2026-05-26T04:00:07.961Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/26/politics/trump-iran-war-peace-deal-analysis
- 特朗普总统已邀请沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔、巴基斯坦、土耳其、埃及和约旦与以色列签署《亚伯拉罕协议》。
- 分析人士表示，鉴于地区国家对伊朗战争和以色列行动的愤怒，该提案面临重大政治障碍。
- 此举可能旨在鼓励以色列人接受伊朗协议，或是安抚共和党鹰派。
AI生成的摘要经CNN编辑审核。
如果说唐纳德·特朗普寻求摆脱伊朗战争的道路已经足够艰难，那么他又新增了一个目标，这可能会让本已分裂的中东政治局势变得更加复杂。
这位总统周一表示，他已邀请沙特、卡塔尔、巴基斯坦、土耳其、埃及和约旦加入其首个任期的标志性协议《亚伯拉罕协议》，该协议旨在与以色列建立历史性联系。
在美国和伊朗谈判代表就拟议的谅解备忘录措辞讨价还价之际，这一建议再次引发了混乱风波，该备忘录可能为和平谈判提供最终框架。
但很难相信，这些国家的政治局势——因以色列在伊朗战争中的角色而进一步激化——会允许即使是强势的阿拉伯和穆斯林国家领导人做出特朗普所期望的对以色列让步。
而特朗普关于甚至伊朗也可能在达成和平协议后加入该协议的说法，似乎与他此前提出的在加沙废墟上打造“中东里维埃拉”的愿景一样不切实际。
“哇，那将是件了不起的大事！”特朗普周一在社交媒体上谈及他的新提案时写道，“这将是这些伟大但始终处于冲突中的国家有史以来签署的最重要协议。”
伊朗伊斯兰共和国几乎不可能在短期内承认其死敌以色列——更不用说考虑到以色列的突袭行动导致最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊丧生了。而以色列也绝不可能考虑与这个它视为对犹太民族存在性威胁的敌人和解。
此外，特朗普发动的一场破坏地区稳定、造成严重经济损失的战争，让其盟友纷纷倒戈，人们必然会质疑他说服盟友团结起来的能力。
那么，该如何看待特朗普在与阿拉伯和穆斯林国家领导人就其伊朗和平努力进行周末虚拟会谈后提出的新策略呢？
一种解释是，尽管一场无果而终的战争打击了他的国内支持率，令他失望，但他并未放弃对中东变革的宏大愿景。要消除让每一场战争都成为下一场战争前兆的历史积怨，实现和解并扩大经济、政治和文化联系至关重要。
但显然，现在绝非合适时机。如果特朗普真的抱有这种想法，那将严重让人怀疑他是否掌握了该地区当前的现实情况。而这并非新鲜事：他一贯低估伊朗作为军事对手的实力，显然还认为伊朗政权会迅速倒台。
但德黑兰并未屈服。据半官方的法尔斯新闻社报道，例如伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队大德黑兰司令部指挥官如今声称，该国现在比战争爆发首日更加强大。
这可能带有一些政治手腕。一种可能性是，特朗普可能希望以有意义的安全保障为筹码，鼓励以色列人接受一项可能在以色列国内不受欢迎的伊朗协议。
又或者，他是想安抚共和党鹰派。这些鹰派人士在周末公开质疑，他是否会在一项框架协议中对伊朗妥协，而该协议在关键的核问题上近期几乎不会取得进展。
不过，特朗普的批评者可能会得出结论，他只是想通过另一篇社交媒体帖子转移公众注意力，要么是为了转移人们对与伊朗谈判进展缓慢的关注，要么是为了在一场未能达到他快速完胜预期的战争后，将自己塑造成正在争取另一场著名胜利的形象。
许多海湾阿拉伯国家目前有比担忧与以色列未来关系更紧迫的优先事项。
这场部分国家并不希望发生的冲突，严重破坏了海湾国家将自身重塑为富裕西方人度假胜地的商业模式和稳定局面。霍尔木兹海峡的关闭削弱了该地区经济，每位外交政策专家都曾预见到这一情况，但特朗普团队却始料未及。
战争结束后，这些美国盟友将面临一个可能更不稳定、更具侵略性的伊朗组成的新环境。在与美国及其武装部队结盟后，它们遭到了伊朗无人机和导弹的袭击，因此可能会重新审视其国家安全战略。对地区安全架构的需求可能会取代与以色列的新协议。
而特朗普正在要求阿拉伯国家做出令人难以接受的重大转变。以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡在这些国家的民众中极不受欢迎，部分原因是伊朗战争爆发前就存在的政治障碍。
例如，沙特阿拉伯长期以来明确表示，加入《亚伯拉罕协议》的前提是为巴勒斯坦建国铺平道路。在2023年10月7日哈马斯对以色列平民发动恐怖袭击后，以色列对加沙发动猛攻，造成数万名平民死亡，这一目标似乎比以往任何时候都更加遥不可及。
以色列在加沙地带的持续军事行动以及约旦河西岸极端定居者的暴力行为，进一步压缩了妥协的政治空间。以色列表明，它认为维护自身安全是一项长期任务——这一立场将进一步加剧地区政治紧张局势。例如，以色列周一表示，计划加强在黎巴嫩对真主党的军事行动，并称这一举措是与美国协调的。
“地区国家对以色列的看法大多非常负面，”国际战略研究所高级研究员哈桑·阿尔哈桑周一在巴林接受CNN记者贝基·安德森采访时表示。
“我认为该地区许多国家认为以色列的行动极具危险性和破坏性，”在巴林发言的阿尔哈桑说，“以色列是引发这场地区战争的两个主要行为体之一，而且越来越多的国家正联合起来制衡以色列在该地区的战略侵略行为。”
CNN军事分析师、退役美国空军上校塞德里克·莱顿称特朗普的计划在很多方面都是“一厢情愿”。他在《CNN新闻中心》节目中表示：“从战略角度看，最终让伊朗站到我们这边是合理的，这也是特朗普的目标之一。但我们还没有到那一步。”
莱顿补充道：“当然，在当前这个时间点，要让阿拉伯国家同意加入《亚伯拉罕协议》并承认以色列，可能有些操之过急。”
以色列今年晚些时候将举行大选，这也意味着即使与伊朗的战争结束，沙特阿拉伯或其他不信任内塔尼亚胡极右翼联合政府的国家也不太可能达成新的协议。
《亚伯拉罕协议》于2020年由以色列与四个阿拉伯国家（摩洛哥、阿联酋、巴林和苏丹）签署，特朗普的助手们将其视为其首个任期的重大成就之一。
特朗普一直设想扩大该协议的范围——在其第二任期初期，这似乎是有可能的，当时他的团队促成了加沙停火，并制定了迄今尚未实现的巩固永久和平的计划。
但在美国方面迄今尚未确保霍尔木兹海峡通航，更不用说解决伊朗核问题的情况下，大规模扩大《亚伯拉罕协议》的想法几乎显得荒谬。
特朗普的特使史蒂夫·维特科夫和贾里德·库什纳一直渴望在中东和乌克兰实现宏大目标，但迄今未能如愿，这让批评人士质疑派遣两位商业大亨去解决棘手外交问题的明智性。他们相对缺乏成功的经历，破坏了特朗普总统任期的核心论调：他是一位娴熟的谈判者和历史性协议缔造者，能够取得历届总统都无法实现的突破。
这可能又是华盛顿采取的一种立场，从西半球看似乎合乎逻辑或可行，但一旦接触中东现实就会土崩瓦解。这不仅是特朗普政府的失败，也是21世纪大部分时间美国外交政策的一个缺陷，包括在伊拉克和阿富汗的政策。
该战略的不切实际之处体现在特朗普将巴基斯坦纳入邀请名单。加入《亚伯拉罕协议》需要这个政治局势本已动荡的穆斯林国家做出巨大转变。尽管伊斯兰堡一直试图讨好特朗普，但它从未正式承认以色列，也没有公开计划这样做。
特朗普承认，他邀请的这些国家中，有些可能有不加入的理由。一位知情人士告诉CNN记者詹妮弗·汉斯勒，特朗普鼓励阿拉伯和穆斯林国家加入，但并未将此作为与伊朗达成任何协议的条件。无论如何，人们有理由质疑——在发动了一场玷污美国实力和影响力的战争后——他的请求是否真的重要。
“目前尚不完全清楚，特朗普总统在这场战争的指挥或管理方面有什么政绩，让他觉得自己能够向地区国家提出这样的要求，”阿尔哈桑说。
A ruse, a brave gamble or a fantasy? Why Trump’s most puzzling Iran move yet is unlikely to work
2026-05-26T04:00:07.961Z / https://www.cnn.com/2026/05/26/politics/trump-iran-war-peace-deal-analysis
- President Trump has asked Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords with Israel.
- Analysts say the proposal faces significant political obstacles given regional anger over the Iran war and Israeli actions.
- The move may be aimed at incentivizing Israelis to accept an Iran deal or appeasing Republican hawks.
AI-generated summary was reviewed by a CNN editor.
If Donald Trump’s search for a way out of the Iran war was not difficult enough, he’s added a new goal that threatens to vastly complicate the Middle East’s already splintered politics.
The president said Monday he’d asked Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan to join his first-term legacy deal, known as the Abraham Accords, which is designed to forge historic ties with Israel.
The suggestion created yet another storm of confusion as US and Iranian negotiators haggled over language on a proposed memorandum of understanding that might provide an eventual framework for peace talks.
But it’s hard to believe that political conditions in these states, further inflamed by Israel’s role in the Iran war, will allow even strongmen Arab and Muslim state leaders to offer concessions to Israel that Trump wants.
And Trump’s statement that even Iran might join the accords in the event of a peace deal seems a fantasy to match his previous vision of a “Riviera of the Middle East” built on the ruins of Gaza.
“Wow, now that would be something special!,” Trump wrote on social media Monday of his new proposal. “This will be the most important Deal that any of these Great, but always in Conflict Countries, will ever sign.”
It’s unthinkable that the Islamic Republic would recognize its sworn enemy Israel any time soon — let alone considering its raids killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. And there’s no chance Israel would contemplate such a step with an enemy it regards as an existential threat to the Jewish people.
Plus, there must be questions about Trump’s capacity to persuade allies to fall into line after starting a war that has shattered regional stability and caused deep economic damage.
So what to make of Trump’s new gambit, which followed weekend virtual talks with Arab and Muslim leaders about his Iran peace effort?
One explanation is that, despite the disappointment of an inconclusive war that has battered his approval ratings at home, he’s not given up his grand visions for a Middle East transformation. A period of reconciliation and a broadening of economic, political and cultural links is vital to any hopes of draining the historic poison that makes each war a precursor to the next.
But it’s also clear this is hardly the moment. Any genuine belief otherwise on Trump’s part would provoke serious doubts about his grip on current realities in the region. And this would not be new: It has been a consistent problem that led him to underestimate Iran as a military adversary and apparently to assume its regime would quickly fall.
But Tehran remains unbowed. The commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Greater Tehran, for instance, now claims his country is stronger now than it was on the first day of the war, according to the semi-official Fars News Agency.
There could be some political art at work. One possibility is that Trump may have hoped to offer incentives to Israelis — in the form of meaningful security benefits — to accept a deal with Iran that is likely to be unpopular in the Jewish state.
Or perhaps he was looking to appease Republican hawks who openly wondered at the weekend whether he was going to cave to Iran in a framework deal that looks likely to make little near-term headway on critical nuclear questions.
Trump’s critics, however, may conclude that he’s looking to fill the ether with another social media post, either to distract from the tortuous pace of talks with Iran or to portray himself as striving for another famous victory after a war that frustrated his expectations of a quick and overwhelming win.
Many Gulf Arab states have higher priorities right now than worrying about their future relationship with Israel.
The conflict, which some states didn’t want, has badly damaged the business model and stability of Gulf nations trying to reinvent themselves as oases for well-heeled Westerners. The region’s economy has been debilitated by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a possibility that every foreign policy expert expected — but that caught the Trump team by surprise.
When the war ends, these US allies will face a new environment that could include a more unstable and aggressive Iran. They may review their national security postures after an association with Washington and US armed forces saw them come under attack from Iranian drones and missiles. The need for regional structures may supersede new compacts with Israel.
And Trump is asking Arab states to take an unpalatable leap. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is deeply unpopular with their people, partly due to political impediments that predate the Iran war.
Saudi Arabia, for example, has long made clear that joining the Abraham Accords would be conditional on a path being established to Palestinian statehood. This seems further away than ever after the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians in Gaza during the Israeli onslaught after the October 7, 2023, Hamas terror attacks on Israeli civilians.
Continued Israeli operations in the enclave and violence by extremist settlers in the West Bank have further narrowed political room for compromise. Israel is showing it believes that maintaining its security will be a perpetual task — a stance that will further strain regional politics. It said on Monday, for instance, that it plans to intensify operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon — a step it says was coordinated with the US.
“A lot of regional perceptions of Israel are not at all flattering,” Hasan Alhasan, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told CNN’s Becky Anderson on CNN International on Monday.
“I think a lot of countries in the region see Israel’s actions as highly dangerous, destabilizing,” said Alhasan, speaking from Bahrain. “Israel was one of the two main actors that began this regional war, and I think countries increasingly are coming together to counterbalance Israel’s strategic aggressiveness in the region.”
CNN military analyst Cedric Leighton, a retired US Air Force colonel, described Trump’s plan as in many ways “wishful thinking.” He said on CNN News Central that it “makes sense from a strategic standpoint to get Iran on our side eventually, which is part of what Trump is looking at. But we’re not there yet.”
Leighton added: “And certainly to get the Arab nations to agree to be part of the Abraham Accords and to recognize Israel at this particular point in time, that might be a bridge too far.”
A general election in Israel later this year also makes it unlikely that Saudi Arabia or other states that distrust Netanyahu’s far-right coalition would enter into new agreements even if the war with Iran ends.
The Abraham Accords were signed in 2020 between Israel and four Arab states (Morocco, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan) and were regarded by Trump’s aides as one of the great achievements of his first term.
Trump has always envisioned expanding the accords — and this seemed a possibility early in his second term, when his team negotiated a ceasefire in Gaza and laid out so far unrealized plans to solidify a permanent peace.
But the idea of a massive expansion of the Abraham Accords when the US side has so far not secured the opening of the strait, let alone resolved the question of Iran’s nuclear program, seems almost absurd.
Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have longed grasped for huge goals in the Middle East and Ukraine and have so far fallen short, leading critics to question the wisdom of sending two business tycoons to unpick knotty diplomatic problems. Their relative lack of success has undermined the central conceit of Trump’s presidency: that he’s a masterful negotiator and historic dealmaker who can nail breakthroughs that would have been beyond past presidents.
This could be another case of Washington embracing positions that look logical or possible from the Western Hemisphere but that dissolve on contact with the Middle East. This is not only a failing of the Trump administration; it’s been a flaw of US policy for much of the 21st century, including in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The impracticalities of the strategy are reflected in Trump’s inclusion of Pakistan on his list. Joining the Abraham Accords would require an enormous shift in a Muslim nation with already volatile political conditions. While Islamabad has sought to cosy up to Trump, it has never officially recognized Israel and has no public plans to do so.
The president allowed that several nations in his list might have reasons not to join. A source familiar with the matter told CNN’s Jennifer Hansler that Trump encouraged the Arab and Muslim states to join but did not make it a condition of any deal with Iran. In any case, there is reason to question whether — after he launched a war that has sullied American power and influence — his requests really matter.
“It’s not entirely clear what President Trump himself has to show for, by way of his track record in running or managing this war, that he feels able to impose such a demand on, on regional countries,” Alhasan said.