2026-03-31T10:04:22.889Z / 路透社
作者：多因索拉·奥拉迪波
2026年3月31日 10:04 UTC 1小时前更新
- 拉瓜迪亚机场本地空中与地面管制岗位不得在午夜前合并——文件显示
- 据美国国家运输安全委员会报告，该规则是1997年地面撞机事故后出台的
- 美国国家运输安全委员会正在调查塔台内哪位管制员承担了地面管制职责
纽约，3月31日（路透社）——据路透社看到的一份文件显示，3月22日加拿大航空客机在拉瓜迪亚机场与消防车相撞当晚，该机场空管人员配置可能违反了机场操作程序，存在岗位合并操作，且合并时间早于午夜。
此次撞机事故发生在美国东部时间3月22日晚11点37分左右，造成两名飞行员遇难，此次事故再次引发了外界对美国空中交通管制人员短缺以及全国范围内管制员工作负荷的担忧。
《路透社伊朗简报》新闻简报将为您带来伊朗局势的最新动态与分析，点击此处订阅。
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全国多名空中交通管制员表示，包括主管岗位在内的人员短缺问题，导致管制员越来越频繁地身兼数职，同时负责本地空中交通和地面交通管制。
美国国家运输安全委员会上周表示，作为此次撞机事故调查的一部分，他们正在收集每位管制员所承担职责的相关信息。
如果涉事管制员同时承担了空中和地面管制职责，这将与拉瓜迪亚塔台的标准操作程序不符。
美国国家运输安全委员会1997年拉瓜迪亚机场一架私人飞机与地面车辆相撞事故的最终报告提到，事后出台了新程序，确保该纽约机场“本地与地面管制岗位不得在午夜前合并”。
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路透社看到的拉瓜迪亚塔台2023年版标准操作程序文件显示，截至2023年该规则仍然有效。据知情人士透露，该文件在2026年仍为现行有效版本。
文件规定：“拉瓜迪亚塔台的岗位不得在本地时间午夜前或班次开始后90分钟内合并，以较晚者为准。”
负责美国空中交通管制的美国联邦航空管理局未回应置评请求。
管制员职责尚不明确
美国国家运输安全委员会主席珍妮弗·霍门迪上周对记者表示，事故发生时，有两名管制员在机场控制塔的玻璃封闭区域内工作。
一名本地管制员负责管理正在使用的跑道和紧邻空域，另一名主管管制员还负责为飞行员提供起飞许可。
“目前尚不清楚是谁在履行地面管制员的职责，我们掌握的信息存在矛盾。”她说道。地面管制岗位负责管理滑行道上所有飞机和车辆的移动，通常不包括正在使用的跑道。
多名现任和退休管制员表示，根据LiveATC.net网站发布的音频，他们认为负责管理正在使用跑道的本地管制员同时也承担了地面交通管制工作。
美国国家运输安全委员会未回应置评请求。
空难调查通常认定事故是由多重因素共同导致，而非单一原因。
岗位合并情况
霍门迪表示，负责运营安全的主管管制员于当晚10点30分签到，本地管制员则于10点45分签到上岗。
根据拉瓜迪亚机场的标准操作程序文件，本地和地面管制岗位最早要到午夜才能合并。
文件还规定，只有当交通流量需要时才能合并岗位。如果因交通流量增加而合并岗位，后续也应根据情况重新拆分。
根据航空数据公司Cirium的数据，在加拿大航空客机撞机当晚的10点至11点37分期间，共有70架商业航班在该机场起降，而2022年以来同期平均起降架次为53架。
多名接受路透社采访的管制员称，当晚的工作负荷十分繁重，通常情况下会安排其他管制员加班或延长正常下班时间，以应对超出计划的航班数量。
一名要求匿名的纽约地区现任管制员表示，本地和地面管制岗位至少应保持独立至午夜。
“这还没算上当晚的航班流量和运行复杂度。”他说道。
多因索拉·奥拉迪波在纽约报道；大卫·谢泼德森在华盛顿、艾莉森·兰珀特在蒙特利尔补充报道；杰米·弗里德编辑
我们的报道准则：汤姆森路透社信托原则。
LaGuardia controller staffing may have violated procedures on night of collision, document shows
2026-03-31T10:04:22.889Z / Reuters
By Doyinsola Oladipo
March 31, 2026 10:04 AM UTC Updated 1 hour ago
节点运行失败
The wreckage of an Air Canada Express jet that collided with a ground vehicle on Monday at New York’s LaGuardia Airport in Queens, New York, U.S., March 24, 2026. REUTERS/Shannon Stapleton/File Photo
- Local air and ground roles at LaGuardia not supposed to be combined before midnight-document
- Rule put in place after 1997 ground collision, according to NTSB report
- NTSB investigating which of the controllers in the tower was handling ground role
NEW YORK, March 31 (Reuters) – Air traffic controller staffing at LaGuardia airport on the night an Air Canada jet collided with a fire truck may have violated the facility’s procedures by combining roles before midnight, according to a document seen by Reuters.
The crash at the New York airport at about 11:37 p.m. ET on March 22, which killed both pilots, has revived concerns over U.S. air traffic control staffing shortages and the workload of controllers across the country.
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Staffing shortages, including at the supervisor level, are placing controllers into combined roles handling local air and ground traffic more often, according to several air traffic controllers across the country.
The National Transportation Safety Board said last week that as part of its crash investigation, it was seeking information on the duties being performed by each controller.
If the controller involved in the crash was performing both air and ground duties, that would be inconsistent with the LaGuardia tower’s standard operating procedures.
An NTSB final report on a 1997 collision at LaGuardia between a private jet and a vehicle referenced new procedures being put in place afterward to ensure “local and ground positions shall not be combined prior to” midnight at the New York airport.
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As of 2023, the rule remained in place, according to a LaGuardia Tower Standard Operating Procedures document seen by Reuters.
“Positions at LaGuardia Tower are not to be consolidated to one position prior to midnight local time or 90 minutes after the start of the shift, whichever is later,” said the 2023 document, which people familiar with the matter said remained current in 2026.
The Federal Aviation Administration, which runs U.S. air traffic control, did not respond to a request for comment.
CONTROLLER DUTIES NOT CLEAR
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy told reporters last week that two controllers were working in a glass-enclosed section of the airport’s control tower at the time of the accident.
There was a local controller managing the active runways and the immediate airspace and a controller-in-charge who was also providing pilots with departure clearance, she said.
“It is not clear who was conducting the duties of the ground controller. We have conflicting information,” she said, referring to the position that manages all aircraft and vehicle movements on the taxiways, generally excluding active runways.
Multiple current and retired controllers said they believed the local controller who was managing the active runways was also handling traffic on the ground, based on audio posted by LiveATC.net.
The NTSB did not return a request for comment.
Air crash investigations typically find accidents result from multiple contributing factors, rather than a single cause.
COMBINING POSITIONS
The controller-in-charge, who is responsible for safety of operations, signed in at 10:30 p.m. while the local controller signed on at 10:45 p.m., the NTSB’s Homendy said.
According to the LaGuardia standard operating procedures document, the local and ground positions should not have been combined until midnight at the earliest.
The document also states positions will only be consolidated as traffic warrants. If positions are consolidated, as traffic volume increases, the positions will be de-combined, the document stated.
On the night of the Air Canada crash, weather-related delays resulted in 70 commercial flights taking off or landing at the airport between 10 p.m. and 11:37 p.m., compared with an average of 53 in the same time frame since 2022, according to Cirium data.
Several controllers interviewed by Reuters described the workload that night as busy and said other controllers would typically be brought in or stay on past their normal shift end time to manage the heavier-than-scheduled number of flights.
The local and ground positions should have stayed uncombined until at least midnight, said a current New York-area controller on condition of anonymity as he was not authorized to speak with media.
“And that is not even talking about the traffic, volume and complexity that night,” he said.
Reporting by Doyinsola Oladipo in New York; additional reporting by David Shepardson in Washington and Allison Lampert in Montreal; Editing by Jamie Freed
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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