前五角大楼官员表示，仅靠威慑已不再足够
摩根·菲利普斯报道
福克斯新闻
2026年2月18日，美国东部时间下午4:54发布
关于美国导弹防御的辩论正越来越聚焦于太空领域，国防专家认为，在导弹发射后最早时刻阻止威胁，可能决定美国本土能否抵御俄罗斯和中国不断扩大的武器库。
在一场纪念”金穹顶”本土防御计划推出约一周年的政策讨论会上，前高级国防官员表示，美国不能再主要依靠威慑和报复来保护国家免受导弹攻击。
“我认为地理因素已不再是盾牌，”前空军副部长卡里·宾根在周五的C-SPAN小组讨论中表示，”现在存在各种类型的威胁可以抵达本土。”
[特朗普推出”金穹顶”导弹护盾，令关键参议员措手不及]
“金穹顶”计划源于2025年1月唐纳德·特朗普总统签署的一项行政命令，该命令指示五角大楼加速开发下一代本土导弹防御架构。该命令要求整合现有的地基拦截器、先进跟踪网络、新型天基传感器，以及可能具备在飞行早期探测和摧毁弹道导弹、巡航导弹和高超音速导弹威胁能力的天基拦截器。
政府官员将这一努力描述为对俄罗斯和中国快速现代化的回应。
俄罗斯已部署新型洲际弹道导弹和高超音速滑翔飞行器，旨在突破导弹防御系统；中国近年来则扩大了核武库并建造了数百个新型导弹发射井。
两国均大量投资于机动再入飞行器和反制措施，旨在复杂化美国的拦截工作。
早期拦截导弹
支持加强太空层防御的人士认为，在导弹飞行早期拦截——即在其能够部署核弹头或反制措施之前——可以简化防御挑战，并减轻靠近美国本土系统的压力。
“它使我们能够在威胁抵达本土之前就将其中和，”导弹防御专家托马斯·卡拉科表示，他指的是太空能力能够在威胁轨迹的早期阶段对其进行跟踪并可能实施拦截。
卡拉科称，天基拦截器”不仅针对非核攻击，甚至针对有限核攻击”都有”令人信服的理由”，他认为提高对手发动打击的门槛可以整体加强威慑。
“如果你提高对手进行有意义投资所需的能力门槛，这其中存在好处，”他说。
小组成员强调，目标并非绝对防御数千枚洲际弹道导弹，而是提高挫败较小或更有限攻击的几率，包括可能涉及大规模齐射或先进反制措施的攻击。
威胁正在演变
前五角大楼高级官员梅丽莎·达尔顿表示，导弹和无人机在最近的冲突中使用已日益常态化，降低了实际使用的门槛。
“它们不尊重边界，”达尔顿指出导弹和无人机攻击日益频繁，”这降低了人们对攻击使用的心理门槛。”
宾根认为，美国历史上严重依赖报复威胁来阻止攻击，但不断变化的技术和对手能力需要更广泛的应对方法。
“美国人可能会惊讶于我们有多么依赖脆弱性和报复，”她说。
太空与整合挑战
虽然天基导弹防御系统曾因成本和技术障碍受到质疑，但卡拉科表示，商业发射和卫星技术的进步已改变了可行性计算。
“这不再是80年代或90年代的苏联，”他说，”技术已经有了相当大的发展。”
不过，专家们承认，整合——以机器速度连接传感器、拦截器和指挥控制系统——可能是最具挑战性的环节。
“我们必须记住这是一个分层防御系统，”宾根说，”我们并不要求太空层系统完成所有任务。”
[五角大楼警告：随着’直接军事威胁’增长，未来战争可能会直接打击美国本土]
与会者还强调，任何重大的本土导弹防御系统扩展都需要两党政治支持，才能在选举周期和预算优先事项变化中持续推进。
“如果你不向人们解释清楚这一计划的意义，它永远不会建成，”卡拉科说。
官员们提出了一个激进的时间表——包括三年内建立初步能力——但”金穹顶”计划仍处于早期开发阶段，大部分工作集中在规划、原型设计和初始合同方面。重大的技术和采购障碍仍然存在，特别是对于任何天基拦截器层，国防官员承认这将需要数年时间才能全面部署。
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这一努力标志着美国应对本土防御方式的重大转变。”金穹顶”计划不再主要依靠中段拦截器和报复威胁，而是旨在在导弹飞行的早期阶段——并向太空更深处推进——就实施防御，目标是在威胁能够部署反制措施或压倒现有系统之前将其阻止。
Missile defense race shifts to space; experts say real battle is in first minutes after launch
Former Pentagon officials say deterrence alone no longer sufficient
By Morgan Phillips
Fox News
Published February 18, 2026 4:54pm EST
The debate over U.S. missile defense is increasingly focused on space, and defense experts argue that stopping threats in the earliest moments after launch could determine whether the homeland remains protected against Russia and China’s expanding arsenals.
At a policy discussion marking roughly a year since the rollout of the “Golden Dome” homeland defense initiative, former senior defense officials said the United States can no longer rely primarily on deterrence and retaliation to shield the country from missile attacks.
“I think geography is no longer” a shield, former Air Force Undersecretary Kari Bingen said during a C-SPAN panel Friday. “There are different types of threats that can reach the homeland.”
[TRUMP UNVEILS ‘GOLDEN DOME’ MISSILE SHIELD, BLINDSIDES KEY SENATORS]
The Golden Dome initiative stems from a January 2025 executive order signed by President Donald Trump directing the Pentagon to accelerate development of a next-generation homeland missile defense architecture. The order calls for integrating existing ground-based interceptors with advanced tracking networks, new space-based sensors and potentially space-based interceptors capable of detecting and defeating ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missile threats earlier in flight.
Administration officials have framed the effort as a response to rapid modernization by Russia and China.
Russia has fielded new intercontinental ballistic missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles designed to penetrate missile defenses, while China has expanded its nuclear arsenal and constructed hundreds of new missile silos in recent years.
Both countries have invested heavily in maneuverable reentry vehicles and countermeasures intended to complicate U.S. interception efforts.
Stopping missiles early
Supporters of a stronger space layer argue that intercepting a missile early in flight — before it can deploy warheads or countermeasures — simplifies the defensive challenge and reduces the strain on systems closer to U.S. territory.
“It gives the ability to neutralize before they manifest here at home,” missile defense expert Thomas Karako said, referring to space-enabled capabilities that could track and potentially intercept threats sooner in their trajectory.
Karako said there is “a compelling case” for space-based interceptors “not just against nonnuclear attack but even limited nuclear attacks,” arguing that raising the threshold for adversaries contemplating a strike strengthens deterrence overall.
“If you raise the threshold for having enough capability to meaningfully invest in enemies … there’s goodness in there,” he said.
Panelists emphasized that the objective is not absolute protection against thousands of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but improving the odds of defeating smaller or more limited attacks, including those that could involve large salvos or advanced countermeasures.
Threats are evolving
Melissa Dalton, a former senior Pentagon official, said missile and drone use has become increasingly normalized in recent conflicts, lowering the perceived threshold for employment.
“They don’t respect the boundaries,” Dalton said, noting the growing frequency of missile and drone attacks.
Bingen argued that the U.S. historically leaned heavily on the threat of retaliation to deter attacks but that changing technologies and adversary capabilities require a broader approach.
“Americans would be surprised how reliant we have been on vulnerability and retaliation,” she said.
Space and integration challenges
While space-based missile defense once drew skepticism due to cost and technical hurdles, Karako said advances in commercial launch and satellite technology have changed the feasibility calculus.
“This is not the Soviet Union in the ’80s or the ’90s,” he said. “The technology has evolved quite a bit.”
Still, experts acknowledged that integration — linking sensors, interceptors and command-and-control systems at machine speed — may be the most difficult challenge.
“We have to remember this is a layered defense system,” Bingen said. “We’re not asking the space layer to do it all.”
[PENTAGON WARNS FUTURE WARS MAY HIT US SOIL AS ‘DIRECT MILITARY THREATS’ GROW]
Participants also stressed that any major expansion of homeland missile defense will require bipartisan political support to endure through election cycles and shifting budget priorities.
“If you don’t persuade people what it’s about, it will never be built,” Karako said.
Officials have floated an aggressive timeline — including a three-year push to stand up initial capabilities — but the Golden Dome is still in early development, with much of the work focused on planning, prototypes and initial contracts. Significant technical and acquisition hurdles remain, particularly for any space-based interceptor layer, which defense officials acknowledge would take years to fully field.
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The effort marks a broader shift in how the U.S. approaches homeland defense. Rather than relying mainly on midcourse interceptors and the threat of retaliation, Golden Dome is designed to push defenses earlier in a missile’s flight — and further into space — with the goal of stopping threats before they can deploy countermeasures or overwhelm existing systems.
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