发布时间：2026年3月26日，美国东部时间凌晨12:00 / 美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）政治版
分析：[斯蒂芬·科林森]
3小时前
伊朗似乎对交易艺术并不感冒。
唐纳德·特朗普总统正急于宣扬这样一个说法：伊斯兰共和国已准备好结束战争。
但德黑兰尚未有任何公开迹象表明，它正准备帮助特朗普化解他在近四周前彻底破坏自己先前外交努力后引发的危机。
“他们非常想达成协议，但不敢说，因为他们认为自己会被本国人民杀死，”特朗普周三晚间在国会成员面前表示。“他们也害怕被我们杀死，”他在对冲突的最新令人费解的评论中说道。
这种脱节让人对特朗普本周宣称的“突破可能迫在眉睫”的说法产生怀疑，尽管冲突危险升级的势头正不可阻挡地增长——数千名美军正前往该地区。
任何将美军投入行动的决定都将给特朗普带来巨大风险，因为这可能导致大量美国人员伤亡。它将引发比伊朗关闭霍尔木兹海峡已经造成的更大的经济冲击波。而一场长期战争可能会耗尽总统的第二个任期及其任内的政治遗产——毕竟他当初竞选时坚称要结束战争，而非发动战争。
因此，谈判的必要性再怎么强调也不为过。
但对外交的希望却因这样一个问题而黯淡：在这场对峙开始超过三周后，谈判走出困境是否为时已晚？
特朗普一直通过重塑公众对现实的认知而获利。但如果他要构建一条既能保住自己信誉，又不向伊朗让步（这种让步会使其胜利宣言显得空洞）的“退出坡道”，就需要真正的实质性内容。此刻还需要另一种与总统人生哲学相悖的东西——给敌人一个体面的退场，而非坚持其所有要求的彻底投降。
特朗普也没有太多时间了。战争带来的政治、经济和地缘政治压力与日俱增。他将面临一个困境：从越南到伊拉克，前人都曾在试图通过升级战争来寻找出路时误入歧途。
伊朗已失去了大量领导层和军事工业复合体，但尽管美军具有毁灭性潜力，伊朗或许也会欢迎将美国总统拖入更血腥战斗的机会。
特朗普的“选择之战”如何使他陷入两难
特朗普本周对战争的反复无常的态度——发出彻底摧毁伊朗发电厂的可怕威胁，随后又退缩并宣称即将取得突破——是其极端政治策略的典型表现。然而，他似乎倾向于在摆出外交姿态之前动用军事力量，这也反映了一个严峻现实：和平协议的前景不佳。
前美国中东和平谈判代表艾伦·戴维·米勒表示，“伊朗将要求唐纳德·特朗普不愿支付的代价，这让他不得不进行一场重大行动，不仅仅是为了打开海峡，而是为了维持海峡的开放。”
米勒在接受CNN国际频道伊莎·索阿雷斯采访时表示，这场战争现在已经是一场国际危机。“特朗普发动的这场‘选择之战’现在已经变成了一场‘必要之战’。”
指望政府现在展现出高超的谈判技巧是不现实的：政府从未真正确定战争的正当理由，也未能制定明确的退出战略。特朗普的女婿贾里德·库什纳和特使史蒂夫·维特科夫战前与伊朗的谈判失败了。他们在乌克兰和加沙的其他尝试也没有取得重大和长期进展。
（图片说明：2026年2月26日，在瑞士日内瓦举行的美伊持续谈判中，阿曼外交大臣赛义德·巴德尔·本·哈马德·布赛迪（右）与白宫特使史蒂夫·维特科夫（中）和贾里德·库什纳举行会议。）
阿曼外交部/美联社
有传言称，如果和平谈判进行，副总统JD·万斯可能成为主要代表，或许是在巴基斯坦或土耳其的主持下。他过去对不干涉主义的支持可能会吸引伊朗人，但这会将这位潜在的2028年总统候选人置于政治困境中。而且，在先前和平谈判进行期间，美国发动的一次袭击加剧了双方的不信任，人员变动也无法缓解这种状况。
特朗普似乎比伊朗人更渴望谈判，这或许反映了他作为总统所面临的压力——他并未为国家备战，如今却面临广泛的公众反对。
伊朗外交部长阿巴斯·阿拉格奇周三表示，美国已向德黑兰发出多条信息，但否认正在进行谈判。然而，白宫新闻秘书卡罗琳·莱维特指出谈判“富有成效”。
和平谈判往往始于双方互相造势，各为其政治立场争取支持。但在此情况下，双方的分歧巨大且真实存在。
一位伊朗官员告诉Press TV，德黑兰要求完全停止侵略和暗杀行为。它希望得到确保战争不再爆发的具体承诺，并要求伊朗获得战争赔偿。该官员呼吁结束以色列对黎巴嫩真主党的袭击。在特朗普绝不可能接受的最高要求中，他宣称对霍尔木兹海峡拥有主权的权利——这将使伊斯兰共和国控制全球20%的石油供应和全球经济。
据信美国的一份15点计划包括禁止伊朗拥有核武器、移交其浓缩铀库存、结束地区代理组织以及重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。这表明，战争已经超出了特朗普的控制范围——冲突开始时海峡对所有油轮开放，现在却成了美国谈判中的关键要求。
伊朗过去已表明愿意就核计划进行谈判；它曾与奥巴马总统达成冻结核计划的协议，而特朗普撕毁了该协议。但作为回报，伊朗需要巨大的制裁豁免，这可能会使濒临崩溃的伊斯兰共和国重建其军事能力。
谈判细节并非阻碍进展的唯一因素。还有一个更根本的脱节：战争双方都认为自己在获胜。莱维特斥责伊朗“未能认识到他们在军事上已经被击败”。
可以肯定的是，数千次美以空袭已经摧毁了伊朗武装部队和领导层，并破坏了维持政权的镇压性安全国家机器。
但特朗普反复宣称胜利，这表明他误解了对手对冲突的看法。这反过来可能削弱他在谈判中的地位。对伊朗政权而言，任何形式的生存都将是胜利。它无法赢得常规战争，但它正试图给美国和世界造成巨大痛苦，以至于特朗普别无选择，只能退缩。
特朗普不断宣称胜利，这导致他的信息出现另一个矛盾点：如果美国已经获胜，为何仍在继续战斗——并向中东派遣数千名海军陆战队员和空降兵？
为何对话或许仍有一线希望
在外交开始前，所有战争看起来都难以解决。妥协的艺术首先需要找到敌人可以达成共识的最窄空间。
可能还有几周的时间可以进行谈判，因为可能用于摧毁霍尔木兹海峡沿岸伊朗设施的美军地面部队正在集结。时间紧迫还有另一个原因——战争爆发前离开波斯湾的最后一批石油和天然气油轮将很快抵达目的地。从那时起，供应中断将加剧能源危机及其经济连锁反应。
负责治国策略研究所（Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft）的特里塔·帕西认为，伊朗和特朗普一样都有结束战争的动机，因此外交仍有机会。“但特朗普必须做出让步才能结束这场战争，这与他最初的立场截然不同。”
帕西指出，美国已经做出了一项重要让步——解除对已经在海上的伊朗石油的制裁，以缓解全球能源危机。这在战前是不可想象的，但现在已成为先例，可能会为未来的和平谈判定下基调。
这虽然不足以作为坚实基础，但已是某种进展。
除非美伊官员尽快建立真正的沟通，否则战争可能会灾难性地升级。如果外交已经无法发挥抑制作用，后果将不堪设想。
If Trump’s diplomacy fails, the Iran war could get much worse
PUBLISHED Mar 26, 2026, 12:00 AM ET / CNN Politics
Analysis by
[Stephen Collinson]
3 hr ago
Iran doesn’t seem to be susceptible to the art of the deal.
President Donald Trump is desperate to sell the story that the Islamic Republic is ready to end the war.
But there’s no public sign yet from Tehran that it’s poised to help him walk back a crisis that he triggered by obliterating his own previous diplomatic effort nearly four weeks ago.
“They want to make a deal so badly, but they’re afraid to say it because they figure they’ll be killed by their own people,” Trump told members of Congress on Wednesday evening. “They’re also afraid they’ll be killed by us,” he said, in his latest puzzling comment on the conflict.
The disconnect casts doubt on Trump’s claims this week that a breakthrough could be imminent, even as momentum inexorably grows toward a dangerous escalation of the conflict — with thousands of US troops on their way to the region.
Any decision to send them into action would represent a huge risk for Trump because it could result in significant American casualties. It would invite far worse economic shockwaves than those already caused by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. And a prolonged war could consume the president’s second term and legacy after he won power adamant that he’d end wars, not start them.
The need for talks could therefore hardly be more urgent.
But hopes for diplomacy are darkened by this question: Is it already too late, more than three weeks into the showdown, to negotiate a way out?
Trump has always prospered by reshaping public perceptions of reality. But real substance is needed if he is to build an off-ramp that preserves his own credibility while avoiding concessions to Iran that would mock his declarations of victory. The moment also calls for something else alien to the president’s life philosophy — providing an enemy with a face-saving exit rather than insisting on complete surrender to his demands.
Trump also doesn’t have much time. The political, economic and geopolitical stresses of the war build every day. The moment is approaching when he will face the conundrum that has led predecessors astray from Vietnam to Iraq: whether to intensify a war in a quest for a way out.
Iran has lost much of its leadership and military industrial complex, but for all the destructive potential of the US military, it might welcome the chance to draw a US president into a bloodier fight.
How Trump’s war of choice led him to unpalatable choices
Trump’s erratic approach to the war this week — making dire threats to obliterate Iranian power plants, then pulling back and proclaiming imminent potential breakthroughs — is typical of a political method that operates at the extremes. Yet his apparent leaning toward military force before dangling diplomacy also reflects a grim reality: The omens for a peace deal are poor.
Aaron David Miller, a former US Middle East peace negotiator, said that “the Iranians are going to demand a price that Donald Trump is not prepared to pay, and that leaves him with the reality of having to mount a major operation, not just to open the straits — but to keep them open.”
Miller told Isa Soares on CNN International that the war is now an international crisis. “This war of choice that Trump waged has now become a war of necessity.”
Expecting negotiating dexterity now from the administration would be a stretch: It’s never really settled on a firm justification for the war, and has also failed to identify a clear exit strategy. Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and special envoy Steve Witkoff’s pre-war negotiations with Iran failed. And their other ventures in Ukraine and Gaza have not yielded significant and long-term progress.
Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, right, holds a meeting with White House special envoy Steve Witkoff, centre, and Jared Kushner, as part of the ongoing Iranian-American negotiations, in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 26, 2026.
Foreign Ministry of Oman/AP
Vice President JD Vance is being mentioned as a possible principal if rumored peace talks go ahead, perhaps under the auspices of Pakistan or Turkey. His past advocacy for non-interventionism may be attractive to the Iranians, but it would put a potential 2028 presidential candidate in a political vise. And a change of personnel won’t ease mistrust exacerbated by a US attack while previous peace talks were ongoing.
Trump seems keener than the Iranians to talk, in a reflection, perhaps, of pressure on a president who didn’t prepare his country for war and is now facing polls that register broad public disapproval.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Wednesday that the US had sent multiple messages to Tehran but denied negotiations were happening. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt, however, pointed to productive talks.
Peace negotiations are often preceded by posturing as each side cultivates its political case. But here, the differences are enormous and genuine.
An Iranian official told Press TV that Tehran demanded a complete halt to aggression and assassinations. It wants concrete undertakings to ensure the war doesn’t resume and the payment of war reparations to Iran. The official called for an end to Israel’s assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon. And in a maximalist requirement Trump could never accept, he asserted the right to exercise sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. This would give the Islamic Republic a stranglehold on 20% of the world’s oil supplies and the global economy.
A US 15-point plan is believed to include prohibitions on Iran having a nuclear weapon, the handing over of its enriched uranium stockpiles, an end to regional proxy groups and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. It is a measure of how the war has slipped beyond Trump’s control that the Strait — which was open to all tanker traffic when the conflict began — has now become a key US demand in negotiations.
Iran has shown in the past that it is willing to talk about its nuclear program; it made a deal with President Barack Obama to freeze the program that Trump tore up. But it would require in return huge sanctions relief that might enable the shattered Islamic Republic to rebuild its military capacity.
The details of negotiations are not the only impediment to progress. There’s a more fundamental disconnect: Both sides in the war think they are winning. Leavitt rebuked Iran for failing to understand “they have been defeated militarily.”
It is almost certainly true that thousands of US and Israeli air strikes have devastated Iranian armed forces and leadership, and have damaged the repressive security state that keeps the regime in power.
But Trump’s repeated claims of victory suggest a misunderstanding of how his adversaries view the conflict. This may in turn weaken his negotiating position in talks. For Iran’s regime, survival in any form would represent victory. It can’t win a conventional battle. But it is seeking to impose so much pain on the US and the world that Trump has no option but to retreat.
Trump’s incessant claims of victory lead to another inconsistency in his messaging: If the US has already won, why is it still fighting — and sending thousands of US Marines and airborne troops to the Middle East?
Why there may be some hope for dialogue
All wars look intractable before diplomacy begins. The art of compromise requires first identifying the narrowest of spaces where enemies can meet.
There are perhaps a few weeks when this will be possible as US ground forces that might be used to eliminate Iranian coastal installations overlooking the Strait of Hormuz assemble. The clock is also racing for another reason — the last oil and gas tankers that left the Persian Gulf before the war erupted will soon reach their destinations. From then on, the strangulation of supplies will worsen the energy crisis and the economic knock-on effects.
Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft believes Iran, like Trump, does have an incentive to end the war, and that diplomacy therefore has a chance. “But Trump is going to have to give something to end this war, and that’s a very different position to be in compared to where he started off,” he said.
Parsi pointed out that the US had already made one important concession — lifting sanctions on Iranian oil that was already at sea in a bid to ease the global energy crunch. This would have been inconceivable before the war, but is now precedent that might frame future peace talks.
It’s not much to build on, but it’s something.
Unless US and Iranian officials make a genuine connection soon, the war could spiral disastrously. If it’s already passed the point at which diplomacy can act as a brake, the consequences are too horrible to contemplate.
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