2026-03-08T22:32:39.366Z / CNN
Brett McGurk是CNN全球事务分析师，曾在乔治·W·布什、巴拉克·奥巴马、唐纳德·特朗普和乔·拜登总统任内担任高级国家安全职务。
伊朗危机爆发两天后，我评估了接下来一周需要关注的10个关键指标。如今进入危机的第二周，是时候重新评估并审视哪些因素的重要性有所上升或下降。
让我们按相同顺序回顾这些指标，并给出更新后的评估。
美国和以色列已在伊朗上空建立起更强的空中优势。我们应预计未来一周军事行动将升级。这意味着打击目标不仅包括导弹和发射装置，还将扩展到伊朗导弹、无人机及核设施的生产工厂和基础设施。特朗普政府并未排除发动地面行动的可能性，或许会聚焦于德黑兰以南250多英里的伊斯法罕地下浓缩铀设施。这将极具风险，且可能需要在伊朗军事力量进一步削弱的基础上才能实施。
总结：军事行动将持续数周而非数日。这不会是一场短期战争。
在失去包括被暗杀的最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊在内的数十名高级领导人后，伊朗任命了一个由总统、首席大法官和高级神职人员组成的临时领导委员会。根据伊朗宪法，该委员会将执掌权力直至新最高领袖任命产生。
周六，伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安发布了一段似乎仓促制作的视频，宣称除非美国从邻国对伊朗发动攻击，否则将停止对邻国的袭击。然而，几小时内，针对海湾国家的袭击再次重启，包括一架无人机袭击迪拜机场。
这表明伊朗内部可能出现了指挥控制失灵、高层权力斗争，或部分部队拒绝服从临时委员会命令的情况。
伊朗领导人随后急忙试图展现团结。周六晚些时候，伊朗国家安全委员会秘书阿里·拉里贾尼坚称临时委员会掌权。周一早些时候，伊朗宣布任命新最高领袖。
周一早些时候，伊朗官方媒体宣布，哈梅内伊56岁的儿子穆贾塔巴被选为伊朗新最高领袖——这是1979年革命以来的第三位最高领袖。这可能会进一步延长战争。如果特朗普曾希望出现类似委内瑞拉的领导层更迭，即新领导人愿意与美国谈判，那么穆贾塔巴显然不是合适人选，他被视为与伊斯兰革命卫队有着深厚联系的意识形态强硬派。
然而，穆贾塔巴是否能成功巩固权力目前尚不清楚。他相对不为人知，从未公开讲话，也从未担任过正式政府职务。伊斯兰共和国1979年因反对世袭君主制而掌权，这也是穆贾塔巴被认为并非主要竞争者的原因之一。
因此，尽管伊朗已任命新领导人，但现在预测穆贾塔巴能执政多久（假设他能在这场战争中存活下来）还为时过早。
我们上周曾讨论过打击伊朗导弹发射装置的重要性，因为这是伊朗无法组织大规模导弹齐射的关键。美国和以色列部队似乎在这一任务上取得了一定成功。根据美国中央司令部的数据，伊朗导弹发射量在一周内减少了90%，且大多数导弹现在被拦截。天空中导弹数量越少，拦截所需的防空火力就越少。
伊朗无人机仍是个挑战，它们数量更多且更容易从伊朗境内任何地点发射。中央司令部称，无人机袭击减少了86%，但仍有一些无人机成功突破防空系统。减少无人机发射将是第二周的关键指标之一。
伊朗对海湾国家发动袭击的决定持续产生反效果，使其更加孤立。
伊朗本希望通过施压这些有影响力的国家，反过来迫使华盛顿停止对伊朗境内的袭击。但结果恰恰相反。海湾国家首都普遍认为，尽管这些国家并非主动选择卷入这场战争，但既然战争已经开始，美国必须将军事行动进行到底。
阿联酋总统在访问医院慰问伤员时首次表态，警告伊朗“有坚韧的意志和坚定的决心”，并誓言将“在这场战争中取得胜利”。与此同时，多个海湾国家的军队已开始在中东上空协同行动，这与行动初期的情况截然不同。几个海湾国家已声明保留自卫反击伊朗的权利，本周可能会看到这些国家对伊朗展开反击。
在更远的地区，伊朗对英国和法国在该地区的设施发动袭击，促使巴黎和伦敦与美国加强合作，包括允许美军使用其基地，并部署英法军事资产到该地区。
总结：伊朗在过去一周更加孤立，而美国从盟友和伙伴那里获得的支持有所增强。考虑到此次行动的复杂性，特朗普应欢迎不断增加的支持。周六特朗普批评英国首相为时已晚，这无助于问题解决。
6. 俄罗斯与中国
伊朗多年来宣称与俄罗斯和中国存在战略联盟，认为其中一方或双方会在危难时刻提供支持。伊朗直接支持俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争，认为俄罗斯会在伊朗需要时回报这份支持。然而从公开信息看，莫斯科和北京均未向伊朗提供实质性支持，仅停留在口头上。
CNN本周晚些时候报道，俄罗斯正在向伊朗提供针对美国船只的目标定位信息，尽管效果似乎有限。如果属实，这将引发华盛顿的强烈反应，可能增加对乌克兰的支持。特朗普不太可能采取这一行动，但这将是确保莫斯科停止对伊朗提供援助的最佳回应。
至于中国，在此次危机中几乎毫无作为——考虑到其对霍尔木兹海峡石油运输的依赖，中国对伊朗威胁海峡通行的决定肯定感到不满。特朗普定于本月底访问北京，这是一个向中国施压、要求其停止支持伊朗导弹和无人机项目的机会。届时，伊朗的这些项目可能已所剩无几。
要理解伊朗，必须了解其所谓的“革命卫队”。正如其名称所示，伊斯兰革命卫队（IRGC）通过镇压要求变革的伊朗民众来“保卫革命”。但革命卫队还通过支持恐怖主义和代理组织在中东煽动不稳定，这就是其“圣城旅”的任务，我们有理由相信其已被指派在包括美国境内发动恐怖袭击。然而，伊朗的意图往往超出其能力范围，迄今为止我们尚未看到此类行动发生。
我们应希望并假定美国国土安全部、联邦调查局和美国情报界正与外国同行合作，侦测和破坏任何新兴威胁。英国上周逮捕了四名据称受伊朗指使策划袭击的人员。
作为对IRGC即使在美境内也构成威胁的提醒，联邦陪审团周五裁定伊朗情报官员阿西夫·默罕默德有罪，他受德黑兰指派企图暗杀包括特朗普总统在内的美国高级政治领导人。默罕默德是在拜登政府任内被逮捕并定罪的。
当前关键指标可能不再是军事或政治，而是经济。全球20%的能源贸易每日通过霍尔木兹海峡。冲突爆发以来，由于担心伊朗袭击，船只几乎不再通过这一狭窄通道。这些船只的保险费率飙升，全球油价在上周暴涨35%，这是历史上最剧烈的价格波动之一。
如果这一问题不尽快解决，海湾产油国将耗尽存储空间，被迫关闭石油生产——进一步危及未来供应。我们预计本周油价将继续上涨，给白宫施压，使其要么在军事行动结束前暂停行动，要么找到方法安抚通过海峡的航运公司。在行动中途草草结束军事行动可能是最糟糕的结果——留下一个虽受重创但仍完整的伊朗政权，保留其残余的导弹和核能力。
白宫正急忙寻找解决方案。上周末，美国宣布设立200亿美元保险基金以支持风险，并暂停对滞留1.4亿桶石油前往印度的船只的制裁。
鉴于该问题的严重性，美国军方可能需要介入保护霍尔木兹海峡及慢速油轮面临的风险。这在里根政府时期曾发生过，当时美国海军保护了航运——但现在任务更加艰巨，因为伊朗已配备射程超过1000公里的无人机，且可从伊朗全境任何地点发射。
因此，需密切关注这一区域，它可能是未来一周战略意义最重大的地方。
本周美国军方领导人的简报强调，随着伊朗军事力量迅速削弱，美国军事力量正在增强。这一态势正日益向有利于美国的方向倾斜，因为美国和以色列正在削弱伊朗向境外投射力量的能力。但这并不影响伊朗在其境内向本国人民投射力量的能力。
因此，按照当前趋势，伊朗军事力量可能大幅削弱，但不会出现许多人期望的政权更迭。仅靠空中力量改变政治结果并非可行的军事任务。
缺乏明确的军事行动终点，使得此次战役与特朗普两届总统任期内指挥的任何行动都不同。然而，进入第二周，我们可以开始看到这场危机的可能结局。五角大楼上周澄清，其行动目标是“明确且有限的”：摧毁伊朗的力量投射能力——导弹、无人机、海军和核设施。完成这些目标可能还需几周时间，届时军事行动将告一段落。
美国无法直接决定政治结果，但可以明确：任何新政府如果希望获得制裁豁免，必须同意不恢复这些能力。同时，美国和以色列空军可继续在伊朗上空巡逻。这可能是危机后新的常态——一个被削弱但受到遏制的伊朗。
但即便如此，这一局面至少还需数周才能实现。
美国、以色列及更广泛的防御联盟正在进行一场有明确军事目标的系统性军事行动，重点打击伊朗在该地区的力量投射能力。政治目标仍不明确，且无论如何不应抱有不切实际的期望。未来一周，经济因素和霍尔木兹海峡可能成为主导议题。
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Week 2 of Iran: Military momentum meets economic and political reality
2026-03-08T22:32:39.366Z / CNN
Brett McGurk is a CNN global affairs analyst who served in senior national security positions under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden.
Two days into the Iran crisis, I assessed 10 key indicators I’d be watching over the coming week. Now entering the second week of the crisis, it’s time to reassess and examine what’s risen or fallen in importance.
Let’s review them in the same order with a refreshed assessment.
The United States and Israel have increased air dominance across Iran. We should anticipate military operations to intensify over the coming week. This will mean a focus on not just the missiles and launchers, but the production facilities and infrastructure that produce Iran’s missiles and drones, as well as its nuclear facilities. The Trump administration has not ruled out a ground operation, perhaps focused on enriched uranium buried in Esfahan, more than 250 miles south of Tehran. That would be highly risky, and may not be possible without further degradation of Iran’s military power.
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In sum, the military campaign is settling in for a period of weeks — not days. This will not be a short war.
After losing dozens of its top leaders, including slain ruler Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran appointed an interim leadership council under its president, chief justice and a senior cleric. Under Iran’s constitution, this council holds the reins of power until a new supreme leader is appointed.
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Inside the precision strikes that shattered Iran’s leadership
2:41 • Source: CNN
Inside the precision strikes that shattered Iran’s leadership
2:41
On Saturday, Iran’s president, Masoud Pezeshkian, released what appears to be a hastily produced video declaring that attacks on neighboring countries would stop, unless the US struck Iran from those countries. Within hours, however, attacks against the Gulf countries restarted, including a drone targeting Dubai’s airport.
This suggests either a breakdown in command-and-control within Iran, a power struggle within senior circles, or a refusal within some units to follow the orders of this temporary council.
Iran’s leaders later scrambled to project cohesion. Later on Saturday, Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran’s equivalent to the US National Security Council, insisted the interim council was in charge, and early Monday in Iran, the country announced a new supreme leader.
Early Monday, Iranian state media announced that Khamenei’s 56-year old son, Mojtaba, was selected as Iran’s next supreme leader — its third since the 1979 revolution. This is likely to prolong the war even further. If Trump was hoping for a Venezuela-like leadership change, with a new leader willing to deal with the US, it will not be Mojtaba, who is known as an ideological hard-liner with deep ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
However, it’s unclear whether Mojtaba will succeed in consolidating power. He’s relatively unknown, has never spoken publicly, and has never held an official government position. The Islamic Republic also rose to power in 1979 in opposition to a hereditary monarchy, one reason Mojtaba was thought not to be a leading contender.
So, while Iran has named new leader, it’s too early to predict how long Mojtaba will be able to govern — presuming he even survives this war.
We spoke last week about the importance of targeting Iran’s missile launchers, without which the country is unable to prepare larger salvos of strikes. US and Israeli forces appear to have had some success in this mission. Iranian missile launches decreased by 90% over the week, according to US Central Command, and most are now being intercepted. The fewer missiles in the sky, the fewer interceptors needed to take them down.
Iran’s drones remain a challenge, they are more plentiful and easier to launch from nearly anywhere inside Iran. Drone attacks are down by 86%, according to Central Command, but some continue to sneak through air defenses. Decreasing drone launches will be a key indicator over this second week.
Iran’s decision to attack the Gulf states has continued to backfire on Tehran.
Iran had hoped that by pressuring these influential countries, they would in turn pressure Washington to stop attacks inside Iran. The opposite has happened. The prevailing view in Gulf capitals is that while these countries may not have chosen this war, now that it’s started — the US must carry the military plan to its conclusion.
Speaking for the first time during a tour of a hospital to visit wounded, the president of United Arab Emirates warned Iran that his country has “thick skin and bitter flesh,” and vowed to “emerge victorious from this war.” Quietly, multiple militaries are now working together in the skies over the Middle East, which was not the case when the operation began. Several Gulf states have stated they reserve the right to respond against Iran in self-defense, and this week could see these countries striking back against Iran.
Farther afield, Iranian attacks against British and French facilities in the region triggered Paris and London to cooperate with the US, including granting access to bases and the deployment of French and UK military assets to the region.
In sum, Iran has grown more isolated over the last week, and the US has enhanced the cooperation it’s receiving from allies and partners. Given the complexity of this operation, Trump should welcome the increasing support. Berating the UK’s prime minister as too late, which Trump did on Saturday, serves no purpose.
- Russia and China
Iran for years has claimed strategic alliances with Russia and China, believing that one or both would support the country in a moment of distress. Iran has directly supported Russia’s war in Ukraine, presuming that Russia would return the favor when Tehran was in need. From public view, however, neither Moscow nor Beijing has lent more than rhetorical support to Iran.
CNN reported late in the week that Russia is providing targeting information to Iran against American ships, albeit with little apparent effect. If that’s true, it should carry repercussions from Washington, perhaps with increased support for Ukraine. Trump is unlikely to do that, but it would be the best response to ensure Moscow halts whatever it might be providing to the Iranians.
As for China, it is nowhere to be seen in this crisis — and given its dependence on oil through the Strait of Hormuz, cannot be happy with Iran’s decisions to threaten the passage. Trump is scheduled to visit Beijing at the end of the month — an opportunity, should he choose it, to press China on its support for Iran’s missile and drone programs. By the time Trump visits, there may be little left of those programs inside of Iran.
To understand Iran, one must understand its so-called “Revolutionary Guards.” The IRGC — as its name implies — “guards” the revolution, including through suppression of the Iranian people who demand a new system. But the IRGC is also tasked with spreading the revolution abroad through terrorism and support for proxy groups that foment instability across the Middle East. That is the job of the IRGC’s “Quds Force,” and we should presume it’s been tasked with acts of terrorism abroad, including within our borders. Iran’s intent often outstrips its capabilities, however, and thus far we have not seen any such acts carried out.
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McGurk: Iran is trying to ‘create this sense of mayhem and chaos’
4:14 • Source: CNN
McGurk: Iran is trying to ‘create this sense of mayhem and chaos’
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We should hope and presume that the Department of Homeland Security, FBI and the US intelligence community are working together and with foreign counterparts to detect and disrupt any emerging threats. The UK last week arrested four operatives reportedly planning attacks on behalf of Iran.
As a reminder of the threat the IRGC has posed even within our borders, a federal jury on Friday convicted an Iranian intelligence agent, Asif Merchant, tasked from Tehran with assassinating senior political leaders in the United States, including President Donald Trump. Merchant was arrested and convicted under the Biden administration.
The key indicator now may not be military or political — but economic. Twenty percent of global energy trade passes each day through the Strait of Hormuz. Since this conflict began, ships have largely not transited the narrow passage due to fears of Iranian attacks. Insurance rates for these ships have skyrocketed, together with global oil prices, which surged 35% over the past week. This was one of the sharpest spikes in history.
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What’s at stake with the Strait of Hormuz
5:55 • Source: CNN
What’s at stake with the Strait of Hormuz
5:55
If this problem is not solved soon, Gulf producers will run out of storage room and be required to shut their taps — further jeopardizing future supply. We should expect prices to continue to rise this week, building political pressure on the White House to either wind down the military operation before its conclusion, or find a way to reassure shippers transiting the Strait. Cutting the military campaign short mid-stream might be the worst outcome of all — leaving behind a wounded but intact Iranian regime with residual missile and nuclear capabilities.
The White House is scrambling to find solutions. Late last week, it announced a $20 billion insurance facility to backstop risk, as well as suspended sanctions on ships stranded with 140 million barrels of oil heading for India.
Given the criticality of this issue, the US military may need to get involved in helping to protect the Strait and risks to slow-moving tankers. This happened before, during the Reagan administration, when the US Navy protected transit — but it’s a much harder mission now, given Iran’s armed with drones that travel over one thousand kilometers and can be launched from anywhere across Iran.
So, keep a close eye on this space, perhaps the most significant strategically over the coming week.
Briefings from US military leaders this week stressed that US military power is building as Iran’s is rapidly diminishing. That equation by the day increasingly tilts against Iran as the United States and Israel degrade its ability to project power outside of its borders. That does not, however, impact Iran’s ability to project power inside its own borders — against its own people.
Thus, on the current trend line, we are likely to see an Iran with massively degraded military power but without the regime change that many are hoping to see. Changing political outcomes from air power alone is not a viable military task.
The lack of a natural endpoint is what makes the campaign unlike anything Trump, as commander in chief, has presided over across his two terms. However, heading into the second week, we can begin to see how this might conclude. The Pentagon sought to clarify last week that it has “discrete and scoped” objectives: destroy Iran’s power projection capacity — missiles, drones, navy and nuclear facilities. It would likely take a few more weeks to prosecute all of those targets. At that point, the military campaign would have run to conclusion.
The United States cannot direct political outcomes, but it can make clear that any new government — if it wants sanctions relief, for example — must agree not to restore those capabilities. All the while, US and Israeli air forces can continue patrolling Iranian skies. That may be the best case for a new normal after all of this — a weakened and contained Iran.
But even that outcome is weeks away at least.
The United States together with Israel and a broader coalition in defense is now prosecuting a methodical military campaign with defined military objectives focused on Iran’s power projection in the region. Political objectives remain unclear and should be unambitious in any case. Over the coming week, it’s the economic factor and the Strait of Hormuz that might emerge as the dominant issue.
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