear weapons”
Those four more or less matched the things President Donald Trump mentioned in a video released the morning of the first strikes.
But just hours after Hegseth’s comments, Trump debuted an amended list at a Medal of Honor ceremony at the White House.
Numbers 3 and 4 were the same, but numbers 1 and 2 were merged into one goal — “destroying Iran’s missile capabilities.” And he added a new fourth goal concerning Iran’s Middle East proxy groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis: “Ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.”
Two days later, we saw a similar split. Rubio echoed Hegseth’s list in a social media post. But shortly thereafter, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt echoed Trump’s amended list. She ran through four goals that again included neutralizing the proxy threat, which Rubio hadn’t mentioned.
And the split has largely continued along those lines, with Leavitt including the proxy threat but others like Hegseth and Rubio omitting it.
We’ve seen yet more shifts this past week.
On Friday, Rubio added “destroy their air force” on top of his previously stated objective of destroying Iran’s navy.
And during interviews Monday with ABC and Al Jazeera, he made destroying the air force one of the four numbered objectives, in place of Iran never obtaining a nuclear weapon.
(Rubio still mentioned preventing Iran from obtaining nukes. But he treated it as more of a side effect of the declared goals, while Hegseth and Leavitt have listed it as one of the four enumerated goals.)
You can see the difference in the lists that Rubio posted on March 4 (mentions nukes but not the air force) and that the State Department posted on Monday (mentions the air force but not nukes).
But lest anyone understand Rubio’s list as the final word, Leavitt on Monday gave another list that differed from what the secretary of state laid out in interviews the very same day.
There were three distinctions: Hers did not mention destroying Iran’s air force. She listed “preventing Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon” as a distinct goal, unlike Rubio. And she again included combatting Iran’s proxies, despite Rubio not mentioning them in either the ABC or the Al Jazeera interviews.
The shifting goals
And even when the general subject matter of the goals has stayed consistent, the wording has evolved.
Early on, the US signaled it sought complete and utter destruction of Iran’s missile program. Trump on February 28 said the US would “destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground.”
“It will be totally, again, obliterated,” the president said.
By March 2, Hegseth said the goals were to “destroy” both Iran’s offensive missiles and its missile production. And Trump said, “We’re destroying Iran’s missile capabilities.”
Later, that objective evolved to include destroying Iran’s “ability to make” missiles and also to destroy its missile launchers.
Over the past week, Rubio has seemed to lay out a more limited version.
He said Friday that the goal was to “dramatically reduce” Iran’s missile launchers. In the Al Jazeera interview, he cited a “significant reduction” in them. And in the ABC interview, he said the goal was a “severe diminishing of their missile launching capability,” rather than a complete destruction.
The proxies goal has also been scaled back.
Trump said on March 2 that the objective was “ensuring” that Iran “cannot continue to arm, fund and direct” the proxies. That would seem to be very difficult to accomplish and verify.
But Leavitt has since characterized the objective as instead trying to “weaken” the proxies, which would be more nebulous and subjective.
What it means
The two examples above seem to point to the administration trying to scale back expectations for what it must accomplish for a successful campaign.
Its initial goals suggested success would be achieved only if Iran had no missiles or ability to fire them, and if proxy groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen were cut off.
The amended goals from Rubio allow some wiggle room.
The other big question is how much the administration emphasizes eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Rubio’s recent rhetoric could be read to suggest the administration is more focused on combatting Iran’s delivery systems than going after its 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium — a mission that would very likely require ground troops.
At a briefing on Tuesday morning, Hegseth pitched the Iran war as different from other recent US wars, where he said the mission was ill-defined.
“In those wars, it was always about the next rotation, never knowing when the mission would end or exactly what the mission was, year after year,” Hegseth said. “Not with Epic Fury.”
But that’s exactly the sense the administration’s public comments about this war have given.
It makes it very difficult to measure the success of the war effort when the administration can’t even give a consistent list of four goals.
And the fact that those goals have shifted so much probably won’t calm the fears of Americans who don’t seem to understand what this war is about.
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