美国常务副国务卿托马斯·迪南诺表示，中国于2020年6月22日在罗布泊试验场进行了产生当量的核试验
摩根·菲利普斯 | 福克斯新闻
2026年2月17日 美国东部时间凌晨6:00发布
国务院指控中国2020年进行了产生当量的核试验，这一指控在美国国内重新引发了关于美国是否应该继续数十年核试验暂停政策的辩论。
美国官员警告称，北京可能正准备进行“数百吨级”的试验——这种规模凸显了中国核武器现代化进程的加速，也使得将北京纳入军控谈判的努力变得更加复杂。
特朗普称，在与习近平会面后，美国将重启核武器试验，指责竞争对手的行动
负责军控与国际安全事务的美国副国务卿托马斯·迪南诺近日表示，美国有证据表明中国在其罗布泊试验场进行了核爆炸试验。
“我可以透露，美国政府知道中国进行了核爆炸试验，包括准备进行数百吨当量的试验。”迪南诺在联合国裁军会议上表示。
他补充说，“中国在2020年6月22日进行了一次此类产生当量的核试验。”
迪南诺还指责北京使用“解耦”技术——在地下洞穴中引爆装置以减弱地震冲击波——来“掩盖其活动”，使其难以被世界发现。
中国外交部否认了这些指控，指责华盛顿将核问题政治化，并重申北京一直自愿暂停核试验。
但这一指控加剧了关于核查、威慑以及美国核武库管理计划（该计划依赖先进模拟而非实际核爆炸）在大国核竞争重新加剧的时代是否依然足够的质疑。
为何小型核试验难以探测
探测小型地下核试验长期以来一直是军控领域最棘手的问题之一。
与冷战时期大规模的大气层核爆炸不同，现代核试验都是在地下深处进行。如果一个国家使用所谓的“解耦”技术——在大型地下洞穴中引爆装置以减弱地震冲击波——那么产生的信号会显著减弱，使得难以将其与自然地震活动区分开来。
这一缺陷在《全面禁止核试验条约》（中国签署但未批准）的讨论中已经争论了数十年。即使是相对小型的地下爆炸也能提供有价值的武器数据，同时仍然难以探测。
“如果你在大型地下洞穴中引爆一个装置，你可以显著削弱其地震特征，”德克萨斯公共政策基金会首席国家倡议官、前五角大楼官员查克·德沃尔表示，“这使得有把握地探测变得更加困难。”
模拟是否足够？
中国1996年签署了《全面禁止核试验条约》，但尚未批准，该条约也从未生效。中国一直自愿暂停核试验——而此次产生当量的核爆炸将违背这一承诺。
随着中国扩大其核武库且主要军控框架步履维艰，冷战时期“信任但核查”的原则正面临越来越大的压力。
“此时，军控界应该彻底失去信誉，”德沃尔表示，他认为政策制定者不应假设西方的克制会得到北京的回报。
几十年来，美国一直依赖核武库管理计划——先进的计算机建模和模拟——来确保其武器在没有爆炸试验的情况下保持可靠性。德沃尔警告称，如果竞争对手进行实际核爆炸，这种方法可能不再足够。
“这个问题假设我们只生活在一个技术世界中，”他告诉福克斯新闻，“在竞争对手‘违反他们签署的每一项条约’的情况下，仅依赖模拟可能会让美国落后。”
德沃尔还指出了他所谓的日益严峻的体制性挑战。
“几乎所有有过直接核试验经验的人现在都已退休，”他说，“重建这种专业知识需要数年时间。”
但并非所有核专家都认为重启核试验是解决办法。
核不扩散政策教育中心执行主任亨利·索科尔斯基警告称，恢复实际核爆炸将比当前体系的批评者所暗示的要复杂得多，成本也高得多。
“当量测试不是一个魔法开关，”索科尔斯基表示，“如果你想要有意义的可靠性数据，你不会只做一次测试——你需要做很多次。”
他指出，美国在冷战期间进行了1000多次核试验，建立了一个现在支撑该计划的庞大数据库。他认为，重启这一过程可能需要数年的准备和大量资金才能产生战略效益。
“这场辩论不是支持核武器与反对核武器的问题，”索科尔斯基说，“而是关于技术上的必要性和经济成本。”
武器机构内部的争议
索科尔斯基表示，这种分歧甚至延伸到了美国核武库内部。
“当然，在我们喜欢使用计算的主要实验室之一——也就是劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室——他们会说你很可靠，”他提到对先进模拟和流体动力学建模的信心。
另一些人则更重视经验验证和保留实际核试验的选择。
他说，这种争议不是意识形态上的，而是技术性的——集中在置信水平、成本和长期战略规划上。
盟友与可信度问题
这一影响远超华盛顿和北京之间的双边关系。
索科尔斯基警告称，如果对美国的决心或能力产生怀疑，“延伸威慑”（美国在核保护伞下承诺保卫盟友）的可信度可能会受到影响。
“他们会认为你会保卫他们吗？”索科尔斯基说，“如果他们不这么认为，那么无论你的武器多么可靠，延伸威慑都不会很好地发挥作用。”
日本和韩国等盟友长期以来依赖美国的核保障，而非建立独立的核武库。任何关于这种平衡正在转变的看法都可能使地区稳定和长期核不扩散努力复杂化。
政策十字路口
目前，美国实验室主任继续证明，美国核武库在没有爆炸试验的情况下仍然安全、可靠。但战略与国际研究中心核问题项目主任希瑟·威廉姆斯表示，竞争对手的持续试验——尤其是缺乏透明度——可能会改变这一计算。
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“如果俄罗斯和中国继续进行核试验活动而不提供某种透明度，那么技术界可能会做出不同的评估，”她说。
美国政策制定者面临的辩论不仅仅是是否恢复核试验，而是在何种条件下核试验才能真正加强威慑，而非加速竞争。
特朗普此前曾表示，美国应该“在平等的基础上”确保核试验，尽管他的政府尚未正式宣布政策转变。
2025年10月，特朗普暗示美国应考虑“在平等基础上”恢复核武器试验，并表示如果其他国家在试验，“我想我们也必须进行试验”。
总统没有澄清他是否指的是全面核爆炸试验（美国自1992年以来未进行此类试验），还是其他形式的不涉及核爆炸的试验。任何恢复核爆炸试验的举动都将是美国政策的重大转变。
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US nuclear testing debate reignites after State Dept alleges China nuclear test
Under Secretary Thomas DiNanno said China conducted yield-producing test at Lop Nur site June 22, 2020
By Morgan Phillips | Fox News
Published February 17, 2026 6:00am EST
The State Department’s allegation that China conducted a yield-producing nuclear test in 2020 is reigniting debate in Washington over whether the United States can continue its decades-long moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.
U.S. officials warned that Beijing may be preparing tests in the “hundreds of tons” range — a scale that underscores China’s accelerating nuclear modernization and complicates efforts to draw Beijing into arms control talks.
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Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno said recently that the United States has evidence China conducted an explosive nuclear test at its Lop Nur site.
“I can reveal that the U.S. government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons,” DiNanno said during remarks at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.
He added that “China conducted one such yield-producing nuclear test on June 22 of 2020.”
DiNanno also accused Beijing of using “decoupling” — detonating devices in ways that dampen seismic signals — to “hide its activities from the world.”
China’s foreign ministry has denied the allegations, accusing Washington of politicizing nuclear issues and reiterating that Beijing maintains a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing.
But the accusation has sharpened questions about verification, deterrence and whether the U.S. stockpile stewardship program — which relies on advanced simulations rather than live detonations — remains sufficient in an era of renewed great-power nuclear competition.
Why small nuclear tests are hard to detect
Detecting small underground nuclear tests has long been one of the thorniest problems in arms control.
Unlike the massive atmospheric detonations of the Cold War, modern nuclear tests are conducted deep underground. If a country uses so-called “decoupling” techniques — detonating a device inside a large underground cavity to muffle the seismic shock — the resulting signal can be significantly reduced, making it harder to distinguish from natural seismic activity.
That vulnerability has been debated for decades in discussions over the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which China signed but never ratified. Even a relatively small underground detonation can provide valuable weapons data while remaining difficult to detect.
“If you detonate a device inside a large underground cavity, you can significantly attenuate the seismic signature,” said Chuck DeVore, chief national initiatives officer at the Texas Public Policy Foundation and a former Pentagon official. “That makes it much harder to detect with confidence.”
Are simulations enough?
China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 but has not ratified it, and the treaty has never entered into force. It has maintained a voluntary testing moratorium — a commitment that a yield-producing detonation would contradict.
As China expands its nuclear arsenal and major arms control frameworks falter, the Cold War principle of “trust but verify” is under growing strain.
“The arms control community should feel thoroughly discredited at this point,” DeVore said, arguing that policymakers should not assume Western restraint will be reciprocated by Beijing.
For decades, the U.S. has relied on the Stockpile Stewardship Program — advanced computer modeling and simulations — to ensure its weapons remain reliable without explosive testing. DeVore warned that this approach may no longer be sufficient if competitors are conducting live detonations.
“The question presupposes that we only live in a technical world,” he told Fox News, arguing that relying solely on simulations while rivals “cheat at every treaty they’ve ever signed” risks leaving the United States behind.
DeVore also pointed to what he described as a growing institutional challenge.
“Virtually everyone who had direct experience with live testing is now retired,” he said. “Rebuilding that expertise would take years.”
But not all nuclear experts agree that resuming testing is the answer.
Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, cautioned that a return to live detonations would be far more complex and costly than critics of the current system suggest.
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“Yield testing isn’t a magic switch,” Sokolski said. “If you want meaningful reliability data, you don’t do one test — you do many.”
He noted that the United States conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests during the Cold War, building a deep database that now underpins the program. Restarting that process, he argued, would likely require years of preparation and significant funding before yielding strategic benefits.
“The debate isn’t pro-nuclear weapon versus anti-nuclear weapon,” Sokolski said. “It’s about what’s technically necessary and what’s economical.”
A debate inside the weapons complex
Sokolski said the disagreement extends even within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
“Certainly at one of our major labs that likes using calculations — that’s Livermore — they would say you’re home,” he said, referring to confidence in advanced simulations and hydrodynamic modeling.
Others place greater weight on empirical validation and preserving the option of live testing.
The dispute, he said, is not ideological but technical — centered on confidence levels, cost and long-term strategic planning.
Allies and the credibility question
The implications extend beyond Washington and Beijing.
Sokolski warned that the credibility of “extended deterrence” — the U.S. commitment to defend allies under its nuclear umbrella — could come under strain if doubts grow about American resolve or capability.
“Do they think you’re going to come to their defense?” Sokolski said. “If they don’t, it doesn’t matter how reliable your weapons are, extended deterrence isn’t going to work very well.”
Allies such as Japan and South Korea long have relied on U.S. nuclear guarantees rather than pursuing independent arsenals. Any perception that the balance is shifting could complicate regional stability and long-standing nonproliferation efforts.
The policy crossroads
For now, U.S. lab directors continue to certify that the American arsenal remains safe, secure and reliable without explosive testing. But Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said sustained testing by competitors — particularly absent transparency — could alter that calculus.
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“If Russia and China continue their nuclear testing activities without providing some sort of transparency, then the technical community might make a different assessment,” she said.
The debate confronting U.S. policymakers is not simply whether to test, but under what conditions testing would meaningfully strengthen deterrence rather than accelerate competition.
Trump previously has suggested the U.S. should ensure testing “on an equal basis” with competitors, though his administration has not formally announced a policy shift.
Trump in October 2025 suggested the U.S. should consider resuming nuclear weapons testing “on an equal basis” with other powers, and at one point said that if others were testing, “I guess we have to test.”
The president did not clarify whether he meant full nuclear explosive detonations, which the U.S. has not conducted since 1992, or other forms of testing such as delivery system evaluations that do not involve nuclear explosions. Any return to explosive testing would represent a significant shift in U.S. policy.
The White House did not immediately return a request for comment.
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